DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Background, Requirements, and Overview

1. DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Background, Requirements, and Overview • Steve Bennett, Ph.D. • Risk Assessment Program Manager • Department of Homeland Security Committee on Methodological Improvement to the Department of Homeland Security’s 2006 Bioterrorism Risk Assessment 28 August 2006

2. A Brief History of DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment • Spring 2003: DHS (and NBACC) stand up • Fall 2003: Requirement for a “Biological ‘Threat’ Assessment” provided to the Biological Assessment Support Center (BASC) within NBACC. • November 2003 – March 2004: Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) approach kicked off to produce the required ‘threat assessment’ • 2 large subject matter expert (SME) workshops (~ 200 SMEs) • 4 taxonomically-divided workshops (~50 SMEs each) • Extensive biological threat agent data collected • Extensive lists of biological agent experts for a number of biological threat agents generated and stored. • April 2004: HSPD-10, Biodefense for the 21st Century published

3. A Brief History of DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (cont.) • Based on HSPD-10, a new process was initiated

4. Bioterrorism Risk Assessments are an Integral Part of the DHS Biodefense Mission “…We need to adopt a risk-based approach in both our operations and our philosophy. Risk management is fundamental to managing the threat… The most effective way to apply risk-based approach is by using the trio of threat, vulnerability and consequence as a general model for assessing risk and deciding on protective measures we undertake.” - Michael Chertoff, Secretary, DHS “…the United States requires a continuous, formal process for conducting…assessments to guide prioritization of…investments in biodefense-related research, development, planning, and preparedness.” - Biodefense for the 21st Century

6. Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Include Both Likelihood and Consequence Components Likelihood is defined as the probability that an adversary acquires, produces, and disseminates a biological weapon Consequence is defined as the expected public health impact of a biological attack

7. Current Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Build Upon Previous Assessments • United States CDC’s Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents– based largely on public health consequence • United States Army Medical Risk Assessment of the Biological Threat– focused on force health protection and included only medical/public health criteria Bioterrorism risk assessments must be ‘end-to-end,’ integrating likelihood and consequences of bioterrorism events

8. Bioterrorism Risk Assessments Must Incorporate a Wide Range of Inputs and Accommodate Significant Uncertainty FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

9. Dissemination Efficiency Agent Release Modeling Agent Mass Mitigation Response Disease Spread RISK Threat Group Target Agent Production AGENT RELEASE Dispersion Mitigation Scenario Consequences Bioagent Scenario Probability Agent Risk Ranking Selection Probability Selection Probability Selection Probability Event Detection Initiation Frequency Event Tree Quantification Overview of the 2006 DHS Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Approach

10. The DHS Integrated Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Is Anchored by a PRA-based Approach • Ability to adjust parameters to address different questions • Ability to query system at consequence level of interest

11. The Risk Analysis Produces a Family of Risk Curves That Can Be Summarized in a Number of Ways

12. The Risk Assessment Generates Three Primary Products FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13. Biological Threat Agents Can Be Evaluated by Comparing Relative Risk

14. Dissemination Efficiency Agent Release Modeling Agent Mass Mitigation Response Disease Spread RISK Threat Group Target Agent Production AGENT RELEASE Dispersion Mitigation Scenario Consequences Bioagent Scenario Probability Agent Risk Ranking Selection Probability Selection Probability Selection Probability Event Detection Initiation Frequency Event Tree Quantification Overview and Structure of the Committee Meeting Presentations

15. The National Academies Will Play an Important Role in the Bioterrorism Risk Assessment Program • DHS is committed to a transparent process that provides for iterative update and improvement to its risk assessment approaches. • NAS/NRC review of the risk assessment is important to ensure a quality product and provide critical recommendations for future assessments. • NAS/NRC review and evaluation of the 2006 assessment: • Near-term comments and recommendations needed in time to impact the 2008 assessment. • Longer-term review will impact the program as a whole as well as specific assessments starting in 2010 and beyond.