1 / 42

Sandro Bologna - ENEA bologna@casaccia.enea.it progettoreti.enea.it Workshop – AICT

E NTE PER LE N UOVE TECNOLOGIE L’ E NERGIA E L’ A MBIENTE. Alcune iniziative di ricerca in Europa e in Italia sul ruolo della ICT nella Protezione delle Infrastrutture Critiche. Sandro Bologna - ENEA bologna@casaccia.enea.it http://www.progettoreti.enea.it Workshop – AICT

meena
Download Presentation

Sandro Bologna - ENEA bologna@casaccia.enea.it progettoreti.enea.it Workshop – AICT

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. ENTE PER LE NUOVE TECNOLOGIE L’ENERGIA E L’AMBIENTE Alcune iniziative di ricerca in Europa e in Italia sul ruolo della ICT nella Protezione delle Infrastrutture Critiche Sandro Bologna - ENEA bologna@casaccia.enea.it http://www.progettoreti.enea.it Workshop – AICT Roma 25 Settembre, 2008

  2. Organisational Layer Intra-dependency Cyber Layer Inter-dependency Physical Layer Three Layers Model for the Critical Infrastructure Increasing importance of the “Cyber Layer” and “Inter-dependency”

  3. Current Structure of the Electrical System in Europe TransmissionNational /International SubtransmissionRegional Distribution System Low Voltage

  4. Meter DSO 2 TSO DSO 1 Microgrid G2 DGop 2 G3 Meter Communicationnetwork Communication control local area 2 Gx DGop n Communication control local area 3 Gy DSO n Microgrid DGop 1 Meter Power grid Communication control local area 1 storage storage storage G1 Demand response Demand response Demand response InformationCommunicationcontrol Microgrid Bulk gen. Power flow Integrated infrastructures for active network operation

  5. FP7 IST Theme Directorate General INFSO (Security) Directorate General INFSO (Internet; network and information security) FP7 EU Policy and Research in CIP-CIIP FP7 SECURITY Theme Directorate General ENTR (Security Research and Development) EPCIP Directorate General JLS (Policy) Policy Joint R&D

  6. Geographical allocation of CIIP R&D relevant initiatives 44 nationaland 28 EU co-funded(CI2RCO Project 2006) Notice that EU projects are counted for each participating country

  7. National initiatives – overview(CI2RCO Project 2006)

  8. Geographical distribution of partners into the 28 EU co-funded initiatives(CI2RCO Project 2006) 57% of the partners from 4 countries

  9. CONCLUSIONS FROM GAP ANALYSIS (1/4) (CI2RCO Project 2007) #1CIP/CIIP is still a very immature field of research #2 There is not yet a real community of researchers - even if there is an increasing large number of actors interested on but not converging #3This is partially due to the absence of a clear policy, both EU and MS, about CIP/CIIP and a clear vision of what “concretely" are CIP/CIIP, which are their goals, constraints and boundaries

  10. CONCLUSIONS FROM GAP ANALYSIS (2/4) (CI2RCO Project 2007) #4The majority of Member States have neither a Strategic Plan on CIIP nor a Specific R&D Program #5 The majority of the R&D activities are funded under different labels, from IT security to Border Control. Moreover, there is a set of different Agencies promoting this kind of initiatives, often with limited coordination #6National initiatives of MS are inhomogeneous in economical dimensionand time span #7 In several MS Ministries of interior or defence are in charge to coordinate national initiatives

  11. CONCLUSIONS FROM GAP ANALYSIS (3/4) (CI2RCO Project 2007) #8Stakeholders involvement appears largely deficient. They shown an application oriented vision strongly related to their own infrastructure and business framework, with a limited attention on border elements and trans-domain consequences #9 In several countries important CI stakeholders appear quite completely absent from the scenario and there is a limited participation from infrastructure's controllers providers (SCADA providers) #10Stakeholders initiatives are mainly focused on the risk analysis aspects more than in the technology development to master and shape the future development of their infrastructures

  12. CONCLUSIONS FROM GAP ANALYSIS (4/4) (CI2RCO Project 2007) #11Most of the partners for the EU-funded projects are from a small number of EU Countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands) and in particular from the same organisations. #12 Strong need to better harmonize EU participation among the Member States because CIIP is a trans-national problem, increasing with globalisation and complexity #13Strong need to stimulate R&D involvment and funding from Industrial Stakeholders, Regional and National Governments #14Strong need to create a European Research Area on CIIP

  13. A Feedback from 1st CI2RCO ConferenceRome, 30 March, 2006 Too many roadmaps and strategic projects instead of projects from which I can really benefit in daily environment (source: energy provider)

  14. Addressing the safety and security issue: the ENEA SAFEGUARD approach OBJECTIVE Development of a network of software components (Agents) to increment the survivability of information intensive critical infrastructures as the electrical transport and distribution networks, during attacks, intrusions, or anomalies caused by network instabilities. REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE A supervisory and control system (SCADA) of the electrical transmission network

  15. Other LCCIs Foreign electrical networks Communication networks ------------------- High level agents Network protection at global level Negotiation agent MMI agent Correlation agent Action agent Topology agent Low level agents Network protection at local level Network statemonitors Intrusion Detection wrappers Anomaly detector agents Actuators Control system of electrical network (RTUs & Control Centers) Home LCCIs Commands and information Only information SAFEGUARD multi-agent architecture

  16. CCN Area 1 Event sequences checking agent Area 3 SIA-C SIA-C SIA-R SIA-R SIA-R SIA-C Area 2 Invariant checking agent Communication ports checking agent RTU state hybrid detector IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM CCR CCR Supervisory and Control System Communication Network RTU RTU RTU Electrical system physical layer Information Network Remote Units Data concentrators Control Centers Power transport network Loads Substations Generators

  17. ENEA Testing Platform of SAFEGUARD Technology emulation on a local network of the components belonging to a SCADA distributed system RTU 1 Message “broker” RTU 2 TEST PLATFORM Attacks/faults Console RTU 3 design running log/document Hybrid detector for State Estimation (Checking Invariants) RTU n Event sequences hybrid detector (Case Base reasoning) Safeguard high level agents (correlator, action ect.) Communication hybrid detector (Data Mining technique) Electrical load-flow simulator (e-Agora) SCADA Control Center National Network Data Base (National DB) Network Data Base (Gegional DB) Low Level Agents SCADA Control Center Regional RTU state hybrid detector (Neural Network) SCADA data exchange bus

  18. ENEA TEST PLATFORM OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGY

  19. Addressing the cascading failures issue: the ENEA IRRIIS approach OBJECTIVE: Provide a technology (named MIT, Middleware Improved Technology) which will reduce the risk of cascading failures caused by interdependency between Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCI) MIT system will support information sharing between LCCIs operators to augment their mutual situational awareness. MIT system will support negotiation and coordinated actions between neighbouring systems for the establishment of effective and optimal measures; REFERENCES INFRASTRUTTURES: An electrical distribution network A public voice/data tele-communication network

  20. Interdependencies between Tlc Net and Electrical Net Electric. Net Tlc Net Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Networks

  21. Other Data Bases Electrical Data Base Overall IRRIIS MIT architecture Communication Components Inter LCCIs data exchange Add-on Components LCCIs Data Bases & Alarm logs Telecom Data Base LCCI 1 LCCI n LCCI 2

  22. The Italian IRRIIS Scenario MANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURES Electrical Distribution Networks Telecommunication Networks

  23. Electricity Simulator Electricity MIT Add-on Telecom MIT Add-on LCCI Electricity Data Base IRRIIS - Physical set-up of the experimentation environment Telecom SCADA Emulator Electrical SCADA Emulator Telecom Simulator LCCI Telecom Data Base Optional External Components SimCIP MITcommunication ElectricalControlRoom Telecom ControlRoom

  24. View of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEA Telecom monitoring panel Electricity monitoring panel Local attacker Telecom Local attacker Electricity Global attacker Telecom network simulation Electrical network simulation SCADA emulation Power backup simulation Logger Local LAN Local LAN MIT components Electricity MIT components Telecom MIT communication channel Test Bed communication channel Experimentation Archive Experimentation SERVER Local LAN Additional analysis tools Experimentation GUI

  25. Addressing the cascading failures issue: the MICIE approach

  26. CESI RICERCA communication network electricity grid Critical Utility InfrastructurAL Resilience http://crutial.cesiricerca.it FP6-2004-IST-4-027513 CRUTIAL is a RTD Project in the area of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection launched by the European Union under the Information Society Technologies priority of the Sixth Framework Programme. The project addresses new networked ICT systems for the management of the electric power grid, in which artefacts controlling the physical process of electricity transportation need to be connected with information infrastructures, through corporate networks (intranets), which are in turn connected to the Internet. CRUTIAL’s innovative approach resides in modelling interdependent infrastructures attempting at casting them into new architectural patterns resilient to both accidental failures and malicious attacks Objectives • Investigation of models and architecturesthat cope with openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities infrastructures • Analysis of critical scenarios which ICT faults provoke serious impact on the controlled electric power infrastructures • Evaluation of distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of the power grid Work Packages WP1 Identification and description of Control System Scenarios WP2Interdependencies modelling WP3Testbed development WP4 Architectural solutions WP5 Analysis and evaluation of Control System Scenarios WP6 Dissemination WP7 Management

  27. Addressing the communication resilience in power control systems: the CESI Ricerca CRUTIAL approach OBJECTIVE to develop therepresentative control algorithms in the testbedsintegrating the electric power system and the information infrastructure REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Grids Control and Data Networks for Operation and Maintenance activities

  28. scenario 1: DSO teleoperation use of public IP backbone for DSO supervision and control assessredundantcommunication architecture assess vulnerabilitiesof standard protocols and impact on control scenario 2: interaction between TSO/DSO in emergency assess defense plan actuation (automatic load shedding) assess securityof the TSO-DSO communications evaluate the impact ofattacksin emergency conditions scenario 3: integration of DSO operation & maintenance process control and corporate intranet integration evaluate the impact ofattacksandfault propagation scenario 4: ICT maintenance of control infrastructures assess remotefunctional testing and operations on ICT devices assess remotereconfiguration of the substation automation Telecontrol testbed - Control system scenarios

  29. Telecontrol testbed – scenario 1b Scenario 1b: DoS attack implementation Control System Scenarios • Simulation of a DoS attack to a Centre router/gateway by TSP insider 1- TSP insider starts attack 2 - Communication bandwidth reduction 3 - Communication backup line PSTN Backup 4 - Loss of remote supervision and control functions of all controlled substations from the primary Centre

  30. Telecontrol Testbed at CESI Ricerca

  31. The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of different Simulation Tools supporting (inter)dependencies simulation The “proof of concepts” is based on a limited number of scenarios built upon a process of knowledge elicitation from the stakeholders Addressing the Interdependencies modelling and simulation issue: the ENEA CRESCO approach • The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of computational layers supporting the Simulation Platform • The goal is to assess major advantages/disadvantages deriving from the use of HPC GRID, in particular ENEA-GRID • The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of the basic problems with Federated Simulation • The “proof of concepts” is based on a limited number of Simulators (CISIA, CIAB, eAgora, NS2, Omnet)

  32. USERS/GIS INTERFACE ENEA CRIAI MIDDLEWARE (Request Management) CAMPUS BIOMEDICO Agent-based model Entity – Resource Model Tor Vergata CRIAI MIDDLEWARE (SIMULATORS INTERFACE) TELECOMM NETWORK SIMULATOR POWER GRID SIMULATOR Infrastrutture n SIMULATOR ENEA

  33. CRESCO Simulation Platform running on the top of ENEA GRID Agent-based model Entity-Resource model Power Grid Simulator Telecomm Network Smulator CRESCO middleware ENEA GRID layer

  34. DIESIS ARCHITECTURE Design of an Interoperable European federated Simulation network for critical InfraStructures Public transportation traffic simulator @CRIAI Railway traffic simulator @TNO Power Grid simulator @ENEA Network Simulator @ICL User @IAIS DIESIS middleware GRID layer

  35. NEISAS – National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System Funded by EC DG JLS EPCIP 2008 program Objective: deployment of a prototype of a National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System Partners: ENEA, Italian Cabinet Office, UK Home Office, UK CPNI, Dutch NICC, Booz & co, Symantec 35

  36. MS3I – Messaging Standard for Sharing Security Information Funded by EC DG JLS EPCIP 2007 program Objective: Definition of an Information Sharing framework for exchanging alerts and reports on new vulnerabilities, threats, incidents and good practices Partners: Symantec, AIIC, Polizia Postale (C.N.A.I.P.I.C.) Stakeholders: National CIP centres, CERTs, CI operators in 15 countries 36

  37. ECCRAMM – Energy Control Centre Risk Analsysis and Management Methodology Funded by EC DG JLS EPCIP 2007 program Objective: deployment of Risk Management methodology to protect Energy Control Centres Partners: Symantec, UCTE, 9 UCTE TSOs, Estonian Ministry of Economics, Eesti Energia (Estonian TSO) 37

  38. Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (1/5) • RdS 2006-2008 AdP con MSE: Area “Governo del Sistema” e Area “Trasmissione e Distribuzione” funded by MSE • SECURE: Security of Energy considering Uncertainty, Risk and Economic Implications funded by EU-FP7 • REALISEGRID: REseArch methodoLogIes and technologieS for the effective development of pan-European GRID funded by EU-FP7 • HARRISON: Galileo Time and Synchronization Applications funded by EC/ESA • MORE MICROGRIDS: Advanced Architectures and Control Concepts for Microgrids funded by EU-FP6

  39. Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (2/5) • DERRI: Distributed Energy Resources Research Infrastructure funded by EU-FP7 • DER-LAB: Network of DER LABoratories funded by EU-FP6 • OSN: Osservatorio sulla Sicurezza Nazionale supported by RdS 2006-2008 AdP, funded by MSE • GRID: Coordination Action on ICT vulnerabilities of power systems and relevant defense methodologies funded by EU-FP6 • CRUTIAL: Critical UTility InfrastructurAL resilience funded by EU-FP6 • DAMSE: European Methodology for Dams Security Assessment funded by EU-EPCIP

  40. Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (3/5) • MIA: Methodology for Interdependence Assessment between ICT and electricity infrastructures, funded by EU-EPCIP • ASTROM: ASsessment of resilience to ThReaths of cOntrol and data Management systems of electrical network, funded by EU-EPCIP • ESTEC: Feasibility Study for a European Network of Secure Test Centres for Reliable ICT-controlled Critical Energy Infrastructures, funded by EU-EPCIP • IRRIIS: Integrated Risk reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems, funded by EU-FP6 • MICIE: Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures, funded by EU-FP7

  41. Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (4/5) • CRESCO.LAIII: Sviluppo di Modelli di Simulazione ed Analisi delle Reti Tecnologiche Complesse e delle loro Interdipendenze, funded by MIUR-PON • GIACS: General Integration of the Application of Complexity in Science, funded by EU-FP6 • DIESIS: Design of an Interoperable European federated Simulation network for critical Infrastructures, funded by EU-FP7 • COST MP0801: Physics of Competition, Cooperation and Conflict, funded by ESF 2008 • TeRN: Sviluppo di sistemi di Early-Warning in Val d’Agri, funded by Regione Basilicata

  42. Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (5/5) • NEISAS: National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System, funded by EU-EPCIP • TRAMP: Sistema Integrato di Gestione e Controllo per il TRAsporto in Sicurezza di Merci pericolose, funded by MIUR

More Related