Wireless Security

1. Cyber Security Spring 2008 Wireless Security

2. 802.11 or Wi-Fi • IEEE standard for wireless communication • Operates at the physical/data link layer • 802.11b – 11Mb/s – 35-100 meter range – 2.5GHz • 802.11a – 54Mb/s – 25-75 meter range – 5GHz • 802.11g – 54Mb/s – 25-75 meter range – 2.5GHz • 802.11n – 540Mb/s – 50-126 meter range – 2.4 or 5 GHz • Wireless Access Point is the radio base station • The access point acts as a gateway to a wired network e.g., ethernet • Laptop with wireless card uses 802.11 to communicate with the Access Point

3. External Security Mechanisms • MAC restrictions at the access point • Protects servers from unexpected clients • Unacceptable in a dynamic environment • Of course MAC isn’t really secure. You can reprogram your card to pose as an “accepted” MAC. • IPSec • To access point or some IPSec gateway beyond • Protects clients from wireless sniffers

4. Basic Wireless Sniffing • Wired cards go into “promiscuous” mode • See all packets that pass on wire even if not destined to that host • Wireless can also go “promiscuous” • See all packets on the associated AP • Can also go into “monitor” mode • See all packets in radio range

5. Wireless under linux • Use iwconfig to control • iwconfig <if> • Use iwlist to get more details • iwlist <if> scanning • Use ifconfig to set IP level information as for a wired interface

6. More sniffing • Can use standard packet sniffers in monitoring or promiscuous mode • Can use wardrive tools to gather greater intelligence • Unadvertised SSIDs • Suspicious behaviour • Weak keys

7. Kismet • One wardriving tool • Press H or h to get to help screen • M or m to mute • Q to quit Kismet. q to quit a current menu • Saves logs in /var/log/kismet • Configuration file in /etc/kismet/kismet.conf

8. Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) • Excellent example of how security system design can go wrong. • Flaws widely published in late 2000 • (In)Security of the WEP algorithm. http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/isaac/wep-faq.html • Unsafe at Any Key Size. Tech. Rep. 00/362 http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/802/11/Documents/ • Took secure elements and put them together poorly • RC4 stream ciphers and per packet initialization vectors • Encrypting 32 bit CRC for message authentication

9. RC4 Stream Cipher • Takes a key value as input and generates a key stream • Key stream is XOR’ed with plaintext to create ciphertext • ci = piki, for i = 1, 2, 3 • Ciphertext is XOR’ed with key stream to create plaintext, • pi = ci ki, for i = 1, 2, 3 • Knowing two of key stream, plaintext, and ciphertext lets you easily compute the third • Reusing a key value is a really, really bad idea. A well known fact for RC4 • Enables trivial attacks if you can inject traffic • Enables somewhat less trivial attacks from passive sniffing.

10. WEP’s use of RC4 • RC4 seed is created by concatenating a shared secret with a 24 bit initialization vector (IV) • Frames can be lost and stream ciphers do not deal with missing bits, so the stream must be reset with each packet. • Therefore, a new IV is sent in the clear with each packet • Since the IV is reset and the IV is only 24 bits, the time to repeat IV’s (and thus keys) with high probability is very short • Randomly select IV’s and probability of reuse pk = pk–1 + (k–1)  1/n (1 – pk–1), where n=2^24 • 99% likely that you get IV re-use after 12,430 frames or 1 or 2 seconds of operation at 11 Mbps. • WEP defines no automatic means of updating the shared key • In practice folks do not frequently update WEP keys • Ideally should be changing shared key after 6 frames to keep low probability of IV collision (99.999% probability of no IV reuse) • RC4 has weak keys • Use of weak keys greatly aid crypto anlaysis • There are standard techniques to avoid the weak keys but WEP does not employee these techniques.

11. WEP CRC Problems • We encrypt the CRC, so it is secure, right? • Wrong. CRC is linear • Flipping bits in the ciphertext can be fixed up in the CRC even if the CRC is RC4 encrypted • This means that an attacker can change the cipher text and fix up the CRC • Cannot do this with crypto hashes used by IKE

12. WEP Active Attacks • Insert known plaintext • Send email (probably forged or annonymized) to someone on the access point and sniff the stream • Knowing both plain and ciphertext getting the key stream for that IV is just an XOR • Sniff both the wireless stream and the wire after the access point • Correlate the two streams to get plan and ciphertext pairs

13. WEP Passive Attacks • Each frame contains one IP packet • Use knowledge about IP headers to get partial key recovery for all packets • XORing ciphertext streams using the same key will result in the XOR of the two plaintext streams • Knowing how plaintext streams differ can help in the analysis • Use natural language facts to determine the likely plain text

14. WEP crackers • Numerous tools will crack WEP given enough traffic • Airsnort • We'll play with airsnort • Wepcrack

15. How do other security protocols avoid these problems? • SSL uses RC4 without these problems • Over a reliable data stream so the 128 bit key does not need to be reset with each packet • Would need to capture 2^64 streams rather than 2^12 streams to get key reuse with 50% probability • New keys potentially change all bits not just the bottom 24 bits. • IPSec has the unreliable transport issues too, but its security has stood up • Uses separate keys in each direction • Uses 64 bit (for 3DES) or 128 bit (for AES) IV’s • Uses the IV as a salt not as part of the key • Forces a rekey after at most 2^32 packets

16. LEAP: One WEP Patch • Cisco and Microsoft driven • Tried to get a fix out to market quickly because of all the flap over WEP • But didn’t get it quite right • LEAP: a Looming Disaster http://www.lanarchitect.net/Articles/Wireless/LEAP/ • Problem is the use of EAP-MD5 • Not appropriate for use over an unsecured physical layer like wireless • MS-Chapv2 is used to protect the credentials and is weak • User name sent in clear • No salt in the hashes • 2 byte DES key • So the sniffer can easily launch an offline dictionary attack • ASLEAP attack tool http://asleap.sourceforge.net/ Implements the attack • One solution is to force your users to use strong passwords • Probably not a good basis for security though • EAP-TLS came out about the same time, but it requires certificate deployment and so was not as popular • EAP-TTLS and PEAP came later and only required access point certificates

17. 802.11i • IEEE effort to improve security of the 802.11 spec • Using 802.1X for authentication • Wi-Fi Alliance promoting interim standards • WPA, a shorter term solution that uses existing hardware • WPA2, an implementation of the full 802.11i standard

18. 802.11i Reading Material • Overview of industry slides from 2003 http://csrc.nist.gov/wireless/S10_802.11i%20Overview-jw1.pdf • Cisco white paper http://cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/wireless/ps430/products_white_paper09186a00800b469f.shtml • Cisco FAQ http://cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns348/ns337/netqa0900aecd801e3e59.html • Recent overview article from Embedded.com http://www.embedded.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=34400002

19. 802.1X • Evolved from PPP authentication • Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) • Not an authentication protocol, but an authentication transport • 802.1X extends EAP mechanisms so they can be used over wires or wireless

20. 802.11i Exchanges

21. Key Management from 802.1x • EAPOL (Extensible Authentication Protocol over LANs) key exchange • 4 way handshake to negotiate pairwise keys • A Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is provided by the authentication server • The handshake negotiates temporal keys and starts the group key negotiation • New session key for each client association • Group key handshake to negotiate group (broadcast) keys • Protocol forces a periodic rekeying of the group keys

22. Key hierarchies

25. Home and Enterprise Modes • Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS) • For small installations (like a home network) • Use pre-shared keys • No authentication server • Extended Service Set (ESS) • For larger installations • Can use pre-shared keys or certificates • Use authentication server

26. Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) • Interim solution to run on existing wireless hardware • Uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) for data encryption and confidentiality • Still uses RC4, 128 bits for encryption • Provisions for changing base keys • Avoids weak keys • Includes Michael a Message Integrity Code (MIC) • 64 bits • Replaces the CRC • Observer cannot create new MIC to mask changes to data • Increases IV from 24 bits to 48 • Mixes the IV and the base key

27. WPA2 • Uses AES, specifically Counter-Mode/CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) • Too computationally intensive in SW for wireless hardware deployed at the time of WEP • Uses 128 bit key • Provides data confidentiality by using AES in counter mode • Provides message authentication using Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) • The MAC also covers the packet source and destination

28. 802.11i Summary