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Economics of Transition. MA EITEI, May 2009. Tom áš Konečný Email: tomas .konecny@cerge-ei.cz , Mobile: 724 875 504 Course webpage: http://home.cerge-ei.cz/tkonecny Office hours: After class or by arrangement Exam: June 24 th , 2009, start 10am Exam grading: Final exam
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Economics of Transition MA EITEI, May 2009
Introduction Tomáš Konečný Email: tomas.konecny@cerge-ei.cz, Mobile: 724 875 504 Course webpage: http://home.cerge-ei.cz/tkonecny Office hours: After class or by arrangement Exam: June 24th, 2009, start 10am Exam grading: • Final exam • 1 formal model (25%) • 3 non-technical questions covering lectures (25% each)
Monday May 25th – 1st part Introduction and brief intro on Czech Transition
Monday May 25th –2nd part Plan vs. Markets, the Role of Institutions General incentive issues: • *Hayek, F. A. (1945): The Use of Knowledge in Society. AER, 519 – 530. • *Kornai, Janos (1986): The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30. Theories of institutions: • Bardhan, Pranab (2000): The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory, in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by Gerald Meier and James Rauch, 359-360. • Akerlof, George (1984): A Theory of Social Custom, in An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales, 69-100. Markets and Social Institutions: • Binmore, K. and A. Shaked (2007): Experimental Economics: Science or What?, available at else.econ.ucl.ac.uk/papers/uploaded/263.pdf • Bowles, Samuel (1998): Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions, Journal of Economic Literature, 36(1), 75-111. • Gintis, Herbert (2009): The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences, Princeton University Press.
Tuesday May 26th - 1st part Output Output fall • *Roland, G.,: Liberalization and Output Fall, Transition and Economics, MIT Press, 2000, Chapter 7, pp. 153-170. • Roland, G., and T. Verdier, Transition and the Output Fall, Economics of Transition, vol. 1, 1999, 1-28.
Tuesday May 26th –2nd part The Politics of Reforms under Uncertainty • *Roland, G.,: Understanding the Politics of Reforms under Uncertainty , Transition and Economics, MIT Press, 2000, Chapter 2, pp. 25-37.
Wednesday May 27th - 1ST part Governments Government capacity and failure • *Chapter IX in Leading Issues in Economic Development, ed. by Gerald Meier and James Rauch, 421-514 ONLY Note IX.B.1, Selections IX.B.1-2, Selections IX.C.2 and IX.C.4. Empirical evidence • La Porta et al. (1998): The Quality of Government, NBER Working Paper # 6727
Wednesday May 27th – 1ST part Governments Corruption in transition context • Treisman D. (2000): The causes of Corruption: A cross-national study. Journal of Public Economics, 76, 399-457. • *Bardhan B. (1997): Corruption and Development. Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 35, 1320 -1346. • Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W. (1993): Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 599-617. • Hellman J.S., Jones G., Kaufmann D. (2000): Seize the state, seize the day: State capture, corruption and influence in transition. World Bank Policy Research Paper 2444.Washington DC. • Slinko I., Yakovlev E., Zhuravskaya E. V. (2003): Institutional subversion: Evidence from Russian regions. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4024. • Sonin K. (2003): Why the rich may favor poor protection of property rights. Journal of Comparative Economics 31, 715-731.
Wednesday May 27th – 2nd part Firms Privatization • Boycko, Maxim, Andrei Schleifer and Robert Vishny (1994): Voucher Privatization. Journal of Financial Economics, 35(2), pp. 249-266. • Svejnar, Jan and Miroslav Singer (1994): Using Vouchers to Privatize and Economy: The Czech and Slovak Case. Economics of Transition 2, 43-64. FDI • Bevan, A.A., Estrin S. (2000): “The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition Economies”. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2638 • Javorcik, B.S. (2004): "Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of Spillovers through Backward Linkages," American Economic Review, vol. 94(3), pages 605-627.
Wednesday May 27th – 2nd part Firms Barriers toentrepreneurship • Johnson, Simon, John McMillan and Christopher Woodruff (2000): Entrepreneurs and the ordering of institutional reform, Economics of Transition, 8 (1), 1-36. • Pissarides, Francesca, Miroslav Singer and Jan Svejnar: Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria, The William Davidson Working Paper • Lizal, Lubomir and Jan Svejnar (2002): Investment, Credit Rationing, and the Soft Budget Constraint: Evidence from Czech Panel Data. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2): 353-370.
Friday May 29th – 1st part Labour Human capital • *Munich, D., Svejnar, J., and K.Terrell: “Returns to Human Capital under the Communist Wage Grid”, The William Davidson Institute WP # 272, December 1999. • *Brainerd, E.,: “Winners and Losers in Russia's Economic Transition,” American Economic Review, 88(5), December 1998, 1094-1116. Labor mobility • Sorm, V., and K.Terrell: “Sectoral Restructuring and Labor Mobility: The Czech Republic,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 28(3) 431-455, Sept. 2000. • Sabirianova, K,: “The Great Human Capital Reallocation: Russia,” The William Davidson Institute WP # 309, 2000.
Friday May 29th – 2nd part Labour Unemployment • Ham, J. C., Svejnar J,. and K, Terrell, “Unemployment and the Social Safety Net During Transitions to a Market Economy: The Czech and Slovak Republics,” AER 88(5), 1998, 1117-1142. • Lehmann, H., J. Wadsworth and A. Acquisti , Grime and Punishment: Job Insecurity and Wage Arrears in the Russian Federation, Journal of Comparative Economics, 27(4) 595-617, Dec. 1999.