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TSG-T3 (USIM) meeting #8 Tdoc T3-99248 Bonn 23 - 25 July, 1999. GSM - UMTS Interworking - Mechanisms. Roland Schmitz T-Nova Deutsche Telekom Group 24.8.99. Different Security Levels of UMTS and GSM. GSM No Serving Network (SN) Authentication No Guarantee of Key Freshness
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TSG-T3 (USIM) meeting #8 Tdoc T3-99248 Bonn 23 - 25 July, 1999 GSM - UMTS Interworking - Mechanisms Roland Schmitz T-Nova Deutsche Telekom Group 24.8.99
Different Security Levels of UMTS and GSM • GSM • No Serving Network (SN) Authentication • No Guarantee of Key Freshness • Length of KC 64 Bit • UMTS • Proof of Trust of HE by SN • Guarantee of Key Freshness • Integrity Protection of Signalling Messages • Length of CK, IK 128 Bit
UMTS-GSM Interworking-Scenarios • Roaming • GSIM - Authentication in GSM R1 • GSIM - Authentication in UMTS R2 • USIM - Authentication in GSM R3 • USIM - Authentication in UMTS R4 • HandOver • GSIM HO from GSM to UMTS HO1 • USIM from GSM to UMTS HO2 • GSIM from UMTS to GSM HO3 • USIM from UMTS to GSM HO4
Assumptions • GSIM is unchanged • Challenge RAND is the same in GSM and UMTS • Each HLR/AuC is capable of generating GSM-Triplets and UMTS-AV. • Re-authentication at HO is too time-consuming
Requirements for an Interworking-Mechanism • Every Roaming/Handover - Scenario should be supported • If possible, UMTS-Subscribers should get UMTS-Level Security each time they are connected to a UTRAN => HO 2 (Handover of USIM from GSM to UMTS) is a critical scenario
Mechanisms • Mechanism I (Ericsson) • does not allow for GSIM roaming; not covered here • Mechanism II (Siemens) • HLR/AuC generates UMTS-AV or derives GSM- Triplet via RAND*=RAND, RES* = c1(RES), Kc* = c2(CK), according to type of requesting VLR • UMTS-AV or GSM-Triplett are sent to VLR • On HO from GSM to UMTS or GSIM-Auth. in UMTS GSM-Keys are „stretched“ by UMTS-VLR via CK*=c3(KC), IK*=c4(KC) • No Impact on existing GSM-Infrastructure! • After USIM-Auth. in GSM or after HO to GSM only GSM-level security for UMTS-subscribers
Mechanism II (HO) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK* = c3(Kc*)IK* = c4(Kc*) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK UTRAN CK, IK GSIM USIM GSIM USIM GSM BSS KC Kc Kc* = c2(CK) Kc*=c2(CK) Kc* = c2(CK) HO01 HO02 HO03 HO04
GSIM-Roaming USIM-Roaming GSIM-Roaming USIM-Roaming Mechanism II (Roaming) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK UTRAN CK, IK GSM BSS KC Kc Kc* = c2(CK) R01 R02 R03 R04
Mechanisms • Mechanism III (Siemens) • like mechanism II, but: In HO 4 (USIM HO from UMTS to GSM), UMTS VLR sends the tripel (KC*=c2(CK), CK, IK) to the GSM-VLR • in case of another HO to UMTS the CK, IK can be used again • UMTS-Security after HO2 (if registered in UMTS) • GSM VLRs have to handle UMTS-AVs • On USIM Registration in GSM only GSM-security even after subsequent HO to UMTS
Mechanism III (HO) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK UTRAN CK, IK GSIM USIM GSIM USIM GSM BSS KC Kc Kc* = c2(CK) Kc*=c2(CK) Kc* = c2(CK) HO01 HO02 HO03 HO04
Alternative Mechanisms • Mechanism IIa: (T-Mobil/T-Nova) • HLR/AuC generates UMTS-AVs and GSM-Tripletts and sends both to VLR, regardless if GSM-VLR or UMTS-VLR • on HO both kinds of authentication data are passed on to new VLR • „Maximum“ Security • High Signalling Load • Mechanism IIIa: (T-Mobil/T-Nova) • HLR/AuC generates UMTS-AV and sends them to all VLRs • GSM-VLRs generate derived RES*, KC* via RES*=c1(RES), KC*=c2(CK); on HO the pair (CK, IK) is passed on • „Maximum“ Security • GSM-VLRs have to implement c1, c2
Mechanisms IIa/IIIa (HO) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK CK, IK UTRAN CK, IK GSIM USIM GSIM USIM GSM BSS KC Kc Kc* = c2(CK) Kc*=c2(CK) Kc* = c2(CK) HO01 HO02 HO03 HO04
GSIM-Roaming USIM-Roaming GSIM-Roaming USIM-Roaming Mechanisms IIa/IIIa (Roaming) CK* = c3(Kc)IK* = c4(Kc) CK, IK UTRAN CK, IK GSM BSS Kc* = c2(CK) Kc Kc* = c2(CK) R01 R02 R03 R04