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Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks

http://project.honeynet.org/misc/project.html. Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks. Ashish Gupta Network Security May 2004. Overview. Motivation What are Honeypots? Gen I and Gen II The GeorgiaTech Honeynet System Hardware/Software IDS

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Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks

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  1. http://project.honeynet.org/misc/project.html Use of Honey-pots to Detect Exploited Systems Across Large Enterprise Networks Ashish Gupta Network Security May 2004

  2. Overview • Motivation • What are Honeypots? • Gen I and Gen II • The GeorgiaTech Honeynet System • Hardware/Software • IDS • Logging and review • Some detected Exploitations • Worm exploits • Sage of the Warez Exploit • Words of Wisdom • Conclusions

  3. Why Honeynets ? An additional layer of security

  4. Security: A serious Problem Firewall IDS A Traffic Cop Problems: Internal Threats Virus Laden Programs Detection and Alert Problems: False Positives False Negatives

  5. The Security Problem Firewall IDS HoneyNets An additional layer of security

  6. Properties • Captures all inbound/outbound data • Standard production systems • Intended to be compromised • Data Capture • Stealth capturing • Storage location – away from the honeynet • Data control • Protect the network from honeynets

  7. Two types Gen I Gen II Good for simpler attacks Unsophisticated targets Limited Data Control Sophisticated Data Control : Stealth Fire-walling Gen I chosen

  8. GATech Honeynet System Huge network 4 TB data processing/day CONFIG Sub-standard systems Open Source Software Simple Firewall Data Control

  9. IDS Invisible SNORT Monitor Promiscuous mode Two SNORT Sessions Signature Analysis Monitoring Session 1 Packet Capture DATA CAPTURE Session 2

  10. Data Analysis SNORT DATA CAPTURE Requires human resources All packet logs stored One hour daily ! Ethereal used Forensic Analysis

  11. Detected Exploitations 16 compromises detected Worm attacks Hacker Attacks

  12. DETECTING WORM EXPLOITS Honey Net traffic is Suspicious Heuristic for worm detection:Frequent port scans Specific OS-vulnerability monitoring possible Captured traffic helps signature development

  13. SAGA of the WAREZ Hacker Helped locate a compromised host Honeynet Very difficult to detect otherwise ! IIS Exploit  Warez Server + Backdoor

  14. Words of Wisdom • Start small • Good relationships help • Focus on Internal attacks • Don’t advertise • Be prepared to spend time

  15. Conclusion • Helped locate compromised systems • Can boost IDS research • Data capture • Distributed Honey nets ? • Hunting down Honeypots • http://www.send-safe.com/honeypot-hunter.php

  16. Discussion • The usefulness of the extra layer ? • Dynamic HoneyNets • Comparison with IDS: are these a replacement or complementary ? IDS HONEY NET

  17. IDS vs HoneyNet • IDS – primary function is detection and alerting • Honeynets – use IDS to detect and alert – but nothing is done to control the threat • Primary intent is to log and capture effects and activities of the threat Honeynets do not protect the network – they have protection as a benefit, not intent

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