Selected documents

1. Origins of the Cold War Selected documents

2. Molotov's Speech, 31 August 1939 about singing the ‘The Molotov-Ribentrop Pact, 1939 Why did the Soviet Union conclude a pact with Germany in 1939? • Problems with Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations for the conclusion of a pact of mutual assistance against aggression in Europe • A denial of Poland to admit the Soviet military assistance • A need to establish good neighborly relationship with Germany

3. Tehran Conference, 1943: Memorandum on Conversation between Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, 30 November, 1943 What were the major points of agreement and conflict between the Big Three at the Teheran Conference in 1943? Poland: agreement of all the participants – Poland should be friendly to the Soviet Union and its “division” is enviable. Disagreement: the line of division; Germany: agreement of all the participants – Germany must be parted into several small weak states.

4. Tehran Conference: Roosevelt-Stalin Meeting What did Roosevelt recommend Stalin to implement in Eastern European states? The president – referendum, Stalin – “in accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could not agree to any form of international control.”

5. Memorandum from the Maisky Commission to Molotov, January 1944 What does the Maisky’s memorandum reveal about Soviet plans for post-war Europe? • Germany and Poland –are permanent problems • we could cooperate with the USA, Great Britain

6. W. Churchill’s recounts about meeting with Stalin in Moscow, October 1944 and famous ‘percentage agreement ‘with Stalin What do you think was the significance of the Stalin-Churchill’s October agreement?

7. Kennan’s telegram from Moscow, 22 February 1946/The Novikov Telegram Evaluate Kennan’s and Novikov’s appraisal of Soviet and American foreign policy conduct? Kennan: ‘we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi [way of living together] that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure.” (USSR is a threat for inside life of the U.S.) Novikov: Careful note should betaken of the fact that the preparation by the United State for a future is being conducted with the prospect of war against the Soviet Union, which in the eyes of the American imperialists is the main obstacle in the path of the United States to world domination. (US is main threat for USSR in international arena)

8. Stalin's Reply to Churchill Did Stalin have a convincing answer to the accusations in Churchill’s speech about Iron Curtain?

9. Report, "American Relations With The Soviet Union" by Clark Clifford, September 24, 1946. What kind of measures did Clifford suppose to ‘prevent additional Soviet aggression’? Restraint the Soviet Union by military means

10. Zhdanov on the Founding of the Cominform, September 1947 What was the purpose of the Cominform when it was founded in September 1947? To stop a crusade against the USSR announced by the U.S.

11. German question: from friendly to hostile division

13. What is “German question” in the reality of 1950s • During the 2 WW and during the initial cold war context: • How to divide and create new a weak, agrarian, demilitarized Germany>> The Big Three – created the discourse about 1) “Zones”, 2) reparations 3) democratization of “Zones” + 4) high authority and free hands of zonal military administration.

14. What is “German question”? 2. In historiography: It is process of finding the answers on the following questions: • Why the allies could not unify Germany or why they did not want to do it? • Who was responsible for the long division of nation? >>

15. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 I) 1943-45: • The idea to divide and to weaken (Tehran conference) was suitable for both Soviets ad Americans: • Stalin – to prevent a new aggression • Roosevelt – to give Germans a lesson • Dissent voices: • Moscow: European Advising Commission, London: a Soviet draft of unification after short period of democratization by the Allied Control Council, 1944 • Washington: Department of States: to integrate Germany in West world • Potsdam conference, August 1945: • Soviet demands for huge reparations will be later against Marshal plan; • Too much authority was attributed to the Zonal military administrations; • Indefinite words about future unification.

16. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 II) 1945-1946: the chances for unification have been lost: • Zones with independent administrations, where own, uncoordinated reforms were imposed • Development and reinforcing the political parties >> communists\social-democrats • Absent of a native German government like it was in Japan; • Soviet high demands reparations from American Zone; • James Burns’ speech about development of the democracy in One Zone. • Now in literature: Stalin was ready to change the implantation of the Western style of the democracy in East Part for getting huge reparations from the West Zones + • Stalin was against to build a socialism in the Zone until 1952

17. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 III) 1947-1949: • Marshal Plan and European economic integration became against Soviet reparations received from the West Zone >> to keep own Zones • Bizone- unification of British and American zones and independent currency reform, 1947-1948 and Trizone >> West German federal state • European military alliance with the U.S. became against demilitarizating and weakening Germany >> to keep own Zone • As s result, the currency reform in Western parts of Germany, + and Berlin blockade, 1948-1949 >> • The edge of American-Soviet war in Germany. • “A disintegrated atom created a divided Germany” • Formal establishment of FRG and GDR, 1949

18. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 IV) 1950-52 • Domestic affairs in two parts: positive economic development against economical crisis; Strong democratic parties against unpopular communist parties >> • Stalin’ diplomatic note, March 12, 1952 : • This is letter + a draft of German Peace Treaty; • Neutrality and unification with withdrawal of all military forces.>> • Answer of the West: April 2, 1952 • Referendum for neutrality and unification • Independent elections • USA were not ready to unify Germany, because W. Germany had become a part of north-Atlantic defense system;

19. Two citations from documents • Note as a Soviet draft for German Peace Treaty: “….Germany is re-established as a unified state, all armed forces must be withdrawn…” • Department of States memorandum about potential German Unification: “the U. S. is likely to unify Germany as a part of European Defense Community, and we should avoid the talks with the Soviet Union…”

20. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 IV) 1950-52 • A meeting with the German communists, April 1952 • Stalin pushed them to build a socialist state Problem in historiography: generous step or propaganda? • No answer. • Two opinions: • Stalin was afraid of West Germany as a member of a new West military alliance >> any Germany, but neutral Germany was suitable for him • A pure bluff

21. German question: the turning points, 1943-61 V) 1953-1961: the rejection to unify Germany, because all participants were interested in keeping what they have obtained • New concept elaborated by the Soviet leadership - German question is not international problem but it is the question of German people >> • Berlin crisis 1958 -1961: • Khrushchev’s ultimatum: to start talks about peace treaty with Germany and Free Berlin; • Khrushchev built the wall during one night, august 1961 • From 1961 Soviet Union began process of building the socialist society in GDR. • 1964: the Treaty with East Germany

22. What is “German question”: historiography ANSWERS: • Concept of complete impossibility to resolve the GQ • Concept of untapped (missed) chances • Responsibility approach Shared points of view: 1) The Big Three did not elaborate the acceptable political formula and mechanism how to unify the Zones before Marshal plan, 1947 and Blockade of Berlin, 1948; 2) The Soviet leadership should not blamed alone for the division, because its activity was more consistent to the previous agreements, but the West initiated new politics like EU, Marshal Plan, NATO with including Trizone.

23. Homework Analysis of documents: reading and questions File “ Documents_2”

24. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins • 3 major interpretations regarding the origins of the Cold War: 1) the orthodox interpretation - a responsibility for the breakdown of the wartime Grand Alliance to the Soviet Union: • Stalin expanded communism in Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East, and • The U.S. had no choice but to check Soviet expansionism. • So, ideological clash Soviet historians - the United States exaggerated any threat the Soviet Union may have posed to the United States at the end of World War

25. 1 famous alternative view in orthodox: Hans Morgenthau and Arthur Schlesinger Jr. • traditional goals of Russian expansionism, rather than communist ideology, was premises for the Cold War; • Americans failed to appreciate the nature of Stalin's ambitions, • and the Soviets could not understand the cause of American sensitivity. >> • the Cold Wary was the product of mutual misunderstanding. • Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, The Origins of the Cold War (1970)

26. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins 2) Revisionist (Gabriel Kolko): • Economic factor - the Truman administration supported for a interventionist strategy designed to make the world safe for American capitalism: • global open door policy of equal trade, • investment opportunity, • private enterprise, • multilateral cooperation in foreign commerce • freedom of the seas

27. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins: revisionists • The Soviet Union: did not want to subordinate its economic system • Losing control in countries with strong communist parties resulted in American support of conservative establishments. Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (1972)

28. Final assessment of the Cold War Origins • 3) post-revisionism (John Gaddis): • both internal and external influences important in explaining the breakdown of the Grand Alliance: • domestic politics, • bureaucracy, • personality, • specific perceptions of Soviet intentions

29. Final conclusion of N. Tsvetkova • ideological differences are insufficient to explain the Cold War after World War II • Soviet and American interests now collided as both nations attempted to fill the power vacuum created by the collapse of Germany and Japan: Europe, Asia • Misunderstanding: Russian political expansionism clashed with American global economic policy