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NIST Research on UOCAVA Voting. Andrew Regenscheid National Institute of Standards and Technology http://vote.nist.gov. Overview. EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting Overview of UOCAVA Threats Report Current Work. EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -1.
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NIST Research on UOCAVA Voting Andrew Regenscheid National Institute of Standards and Technology http://vote.nist.gov
Overview EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting Overview of UOCAVA Threats Report Current Work
EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -1 • Help America Vote Act - EAC to study electronic transmission of ballots • National Defense Authorization Act FY2005 - EAC guidelines on electronic absentee voting • Military and Overseas Voting Empowerment Act- Pilot Project
EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -2 • NIST conducting research to support EAC’s efforts on UOCAVA voting • Scope of current NIST research focused on security • New security issues introduced by UOCAVA voting • Past NIST research on usability, accessibility, reliability, software assurance, etc., would apply to UOCAVA voting systems
EAC/NIST Involvement in UOCAVA voting -3 • Past Work • A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems • Current Work • IT Security Best Practices for UOCAVA Voting Systems • Best Practices for Securing the Electronic Transmission of Election Materials • Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting
UOCAVA Report Overview -1 NISTIR 7551: A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems Report looks at using different technologies for all aspects of UOCAVA voting Splits voting process into three stages Voter Registration/Ballot Request (e.g, FPCA) Ballot Delivery Ballot Return
UOCAVA Report Overview -2 • Five transmission methods considered for each stage • Postal Mail • Telephone • Fax • Electronic Mail • Web-based (e.g., web sites)
UOCAVA Report Overview -3 • Threat analysis performed for each transmission option at each stage • Analysis based on NIST SP 800-30 RiskManagement Guide for Information Technology Systems • Identified mitigating security controls, where possible • Both technical and procedural controls • Security controls taken from NIST SP 800-53 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems
Initial Conclusions -1 Registration and Ballot Request • Main concern: handling/transmitting sensitive voter information • Threats to electronic transmission can be mitigated through technical controls and procedures • Threats to e-mail and web-based systems pose greater security challenges
Initial Conclusions -2 Blank Ballot Delivery • Main concerns: reliable delivery, integrity of ballots • Threats to electronic transmission can be mitigated through technical controls and procedures • Electronic ballot accounting more difficult than with physical ballots
Initial Conclusions -3 Voted Ballot Return • Main concerns: reliable delivery, privacy, integrity of voter selections • Electronic methods pose significant challenges • Fax presents fewer challenges, but limited privacy protection • Threats to telephone, e-mail, and web voting are more serious and challenging to overcome
Current Work -1 IT Security Best Practices for UOCAVA Voting Systems • Minimal set of best practices applicable to all UOCAVA election system components • Intended to help jurisdictions and manufacturers develop better systems and supporting procedures • Based on NIST guidelines for federal IT systems • Will include best practices on user authentication, cryptography, system hardening, and network security • Expected draft for public comment: 1st quarter of 2010 Page 12
Current Work -2 Best Practices for Securing the Electronic Transmission of Election Materials • Collected UOCAVA election procedures from multiple jurisdictions • Will document security best practices for using e-mail and web sites for ballot requests and ballot delivery • Augments EAC’s existing best practices for UOCAVA voting • Expected draft for public comment: 2nd quarter of 2010 Page 13
Current Work -3 Security Considerations for Remote Electronic UOCAVA Voting • Research document that will define security objectives for remote electronic voting • Will identify security issues that can or cannot be solved with current technology • Purpose to inform future work on remote electronic voting • Expected release: 2nd quarter of 2010 Page 14
NISTIR 7551: A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems available at: http://vote.nist.gov UOCAVA Report