Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Governance: The Theory of Administration by Herbert A. Simon

1. 第三、四講理性：教育管理与治理的实践基础（一）Rationality: Practical Foundation of Educational Management & Governance (1) 華東師範大學 教育管理學系 教育管理与教育治理的实践基础工作坊 21-22 October, 2015

2. Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Laureate in Economics 1978, in his book Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) writes “Administration is ordinarily discussed as the art of ‘getting things done.’ Emphasis is placed upon processes and methods for insuring incisive action. Principles are set forth for securing concerted action from groups of men. In all this discussion, however, not very much attention is paid to the choice which prefaces all action― to the determining of what is to be done rather than to the actual doing. … Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Governance:

4. Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Laureate in Economics 1978, in his book Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) writes “…Although any practical activity involves both ‘deciding’ and ‘doing’ it has not commonly been recognized that a theory of administration should concerned with the processes of decision as well as with the process of action. …The task of ‘deciding’ pervades the entire administrative organization quite as much as does the task of ‘doing’ ― indeed, it is integrally tied up with the latter. … Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Governance:

5. Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Laureate in Economics 1978, in his book Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) writes …. A general theory of administration must include principles of organization that will insure correct decision-making, just as it must include principles that will insure effective action.” (Simon, 1945/1997, p.1) Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Governance:

6. Herbert A. Simon, the Nobel Laureate in Economics 1978, in his book Administrative Behavior (1997/1951) writes … Accordingly, educational administration can be construed as human capacities and efforts of “getting things done” and the “things” in point are of course educational activities. Furthermore, in order to get things done, Simon suggests, two principles must be insured. One is to “decide” what is to be done and the other is to the actual doing. Practical Foundations of Educational Management & Governance:

7. Conceptions of action, project and agency: The capacities and efforts of getting things done can further be divided into the following concepts Action: It refers to human efforts deliberately taken by an agent aiming at fulfilling an anticipated state of affair. It can simply be defined as a single “in-order-to” intention and effort. Project: It refers to a series of actions, which work in a sequence of “in-order-to” intentionality. If all go well, they will probably lead to the fulfillment of the anticipated goal. Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Sciences

8. Conceptions of action, project and agency: …. Agency: It refers to a group of projects methodically organized and undertaken by an agent or a group of agents. It presupposes the agents in point to possess and demonstrate the quality of knowledgeability, rationality, power and reasonability. Knowledgeability: To be knowledgeable, the agent is supposed to have sufficient if not full knowledge of the action or even project to be undertaken as well the environment (both physical and social) in which her project is to be carried out. Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Sciences

9. Conceptions of action, project and agency: …. Agency: … Rationality: To be rational, the agent is supposed to have identified the objective to be attained, to have chosen an effective (or even the most efficient) action plan to be undertaken, and finally to have concrete idea and/or belief of the chance for success. Power: Power refers to the agent’s’ capacities of controlling and mastering the environments, in which the agent is supposed to carry out his project. These capacities include possibilities in mobilize both physical and social resources which can contribute to the success of his project. At the same, they also include ability to avoid and to contain those factors which may hinder and/or jeopardize the possibility of success of his project. Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Sciences

10. Conceptions of action, project and agency: …. Agency: … Reasonability: To be reasonable, the agent will not only have to be rational but must justify her actions and/or project to be socially acceptable. In other worlds, she must provide a normative justification to the public (both partners and audiences) within the respective institutional context. Distinction between Theoretical and Practical Sciences

11. Knowledgablility Rationality Get things done socially Means Ends Social Action, Project, & Agency Power Institution

12. Weber’s ideas of rationality: The concept of rationality has been conceived by Weberians as well as sociologists in general as the mastery concept in Weber’s work. However, “the notion of rationality is far from unequivocal.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 1) As Weber underlines in a footnote to The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, “if this essay makes any contribution at all may it be to bring out the complexity of the only superficially simple concept of the rational.” (Weber, 1958, P. 194, n. 9; quoted in Brubaker, 1984, P.1) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

13. 1864-1920

14. Weber’s ideas of rationality: … In fact, it has been well documented by Weber’s followers that Weber’s specifications of the idea of rationality vary in his empirical studies in different domains of modern society, such as capitalist enterprising and calculation, legal formalism, bureaucratic administration, and asceticism and the ethic of vocation. (e.g. Brubaker, 1984; Collins, 1981; Kalberg, 1980) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

15. Weber’s Rationalization of Education & Training

16. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: In a summary essay of Max Weber’s conception of rationality, Stephen Kalberg’s writes “however much they may vary in content, mental processes that consciously strive to master reality are common to all types of rationality.” (Karlberg, 1980, p. 1159) Taking Kalberg’s conception as a point of departure, we may conceptualized rationality as a state of mind and a mental process, in which modern men are consciously and methodically try to take control different domain of their lives. …. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

17. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: ……. As these conscious and methodical efforts of mastery spread infiltrate into different domains in modern societies, the process of rationalization began to take shape first in Western Europe in the eighteenth century. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

18. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: A number of definitive features have been characterized by Weber in his empirical studies of the rationalization of the occidental societies. Capitalism and calculability and controllability: Weber underlines that the “rational capitalist establishment is one with capitalist accounting, that is, an establishment which determines its income yielding power by calculating according to the methods of modern bookkeeping and the striking of a balance.” (1961, P.207; quoted in Collins, 1981, P927.) …… Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

19. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: A number of definitive features … Capitalism and calculability and controllability: … It implies that calculability is capitalists’ efforts of monitoring carefully and methodically the processes and operations of their production (i.e. the means) in attaining their goal (i.e. profit maximization). Accordingly, capitalists can then be able to have total control over the productive and distributive processes. This in turn can minimize their cost and maximize their profits. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

20. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: A number of definitive features …. Scientific-technical development and knowledgeability: In order to act rationally and to have exact calculation and full control of their actions, modern men are require to possess certain if not full knowledge of the reality that they are supposed to master. They include “knowledge of means-ends relationsand the probable reactions of their physical and social environment to their actions.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 30) The institutions which provides such a knowledge base for the growth of rationalism in modern society are enterprises of scientific and technological research sponsored by both public and private fund. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

21. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: A number of definitive features …. Modern legal system and Formalism: Roger Brubaker underlines that “modern capitalist rationality is rooted in calculability, modern legal rationality in formalism.” (Brubaker, 1984, P. 16) By formalism, it refers to the legal and social orders which are “bound to fixed and inviolable ‘rules of the game’.”(Weber, 1978, P. 811; quoted in Brubaker, P. 17) These social orders and their ‘rules of the game’ will not only provide all their participants with formal and standard guidelines for their calculations and actions but will also render formal devices for settlements of conflicts. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

22. The conceptualization of Weber’s notion of rationality: A number of definitive features …. Predictability: The developments of scientific-technical knowledge, legal formalism, and calculability and controllability of capitalism have greatly enhanced the certainty and predictability of modern men’s capacities of mastery of reality. As a result, predictability has become the core of technical efficiency in most of the domains of modern society. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

23. The Weberian concept of rationality: In summary, Weber and his followers have construed the concept of rationality as a kind of conscious and methodical human efforts, through which human agents can master different aspects of reality (i.e. external world) in knowledgeable, mans-ends calculable, controllable, formalized, and predictable manners. Accordingly, when we say that a man acts rationally, we are in fact measuring the human action in point with Weber’s conception of an “ideal type”. That is, we are assessing the extent to which the action has met with knowledgeability, calculability, controllability, formality, and predictability. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

24. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality To act on & to master The External World Actor Consciously & methodically in knowledgeable, mans-ends calculable, controllable, formalized, and predictable manners Rationality

25. Weber’stypology of rationality: Stephen Kalberg has summarized Weber’s specifications of rationality into four types (1980). They are Practical rationality… Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

26. Weber’s typology of rationality: … Practical rationality: It refers to the human efforts which strive to consciously deal with reality in terms of “individual’s purely pragmatic and egoistic interests”. (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1151) To be practical and pragmatic, it means that a man “accepts given realities and calculates the most expedient means of dealing with difficulties they present.” (P. 1152) “Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man’s capacity for means-ends rational action.” (P. 1152) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

27. Weber’s typology of rationality: … Substantive rationality: “Like practical rationality…, substantive rationality directly orders action into patterns. It does so, however, not on the basis of a purely means-end calculation of solutions to routine problems but in relation to a past, present, or potential ‘value postulate’.” (Kalberg, 1980, P. 1155) By ‘value postulate’, it refers to “entire clusters of values that vary in comprehensiveness, internal consistency, and content. Thus, this type of rationality exists as a manifestation of man's inherent capacity for value-rational action.” (P. 1155) ….. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

28. Weber’s typology of rationality: … Substantive rationality: …. In short, it represents human effort of striving for conscious mastery of reality through ordering action into pattern of priority in accordance with a set of “value postulate”, e.g. Calvinism, Buddhism, Hinduism, communism, or socialism. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

29. Weber’s typology of rationality: … Theoretical rationality (Weber also refers it as intellectual rationality): “This type of rationality involves a conscious mastery of reality through construction of precise abstract concepts rather than action.” (Kalberrg, 1980, P. 1152) This type of rationality can most typically be found in the act of enquiry among philosophers and scientists. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

30. Formal rationality: Formal rationality can be construed as a particular type of practical rationality, which specifically corresponded “with industrialization: most significantly, the economic, legal, and scientific spheres, and the bureaucratic form of domination.”(Kalberg, 1980, P. 1158) “Whereas practical rationality always indicates a diffuse tendency to calculate and to solve routine problems by means-end rational patterns of action in reference to pragmatic self- interests, formal rationality ultimately legitimates a similar means-end rational calculation by reference back to universally applied rules, laws, or regulations.” (P. 1158) Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

31. Weber’stypology of social actions: On the beginning pages of Economy and Society (1978) under the section entitled “Types of Social Action”, Weber writes, (Weber, 1978, P. 24-25) “Social action, like all action, may be oriented in four ways. It may be: (1) instrumentally rational (purposive-rational), that is, determined by expectations as to behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends; Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

32. Weber’s typology of social actions: ……..Weber writes, (Weber, 1978, P. 24-25) (2)value-rational, that is, determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently for its prospects of success; (3)affectual (especially emotional), that is, determined by the actor’s specific affects and feeling states; (4) traditional,that is, determinedby ingrained habituation.” Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

33. This typology has been interpreted by Weberians as classification of social action by descending order in regards to the degree of instrumental rationality. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

34. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality

35. Habermas’ critique of Weber’s conception of rationality and action: In his two-volume work The Theory of Communicative Action (1984 & 1987) Habermas underlines that “Through his basic action-theoretic assumptions Weber prejudice this question in such a way that processes of social rationalization could come into view only from the standpoint of purposive (instrumental) rationality. I would like, therefore, to discuss the conceptual bottleneck in his theory of action and the use this critique as the starting point for analyzing further the concept of communicative action.”(Habermas, 1984, P. 273) ….. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

38. Habermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice that Habermas has accursed Weber’s theory of action mainly fall into two aspects: “It conceptualizes action on the presupposition of exactly one world of existing states of affairs and neglects those actor-world relations that are essential to social interaction.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 274) Within Habermas conception of “actor-world relations”, which he adopts from Piaget’s cognitive development theory, more specifically Piaget’s theory of “decentration of an egocentric understanding of world”, the concept of ‘world’ can in fact be demarcated into “three worlds”. ….. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

39. Habermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice …. …….According to Piaget’s theory, as a human’s cognition develop, his concept of world will simultaneously differentiated into (1) the “subjective world” of the Ego of a human, (2) the “objective world” which consists of “facts”, i.e. “what he regards as existing states of affairs of the objective world”, (3) the “social world” which consists of “certain normative expectations”, i.e. “what he regards as legitimate elements of the common social world.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 69) And what has been neglected in Weber’s conception of actor-world relation is exactly social world or in Habermas conception the “lifeworld”. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

40. Habermas’ critique of Weber’s conception …. The conceptual bottleneck and prejudice …. “As actions are reduced to purposive interventions in the objective world, the rationality of means-ends relation stands in the foreground.”(Habermas, P. 274) As a result, within Weber’s conception of rationality, there is no place for the “communicative rationality” and “communicative action”, which Habermas has delegated a two-volume work of nearly one thousand pages to signify. (1984 and 1987) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

41. Weberian’s Conceptions of Rationality The Objective World Purposive/ Instrumental Rationality To act on & to master Actor (Subjective World) Communicative Rationality To understand & to rearch agreements The Social World (Lifeworld)

42. Habermas’ conceptions of rationality “When we use the expression ‘ration’, we suppose that there is a close relation between rationality and knowledge. Rationality has less to do with the possession of knowledge than with how speaking and acting subjects acquire and use knowledge. In linguistic utterances knowledge is expressed explicitly; in goal-directed actions an ability, an implicit knowledge is expressed. … The close relation between knowledge and rationality suggests that the rationality of an expression (or action) depends on the reliability of the knowledge embodied in it.”( Habermas, 1984, P.8) “Rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking and acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior for which there are good reasons or ground.”(p.22) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

43. Habermas’ classification of rationality Cognitive-instrumental rationality: “A goal-directed action can be rational only if the actors satisfies the conditions necessary for realizing his intention to intervene successfully in the world.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 11) Accordingly, there are two conditions for the success of an teleological (goal-directed) action Cognitive condition: True propositions of the conditions necessary for the realization of the intervention. Instrumental condition: The effectiveness of carrying out the interventions, i.e. teleological actions. Definitionof cognitive-instrumental rationality: “The concept of cognitive-instrumental rationality …carries with it connotations of successful self-maintenance made possible by informed disposition over, and intelligent adaptation to, conditions of a contingent environment.” (p.10) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

44. Habermas’ classification of rationality Communicative rationality: “An assertion can be called rational if the speakers satisfies the conditions necessary to achieve the illocutionary goal of reaching an understanding about something in the world with at least one other participant in communication.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 11) Definition of communicative rationality: “Concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotation based ultimately on the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of argumentative speech, in which different participants overcome their merely subjective view and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld.” (p. 10) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

45. Rationality and the world Realist's objective world: The realist worldview “starts from the ontological presupposition of the world as the sum total of what is the case and clarifies the conditions of the rational behavior on this basis. ...On this model rational actions basically have the character of goal-directed, feedback-controlled interventions in world of existing states of affairs.” (1984, p. 11-12) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

46. Rationality and the world Phenomenologist's lifeworld: “The phenomenologist does not ...simply begin with the ontological presupposition of an objective world; he makes this a problem by inquiring into the conditions under which the unity of an objective world is constituted for the members of a community. The world gains objectivity only through counting as one and the same world for a community of speaking and acting subjects. ...Through communicative practice they assure themselves at the same time of their common life-relations, of an subjectively shared lifeworld. This lifeworld is bounded by the totality of interpretations presupposed by the members as knowledge.” (Habermas, 1984, p. 12-13) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

47. Communicative rationality and theory of argumentation: “I believe that the concept of communicative rationality ...can be adequately explicated only in terms of a theory of argumentation.” (1984, p. 18) “We use the term argumentation for that type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An argument contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic expression.” (1984, p. 18) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

48. Constituents of communicative rationality: By bringing in the theory of argument, Habermas expands his conceptualization of communicative rationality by asserting that In the context of cognitive-instrumental action, “we … characterize as rational speaking and acting subjects who, as far as it lies within their power, avoid errors in regard to facts and means-ends relations. But there are obviously other types of expressions for which we can have good reasons, even though they are not tied to truth or success claims. … Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

49. Constituents of communicative rationality: “In the context of communicative action, we can call someone rational… if he is able to put forward an assertion and, when criticized, to provide grounds for it by pointing to appropriate evidence,… if he is following an established norm and is able, when criticized, to justify his action by explicating the given situation in the light of legitimate expectation… if he makes known a desire or an intention, expresses a feeling or a mood, shares a secret, confesses a deed, etc., and is then be able to reassure critics in regard to revealed experience by drawing practical consequences form it and behaving consistently thereafter.” (Habermas, 1984, P. 15) Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action

50. Constituents of communicative rationality: Accordingly, Habermas has differentiated forms of argumentation and the validity claims of the argument i.e. constituents of communicative rationality as followings Theoretical discourse: It refers to the form of argumentations in which controversies over validity claims of “truth of propositions and/or efficacy of teleological actions” are thematized and if positive settled. Jurgen Habermas’ Theory of Rationality and Action