Authority and Democracy

1. Authority and Democracy Authority and Expertise

2. Three requirements for a Theory of Political Obligation Universality: everyone living on the territory of the state has a duty to obey the law Particularity: political obligation involves a duty to obey the laws of a particular state (the one to which we belong); Generality: political obligation involves a prima facie obligation to obey all the laws of the state any time we are in a position to do so Raz rejects Universality and Generality. (Particularity?)

3. Practical Authority • When does X have practical authority over Y? • When does X have the power to create a moral obligation for Y to do what X says by issuing a directive? • Under what conditions does Y have good reasons to subject his own will to that of X?

4. Practical authority vs Theoretical authority Practical authority (e.g. the state) ≠ Theoretical authority (e.g. doctors) but Raz: Theoretical and practical authority ‘share […] the same basic structure’ (MoF, p. 53). We can ground practical authority certain types of expertise. NB: Raz is not talking only about political authority

5. Pre-emptive Reasons Practical authority provides its subjects with pre-emptive (or exclusionary)reasons. Pre-emptive reason: a (first order) reason to act in accord with the content of the directive + a (second-order) reason to exclude fromdeliberation reasons we might have not to act in accord with the directive Subjects to the Authority are supposed to replace the reasons they might have for not acting as the directive requires them to.

6. Service conception of Authority When are we justified in treating someone’s directives as providing us with exclusionary reasons? Raz: when doing so will help us to conform to the balance of reasons that already applies to us. Three theses: • Dependence Thesis • Normal Justification Thesis • Pre-emption Thesis

7. Dependence Thesis In order for a directive to be authoritative, it must reflect reasons that already apply to the subject of the directive (‘dependent reasons’) [Traffic law] NB: • The subject does not need to know that she has those reasons • The subject might not acknowledge their existence once it is communicated to her • “being in the service of the subject” ≠ “being in the interest of the subject” (sometimes we have moral reasons to act against our interests, e.g. military authority) A is “in the service of the subject” = A helps the subject to act in accordance to reasons that already apply to her

8. Normal Justification Thesis NJT: the normal way to establish that X has authority over Y is to show that Y is likely better to comply with the reasons which apply to her if she takes X’s directives as binding and tries to follow them, rather than trying to act on the reasons that apply to her directly. NB: “normal” vs “only” Piecemeal account: • Different subjects will be in different relationships with the same authority (≠ Universality) • X might be an authority with respect to some areas but not others (≠ Generality)

9. Pre-emption thesis Pre-emption Thesis: Dependent reasons are replaced by the reasons created by the authority. They are not added to them. Authorities do not have the right to impose independent duties (that do not tract dependent reasons).

10. Justifying the pre-emption thesis Dependence Thesis → Pre-emption Thesis Authoritative directives ultimately derive their force from the considerations that justify them (dependent reasons). They cannot be balanced with dependent reasons, as that would be a form of double-counting. Normal Justification Thesis → Pre-emption Thesis X has legitimate authority over Y only if it would be rationally unacceptable for Y to rely on his own deliberation. If the NJT is valid, Y should treat its reasons as pre-emptive because failing to do so would involve deliberating..

11. Mistakes NB. Directives are not binding only when they successfully track dependent reasons. “An authority is justified … if it is more likely than its subjects to act correctly for the right reasons. … If every time a directive … fails to reflect reasons correctly, it were open to challenge as mistaken, the advantage gained by accepting the authority as a more reliable and successful guide to right reason would disappear” (MoF, p. 61)

12. Independence Condition NB: NJT is not sufficient to establish authority. It is also necessary that the matter about which the subject is deliberating ‘‘is not one on which it is more important that people should decide for themselves than that they should decide correctly’’ (Raz 1989: 1180). (Is this necessary to state this as a further condition? In all cases in which the condition applies presumably the NJT would not grant authority anyway)

13. Applying NJT to political authority • In certain domains PA has greater expertise (safety of pharmaceuticals) • PA is generally less prone to biases, temptations, self-deception • Often trying to follow the right reasons can be self-defeating (time-consuming, tiring etc.). Following rules or directives can be more efficient. • PA saves us time energies in deliberation • Certain outcomes (such as those that require coordination) can be achieved only through the action of an authority

14. Examples • There is more than one way of realizing a certain goal, but no reason to prefer one over another (is it better to pay taxes quarterly, monthly or every six months). • Coordination problems (which side of the road to drive) • Prisoner’s dilemma situations (individual rationality pushes us to act in ways that are suboptimal or harmful, which could be avoided if we were to follow the authority).

15. Objection # 1 (The role of exclusionary reasons) NJT shows that subjects do better at complying with the right balance of reason when they treatauthoritative directives as exclusionary reasons. It does not show that the directives actually are exclusionary reasons (S. Darwall). Raz’s reply: Subjects are only justified in treating authoritative directives as exclusionary when they actually are exclusionary reasons. (Compare instrumental reasons.)

16. Objections #2 (Exclusionary vs Weighty Reasons) Exclusionary reasons seem to lead to unacceptable results (nurse example). Why not think of authoritative directives as creating particularly weighty reasons? Raz’sreplies: a) this would involve double counting b) The reason for having authorities is to help us in deliberating about issues we might not be in the best position to deliberate about. Treating the directive as a weighty rather than exclusionary reason won’t help, as we’d still be required to do deliberate. NB This reply is convincing only if you accept the NJT. If the reason why the directive is binding is not that it enables you to track the correct balance of reasons when you act (but, say, the fact that you consented to the authority), double-counting is not a problem

17. Objection #3 (To whom do we owe obedience?) Darwall, Perry: Raz’sview cannot explain why our duty to obey is owed to the authority and why the authority has the power to demand that we comply. (Since the point of the service conception is simply to get us to comply with reason better).