About the May 24th 2022 Mass Shooting at Robb Elementary School (Uvalde, Texas)

2. 131 M St, N. E., Fifth Floor Washington, D. C. 20507 Free: (833) 827-2920 ASL: (844) 234-5122 FAX: (202) 827-7545 Website: www.eeoc.gov U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Legal Counsel October 13, 2022 VIA: waacl13@gmail.com Michael Ayele (aka) W ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES P.O. Box 20438 Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA, 10013 Re: FOIA No.: 820-2022-011844 Robb Elementary School Shooting Dear Mr. Ayele (aka) W: Your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, received on 08/10/2022, is processed. Our search began on 09/20/2022. All agency records in creation as of 09/20/2022 are within the scope of EEOC’s search for responsive records. The paragraph(s) checked below apply. [X] Request items numbered 1 through 17 are procedurally denied as [] it does not reasonably describe the records you wish disclosed, or [X] no records fitting the description of the records you seek disclosed exist or could be located after a thorough search, or [] the responsive records are already publicly available. See the comments below for further explanation. [X] Request item number 20 is granted. Request items numbered 18 and 19 are denied pursuant to the FOIA exemptions indicated at the end of this letter. The comments below explain the use of these exemptions in more detail. [X] I trust that the furnished information fully satisfies your request. If you need any further assistance or would like to discuss any aspect of your request, please do not hesitate to contact the FOIA Professional who processed your request or our FOIA Public Liaison (see contact information in above letterhead or under signature line). [X] You may contact the EEOC FOIA Public Liaison Michael L. Heise for further assistance or to discuss any aspect of your request. In addition, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740- 6001, email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769. The contact information for the FOIA Public Liaison is as follows: Michael L. Heise, EEOC FOIA Public Liaison, Office of Legal Counsel, FOIA Division, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 131 M. Street, N.E., Fifth Floor, Washington, D.C. 20507, email to FOIA@eeoc.gov, telephone at (202) 921-2542; or fax at (202) 827-7545. [X] If you are not satisfied with the response to this request, you may administratively appeal in writing. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted in 90 days from receipt of this letter to the Office of Legal Counsel, FOIA Division, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 131 M Street, NE, 5NW02E, Washington, D.C. 20507, email to FOIA@eeoc.gov; online at

3. 820-2022-011844 https://eeoc.arkcase.com/foia/portal/login, or fax at (202) 827-7545. Your appeal will be governed by 29 C.F.R. § 1610.11. Sincerely, Michael L. Heise Assistant Legal Counsel | FOIA Division foia@eeoc.gov Applicable Sections of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b): Exemption(s) Used: [X] (b)(3)(A)(i) [X] § 706(b) [X] § 709(e) [X] § 107 of the ADA [X] § 207 of the GINA [] (b)(4) [] (b)(5) (b)(3(A)(i) Exemption (b)(3)(A)(i) to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3)(A)(i) (2006), amended by OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 123 Stat. 2142, 2184, states that disclosure is not required for a matter specifically exempted from disclosure by statute if that statute: (A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue[.] Sections 706(b) and 709(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e- 8(e)(1982), are part of such a statute. Section 706(b) provides that: Charges shall not be made public by the Commission . . . Nothing said or done during and as a part of [the Commission's informal endeavors at resolving charges of discrimination] may be made public . . . Section 709(e) of Title VII provides: It shall be unlawful for any officer of the Commission to make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the Commission pursuant to its authority under this section [to investigate charges of discrimination and to require employers to maintain and submit records] prior to the institution of any proceeding under this title involving such information. Section 107 of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 207 of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act adopt the procedures of sections 706 and 709 of Title VII. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Co., 449 U.S. 590 (1981); Frito-Lay v. EEOC, 964 F. Supp. 236, 239-43 (W.D. Ky. 1997); American Centennial Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 722 F. Supp. 180 (D.N.J. 1989); and EEOC v. City of Milwaukee, 54 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (E.D. Wis. 1999). [] (b)(6) [] (b)(7)(A) [X] (b)(7)(C) [] (b)(7)(D) [] (b)(7)(E) [] (b)(7)(F) 2 | P a g e

4. 820-2022-011844 INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE THIRD EXEMPTION TO THE FOIA:  Access to privileged charge information, if any exist: EEOC can neither confirm nor deny the existence, or non-existence, of any Title VII, ADA, and/or GINA, charges filed by an individual against an entity to which you are not, or do not represent, a party to the charge. (b)(7)(C) Exemption (b)(7)(C) to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2006), amended by OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, authorizes the Commission to withhold: records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy . . . The seventh exemption applies to civil and criminal investigations conducted by regulatory agencies. Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998). Release of statements and identities of witnesses and subjects of an investigation creates the potential for witness intimidation that could deter their cooperation. National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire and Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239 (1978); Manna v. United States Dept. of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158,1164 (3d Cir. 1995). Disclosure of identities of employee-witnesses could cause “problems at their jobs and with their livelihoods.” L&C Marine Transport, Ltd. V. United States, 740 F.2d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court has explained that only “[o]fficial information that sheds light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties” merits disclosure under FOIA and noted that “disclosure of information about private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files” would “reveal little or nothing about an agency’s own conduct.” United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). INFORMATION WITHHELD PURSUANT TO THE SEVENTH EXEMPTION TO THE FOIA:  Access to charge files to which you are not a party could reasonably be expected to constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, should such records exist. COMMENTS This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), request. For request items numbered 1 through 17, EEOC has no records responsive to your request. Those request items appear below. 1. Your discussions about the decision of the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives (Dade Phelan) to create by proclamation the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting, pursuant to Rule 1, Section 17, and Rule 4, Sections 57 and 58, of the Rules of the House of Representatives; 2. Your discussions about the Investigative Committee having been tasked to “conduct all inquiries into the actions of any State or local officer, employee, department, agency, institution, or instrumentality and any political subdivision needed to make a complete and thorough examination of the facts and circumstances of the events relating to the violent acts, shootings, and murders at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde;” 3. Your discussions about the testimonies provided to the Investigative Committee by employees of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (CISD), the Uvalde CISD Police Department, the Uvalde Police Department, the Uvalde County Sheriff Office, the Department of Public Safety, the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), Uvalde 3 | P a g e

5. 820-2022-011844 Mayor Don McLaughlin, and members of the shooter’s family between June 16th 2022 and July 11th 2022 in “executive sessions closed to the public;” 4. Your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that the shooting at Robb Elementary School could happen elsewhere. 5. Your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that law enforcement agencies must “acknowledge that stopping the killing of innocent lives is the highest priority in active shooter response, and all officers must be willing to risk their lives without hesitation;” 6. Your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that law enforcement responders of the May 24th 2022 Robb Elementary School shooting “failed to adhere to their active shooter training;” 7. The training provided to employees of your police/sheriff departments on how to effectively deal with an active shooter incident at a school/college/university operating in your city/county/state government. 8. Your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that the mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School was motivated by a “desire for notoriety and fame;” 9. Your discussions about the decision of the Investigative Committee to dedicate their July 17th 2022 report to victims and family members of the shooting at Robb Elementary School; 10. Your discussions about the July 26th 2022 suspension of former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez; 11. Your discussions about the July 29th 2022 reinstatement of former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez (three days following her suspension); 12. Your discussions about the June 22nd 2022 decision of Uvalde CISD to place former Police Chief Pete Arredondo on unpaid administrative leave; 13. Your discussions about the July 22nd 2022 decision of the Uvalde CISD to postpone a “meeting that had been scheduled to consider terminating their school police chief, Pete Arredondo;” 14. The employment contract offered to the police/sheriff chief working in your city/county government. 15. The employment contract offered to members of your police/sheriff departments (who are not police/sheriff chiefs but are nonetheless) working in your city/county government. 16. The standard employment contract offered to employees of your city/county/state government, who are not working as agents of law enforcement. 17. The mechanism by which an employee of your city/county/state government can have an adverse employment determination reviewed either by your Human Resources (H.R) Department and/or other state/federal agencies. Request items numbered 18 and 19 are denied pursuant to the third and seventh exemptions of the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(3)(A)(i) and (b)(7)(C). Those request items are: 18. [18] The extent of your knowledge on whether Mandy Gutierrez initiated contact with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) following her July 26th 2022 suspension as principal of Robb Elementary School; 19. The extent of your knowledge on whether Pete Arredondo initiated contact with the TWC and/or the EEOC following the June 22nd 2022 decision of Uvalde CISD to place him on unpaid administrative leave; 4 | P a g e

6. 820-2022-011844 The confidentiality provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and GINA, prohibit the EEOC from confirming or denying the existence, or nonexistence, of a charge brought by an individual to a third party of the charge. The third exemption to the FOIA exempts this information from disclosure. The seventh exemption, 7(C), to the FOIA permits the agency to withhold information compiled in investigative files where disclosure of such information could result in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In this instance, we cannot grant access to, or copies of, any ADEA and EPA charges. 29 C.F.R. § 1610.17(g). Request item 20 is granted. That request item is: 20. The work-sharing agreement concluded between the TWC and the EEOC. Attached for your Review is the Worksharing Agreement between Texas Workforce Commission, Civil Rights Division and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dated October 2019 (5 pages). For a full description of the exemption codes used please find them at the following URL: https://www.eeoc.gov/foia/freedom-information-act-reference-guide This response was prepared by Tracy L. Smalls, Government Information Specialist, who may be reached at Tracy.Smalls@EEOC.Gov or 202-921-2541. 5 | P a g e

7. 131 M St, N. E., Fifth Floor Washington, D. C. 20507 Free: (833) 827-2920 TTY: (202) 663-6056 FAX: (202) 827-7545 Website: www.eeoc.gov U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Legal Counsel 08/25/2022 VIA: waacl13@gmail.com Michael Ayele (aka) W Association for the Advancement of Civil Liberties P.O. Box 20438 Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA, 10013 Re: FOIA No.: 820-2022-011844 Robb Elementary School Shooting Dear Mr. Ayele (aka) W: This letter is in response to your request or appeal under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), received by our office on 08/10/2022. As provided in U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B) (2007), we hereby provide you with the required written notice that we are extending by ten (10) working days the time in which we shall respond. Such extension is necessary because of the following “unusual circumstances”: [X] (i) the need to search for and collect the requested records, if any exist, from field offices or other establishments that are separate from this office; [ ] (ii) the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or [ ] (iii) the need for consultation with another agency, or two or more components of this agency, having a substantial interest in the determination of the request. [ ] If you have any questions or wish to discuss reformulation or an alternative time frame for the processing of your request, you may contact the FOIA Professional Tracy Smalls handling your request at . Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001; email at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at (202) 741-5770; toll free (877) 684-6448; or facsimile at (202) 741-5769. We will respond to your request by 09/21/2022. Sincerely, Tracy L. Smalls Tracy L. Smalls _____________________________ Tracy L. Smalls Government Information Specialist foia@eeoc.gov

8. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Office of Legal Counsel 131 M St, N. E., Fifth Floor Washington, D. C. 20507 Free: (833) 827-2920 TTY: (202) 663-6056 FAX: (202) 827-7545 Website: www.eeoc.gov 08/10/2022 VIA: waacl13@gmail.com Michael Ayele Association for the Advancement of Civil Liberties P. O. Box 20438T Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 10013 Re: FOIA No.: 820-2022-011844 Dear Mr. Ayele: Your request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, received by the Office of Legal Counsel on 08/10/2022, is assigned to the [X] Simple [ ] Complex [ ] Expedited track with the above FOIA number. Your request will be processed by Tracy Smalls who can be reached at: 202-921-2541. [X]EEOC will make every effort to issue a determination on your request on or before 09/07/2022. FOIA and EEOC regulations provide 20 working days to issue a determination on a request, not including Saturdays, Sundays and federal holidays. In unusual circumstances, EEOC may extend the 20 working days by 10 additional working days or stop processing your request until you respond to our request for fee or clarifying information. Should EEOC take an extension or stop processing your request, notice will be issued prior to the expiration of the 20 working days. [X the need to search for, collect, and appropriately examine a voluminous amount of separate and distinct records which are demanded in a single request; or You may contact the FOIA Requester Service Center for status updates on your FOIA request or for FOIA information via toll free at (833) 827-2920, to our non-toll free number at (202) 921-2542, by e-mail to FOIA@eeoc.gov, by facsimile to (202) 653-6034, or by mail to our office address in the letterhead above. Additionally, if your request was filed online through the EEOC FOIA Web Portal, you may monitor its status at https://eeoc.arkcase.com/foia/portal/login. You may also contact the Acting EEOC FOIA Public Liaison, Michael L. Heise, for assistance. Sincerely, Dister Battle for _____________________________ Michael L. Heise Assistant Legal Counsel foia@eeoc.gov Endnotes

9. R005250-081022 - Public Information Request Message History (3) On 8/26/2022 10:50:33 AM, TWC Open Records wrote: Subject: [Records Center] Public Information Request :: R005250-081022 Body: Dear Mr. Ayele: This communication is in response to your August 10, 2022, request under the Texas Public Information Act. While the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) is a state agency with varied functions, it has no role in law enforcement, secondary education policy, or investigation of the tragic shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas. Other than the agency employees, TWC does not set or review the terms and conditions of employment of other employers in the state. TWC is an at-will employer, so no agency employees have a negotiated employment contract. We have no documents responsive to items 1 – 16, 18, and 19 of your request. In response to item 17 regarding the review of adverse employment decisions related to the agency employees, we have uploaded Chapter 8 from the TWC Personnel Manual to your GovQA account. Public and private employees may file a complaint with the TWC Civil Rights Division (CRD) if they perceive discrimination in an employment transaction. You may find more information about the process at: https://www.twc.texas.gov/jobseekers/how-submit-employment- discrimination-complaint How to Submit an Employment Discrimination Complaint — TWC - Texas Workforce Commission TWC's Civil Rights Division’s programs provide an avenue for current and former employees (or people who applied for employment) to file a complaint if they believe they have been discriminated against in an employment transaction. www.twc.texas.gov We also uploaded the latest Workshare Agreement in response to item 20. Please log in to the Open Records Center at the following link to retrieve the TWC Personnel Manual and Workshare Agreement. Public Information Request - R005250-081022 If you have any questions, please contact us by responding to this email or leaving a message in the TWC Open Records Center portal. Thank you for your interest in the Agency. Sincerely, Shauntay Black on behalf of Connie Garza Assistant Disclosure Officer OGC-Open Records On 8/10/2022 12:27:36 AM, TWC Open Records wrote: Page 1

10. Dear Michael Ayele: Thank you for your interest in public records of Texas Workforce Commission. Your request has been received and is being processed in accordance with Chapter 552 of Texas Government Code, the Public Information Act. Your request was received in this office on 8/10/2022 and given the reference number R005250-081022 for tracking purposes. Records Requested: W (AACL) Date.: August 10th 2022 Michael A. Ayele P.O.Box 20438 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia E-mail: waacl13@gmail.com , waacl1313@gmail.com ; waacl42913@gmail.com Request for Records Hello, This is Michael A. Ayele sending this message though I now go by W. You may call me W. I am writing this Page 2

11. letter to file a request for records with your offices.[i] The basis for this records request is the July 17th 2022 report published by the Texas House of Representatives following the mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School (located in Uvalde, Texas).[ii] I) Records Requested What I am requesting for prompt disclosure are records within your possession detailing [1] your discussions about the decision of the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives (Dade Phelan) to create by proclamation the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting, pursuant to Rule 1, Section 17, and Rule 4, Sections 57 and 58, of the Rules of the House of Representatives; [2] your discussions about the Investigative Committee having been tasked to “conduct all inquiries into the actions of any State or local officer, employee, department, agency, institution, or instrumentality and any political subdivision needed to make a complete and thorough examination of the facts and circumstances of the events relating to the violent acts, shootings, and murders at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde;” [iii] [3] your discussions about the testimonies provided to the Investigative Committee by employees of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (CISD), the Uvalde CISD Police Department, the Uvalde Police Department, the Uvalde County Sheriff Office, the Department of Public Safety, the Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training (ALERRT), Uvalde Mayor Don McLaughlin, and members of the shooter’s family between June 16th 2022 and July 11th 2022 in “executive sessions closed to the public;” [iv] [4] your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that the shooting at Robb Elementary School could happen elsewhere;[v] [5] your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that law enforcement agencies must “acknowledge that stopping the killing of innocent lives is the highest priority in active shooter response, and all officers must be willing to risk their lives without hesitation;” [6] your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that law enforcement responders of the May 24th 2022 Robb Elementary School shooting “failed to adhere to their active shooter training;” [vi] [7] the training provided to employees of your police/sheriff departments on how to effectively deal with an active shooter incident at a school/college/university operating in your city/county/state government; [8] your discussions about the finding of the Investigative Committee, which concluded that the mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School was motivated by a “desire for notoriety and fame;”[vii] [9] your discussions about the decision of the Investigative Committee to dedicate their July 17th 2022 report to victims and family members of the shooting at Robb Elementary School; [viii] [10] your discussions about the July 26th 2022 suspension of former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez;[ix] [11] your discussions about the July 29th 2022 reinstatement of former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez (three days following her suspension);[x] [12] your discussions about the June 22nd 2022 decision of Uvalde CISD to place former Police Chief Pete Arredondo on unpaid administrative leave; [xi] [13] your discussions about the July 22nd 2022 decision of the Uvalde CISD to postpone a “meeting that had been scheduled to consider terminating their school police chief, Pete Arredondo;” [xii] [14] the employment contract offered to the police/sheriff chief working in your city/county government; [15] the employment contract offered to members of your police/sheriff departments (who are not police/sheriff chiefs but are nonetheless) working in your city/county government; [16] the standard employment contract offered to employees of your city/county/state Page 3

12. government, who are not working as agents of law enforcement; [17] the mechanism by which an employee of your city/county/state government can have an adverse employment determination reviewed either by your Human Resources (H.R) Department and/or other state/federal agencies; [18] the extent of your knowledge on whether Mandy Gutierrez initiated contact with the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC) and/or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) following her July 26th 2022 suspension as principal of Robb Elementary School; [19] the extent of your knowledge on whether Pete Arredondo initiated contact with the TWC and/or the EEOC following the June 22nd 2022 decision of Uvalde CISD to place him on unpaid administrative leave; [20] the work-sharing agreement concluded between the TWC and the EEOC. II) Request for a Fee Waiver and Expedited Processing The requested records do/will demonstrate that [1] there were non-negligible significant efforts to control the narrative as to what exactly transpired on May 24th 2022 in Uvalde, Texas; [2] several news stories, which popped up on the Internet following the May 24th 2022 shooting at Robb Elementary School have since been debunked; [3] several high-ranking Texas government officials including Governor Gregory Wayne Abbott have retracted the statements they have made following the May 24th 2022 mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School; [xiii] [4] the mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School was motivated by Salvador Ramos “desire for notoriety and fame;” [5] law enforcement responders of the May 24th 2022 shooting at Robb Elementary “failed to adhere to their active shooter training and they failed to prioritize saving the lives of innocent victims over their own safety” (according to the Investigative Committee of the legislative branch of the Texan government); [6] Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District (CISD) has placed former Police Chief Pete Arredondo on unpaid administrative leave on June 22nd 2022; [7] Uvalde CISD has “postponed a meeting that had been scheduled to consider terminating their school police chief, Pete Arredondo” on July 22nd 2022; [8] former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez was suspended from her position of employment on July 26th 2022; [9] former Robb Elementary School principal Mandy Gutierrez was reinstated to her position of employment as principal on July 29th 2022 (three days following her suspension); [10] Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W is a Black man who has been in correspondence with the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) about several aspects of the investigative report they say they’re going to publish on the May 24th 2022 Robb Elementary School mass-shooting; [xiv] [11] Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W is a Black man, who was previously employed for the Missouri Department of Mental Health (a state government agency); [12] Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W is a Black man, who has toward the end of Calendar Year 2013 filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against the Missouri Department of Mental Health (MODMH); [13] the charge of employment discrimination filed by Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W with the EEOC was assigned Case No.: 28E – 2014 – 00485C; [14] the MODMH have informed Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W that 9 (nine) complaints of employment discrimination were filed against them with the EEOC between January 01st 2010 and December 17th 2021; [15] the MODMH have informed Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W that they have participated in 4 (four) mediation sessions through the EEOC Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) program between January 01st 2010 and December 17th 2021; [16] the MODMH have informed Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W that they opted not to participate in 5 (five) mediation sessions through the EEOC ADR program between January 01st 2010 Page 4

13. and December 17th 2021. [xv] In my judgment, the facts presented in my request for a fee waiver and expedited processing are not the sort to bolster public confidence in the activities of the U.S government overall. As a Black man with a U.S college degree (who has previously filed a charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC), I would like to take this opportunity to denounce gun related violence committed in the United States of America (U.S.A) and elsewhere in the world. Since the May 24th 2022 mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School (in Uvalde, Texas); I (personally) have noticed actions being taken that remind me a great deal of the decisions, which were made following the February 14th 2018 mass-shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School (in Parkland, Florida). As you are likely aware, the decisions that were made following the February 14th 2018 mass-shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School have been subject of a complaint filed by March for Our Lives against the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission.[xvi] Given the complaint filed by March for Our Lives against the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission, I do have serious concerns about what the future holds for schools in the State of Texas. For what seems to me very obvious reasons, I am extremely skeptical whenever [1] greater access to firearm and [2] increased police presence in school are being presented as a solution to the frequent mass-shootings, which make the headlines of several newspapers throughout the U.S.A.[xvii] The core issues presented in this records request are as follows. 1) Have you had conversations about the May 24th 2022 mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas? If yes, will you disclose those records? 2) What training is provided to members of your police/sheriff departments in the event of an active shooter incident at a school/college/university operating in your city/county/state/federal government? Will you disclose the training provided to members of your police/sheriff departments in the event of an active shooter incident at a school/college/university operating in your city/county/state/federal government? 3) Is there a difference in the terms and conditions of the employment contracts concluded between police/sheriff chiefs and other employees of local/state government? If yes, will you disclose the conversations you have had about the terms and conditions of the employment contract concluded between the police/sheriff chiefs and other employees of local/state government? Will you disclose the terms and conditions of the employment contracts I have requested? 4) Is there a mechanism by which city/county/state government employees can have an adverse employment decision reviewed? If yes, have you had conversations about the tools at the disposal of your city/county/state government employees in the event of an adverse employment decision handed down to them? If yes, will you disclose those conversations you have had? This records request should be expedited because it puts into question the government’s integrity about the way that people are treated in the U.S.A on account of their gender, their racial backgrounds, their national origins and their disability status. My request for a fee waiver should be granted because [1] I have identified operations and activities of the federal government in concert with U.S city/county/state government as well as the legislative branch of the Texan government; [2] the issues presented are meaningfully informative about government operations or activities in order to be ‘likely to contribute’ to and increase public understanding of those operations or activities. Under penalty of perjury, I hereby declare all the statements I have made to be Page 5

14. true and accurate. Be well. Take care. Keep yourselves at arms distance. W (AACL) Michael A. Ayele Anti-Racist Human Rights Activist Audio-Visual Media Analyst Anti-Propaganda Journalist Work Cited [i] Please be advised that I have previously disseminated a vast number of documents obtained through records request via Archive.org, Scribd.com, Medium.com and YouTube.com. These documents have been made available to the public at no financial expense to them. As a member of the media, I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that the records you disclose to me could be made available to the general public through the means I have mentioned above or other ones. On December 10th 2021, I have launched a website on Wordpress.com for the purpose of making the records previously disclosed to me by the U.S government further accessible to members of the general public interested in the activities of their elected and non-elected representatives. You can find out more about the recent publications of the Association for the Advancement of Civil Liberties (AACL) here.: https://michaelayeleaacl.wordpress.com/ Page 6

15. [ii] This is the interim report of the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting of the Texas House of Representatives. Conscious of the desire of the Uvalde community and the public at large to receive an accurate account of the tragedy at Robb Elementary School, the Committee has worked diligently and with care to issue this interim report of its factual findings. The Committee’s work is not complete. We do not have access to all material witnesses. Medical examiners have not yet issued any reports about their findings, and multiple other investigations remain ongoing. The Committee believes this interim report constitutes the most complete telling to date of the events of and leading to the May 24, 2022, tragedy. This Committee has prioritized factual accuracy, as will be evident from our attention to conducting our own interviews and documenting our sources of information. Still, based on the experiences of past mass-shooting events, we understand some aspects of these interim findings may be disputed or disproven in the future. The Committee issues this interim report now, believing the victims, their families, and the entire Uvalde community have already waited too long for answers and transparency. The Committee gratefully acknowledges the assistance of all who helped with its investigation and the preparation of this interim report, including Clement Abbondandolo, Margo Cardwell, Courtney Chaplin, Matthew Crow, Casey Garrett, Harrison Garrett, Paige Higerd, Ted Liggett, Michael Massengale, Kolton McDougald, and Ellic Sahualla. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf [iii] On June 3, 2022, Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives Dade Phelan created by proclamation the Investigative Committee on the Robb Elementary Shooting, pursuant to Rule 1, Section 17, and Rule 4, Sections 57 and 58, of the Rules of the House of Representatives. Three members were appointed to the Committee: Representative Dustin Burrows, Chair; Representative Joe Moody, Vice-Chair; and the Honorable Eva Guzman, Public Member. The Speaker gave the Committee the same authority and duties conferred on standing committees under the rules, and the Committee is set to expire on the date the 88th Legislature convenes. Speaker Phelan charged the Committee with the duty to “conduct all inquiries into the actions of any State or local officer, employee, department, agency, institution, or instrumentality and any political subdivision needed to make a complete and thorough examination of the facts and circumstances of the events relating to the violent acts, shootings, and murders at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde.” In the conduct of its investigation, Page 7

16. the Speaker charged the Committee to “examine the evidence developed by all law enforcement authorities” and to “acquire and analyze additional evidence as needed to make comprehensive findings.” The Committee has the additional duty of providing assistance to the Select Committee on Youth Health and Safety and the Committee on Homeland Security and Public Safety in the consideration of their joint charges on mass violence prevention and community safety. This Committee “shall submit a final report in the same manner as an interim study committee under Rule 4, Section 61, Rules of the House of Representatives.” Put more simply, this is a fact-finding committee. The Speaker has tasked other legislative committees with the difficult but critical responsibility of proposing policy in response to the tragedy at Robb Elementary School. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb- Elementary-Investigative-Committee-Report.pdf [iv] The Committee held its first meeting on June 9, 2022, in Austin, Texas. In an extensive briefing in executive session, Col. Steven C. McCraw, Director of the Texas Department of Public Safety, provided the Committee an overview of the status of the ongoing DPS investigation, including the attacker’s background, the incident timeline, and the response by law enforcement. The Committee reviewed a composite video recording of the attacker’s approach to the school and law enforcement’s response. The meeting concluded with DPS agreeing to provide its evidence to the Committee. The Committee then heard three days of testimony on June 16th, 17th, and 20th in Uvalde, Texas. Testifying witnesses included employees of the Uvalde CISD (including Robb Elementary School staff), the Uvalde CISD Police Department, the Uvalde Police Department, the Department of Public Safety, and members of the attacker’s family. On June 17th, all three members of the Committee visited the Robb Elementary School campus accompanied by Uvalde CISD Superintendent Dr. Hal Harrell, and the Committee paid its respects to the victims and to the community by laying a floral wreath at the school memorial. Uvalde CISD Police Chief Pete Arredondo testified before the Committee in Austin, Texas, on June 21st followed by Sgt. Thomas Calabro with the Houston Police Department, who provided information about training and standard practices for law enforcement responses to active shooter scenarios and for the command and coordination of multiple responding law enforcement agencies. Page 8

17. The Committee returned to Uvalde on June 29th and 30th. On June 29th, the Committee interviewed Uvalde Mayor Don McLaughlin, four Robb Elementary School fourth grade teachers, and five employees of the Uvalde Police Department, including a dispatcher. The next day, June 30th, the Committee interviewed Uvalde CISD employee Becky Reinhardt, Uvalde County Precinct One Constable Johnny Field (by videoconference), and two peace officers who responded to the incident from the Department of Public Safety (a special agent and a lieutenant). That day, the Committee’s investigators also interviewed Robb Elementary School teacher Arnulfo Reyes, the teacher in Room 111 who is still recovering from his injuries. The Committee received a report and an audio recording of the interview of Mr. Reyes. On July 11th, the Committee reconvened in Austin to interview ALERRT Assistant Director John Curnutt and Uvalde County Sheriff Ruben Nolasco, both by videoconference. The Committee also conducted a follow-up interview of DPS Director McCraw. The Committee interviewed all 35 witnesses in executive session, meaning that the sessions were closed to the public. Despite public expressions of frustration and even criticism that these meetings were conducted behind closed doors, the Committee is confident that its method served the goal of an objective fact-finding process. The Committee was able to engage witnesses in candid discussions that may not have been possible in public hearings or other settings. In addition to the witnesses who appeared before the Committee in executive session, the Committee’s investigators conducted at least 39 independent informal interviews, The Committee and its investigators have reviewed hundreds of crime-scene photos and dozens of audio and video recordings from the incident, including surveillance camera footage, mobile-phone video, 911 calls, radio transmissions, and body-worn camera footage. They reviewed recordings and summaries of witness interviews conducted and recorded by law enforcement agencies. Documentation received from the Department of Public Safety and reviewed by the Committee included an enormous trove of digital evidence, including data from mobile phones, cloud storage, and social media messages. The Committee received and reviewed thousands of pages of documents received from numerous agencies including ALERRT, ATF, Texas DPS, FBI, Texas School Safety Center, and Uvalde CISD. These documents included school audits and safety plans, school disciplinary records, employment records, criminal-history reports, dispatch logs, ballistics reports, firearms traces, gun store records, information about the victims, and various diagrams, sketches, and timelines. The Committee also invited and received suggestions from witnesses about how to improve policies relating to school safety, firearm safety, law enforcement training and resources, and active shooter response. The Committee genuinely appreciates the input from all witnesses, and it will be shared with the House committees formed to evaluate and propose policies to address mass violence prevention and community safety. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf Page 9

18. [v] There is nothing we can do to heal the wounds suffered by the Uvalde community, nothing that can redress the loss of 21 souls stolen from their families and friends. We must critically examine the contributing factors to the horrific massacre at Robb Elementary School to try to provide answers and prevent similar tragedies in the future. A safer environment for all Texas children is one of the ways we can honor the memory of the students and teachers murdered in Uvalde. (…) Of necessity, this report will describe shortcomings and failures of the Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District and of various agencies and officers of law enforcement. At the outset, we acknowledge that those same shortcomings could be found throughout the State of Texas. We must not delude ourselves into a false sense of security by believing that “this would not happen where we live.” The people of Uvalde undoubtedly felt the same way. We must all take seriously the threats to security in our schools and the need to be properly prepared to confront active shooter scenarios. Other than the attacker, the Committee did not find any “villains” in the course of its investigation. There is no one to whom we can attribute malice or ill motives. Instead, we found systemic failures and egregiously poor decision making. We recognize that the impact of this tragedy is felt most profoundly by the people of Uvalde in ways we cannot fully comprehend. (…) As of the fall of 2020, there were 5,371,586 students in Texas schools. There are 1,204 school systems, most of which are independent school districts. The largest independent school district in Texas is in Houston, with 196,943 students enrolled for the 2020–21 school year. The smallest district is San Vicente ISD, which had five students for 2020–21. Most school districts have multiple campuses with multiple buildings. It is estimated that there could be as many as 80,000 buildings in the State of Texas that house children at various times during the school year. These are important facts to remember in the context of discussing policy related to school-hardening measures. Uvalde CISD serves a rural community of 15,217 citizens. The district’s schools include Uvalde High School, Page 10

19. Morales Junior High, Anthon, Flores, Robb, and Dalton elementary schools, and several alternative education programs. The campus buildings range from over 100 years in age to the newest school, Uvalde High School, which was opened nearly four decades ago in 1983. Uvalde CISD constructed many of those older buildings during times when the potential threats to students were much different than those faced today. While no school could ever be built to prevent every conceivable threat, they can be built and operated in ways to better mitigate risk and impede potential threats from outside attackers. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf [vi] Since the 1999 Columbine tragedy, the law enforcement community has recognized the critical importance of implementing active shooter training for all officers, regardless of specialty. Also, all officers must now acknowledge that stopping the killing of innocent lives is the highest priority in active shooter response, and all officers must be willing to risk their lives without hesitation. At Robb Elementary, law enforcement responders failed to adhere to their active shooter training, and they failed to prioritize saving the lives of innocent victims over their own safety. The first wave of responders to arrive included the chief of the school district police and the commander of the Uvalde Police Department SWAT team. Despite the immediate presence of local law enforcement leaders, there was an unacceptably long period of time before officers breached the classroom, neutralized the attacker, and began rescue efforts. We do not know at this time whether responders could have saved more lives by shortening that delay. Regardless, law enforcement committed numerous mistakes in violation of current active shooter training, and there are important lessons to be learned from each faulty assumption and poor decision made that day. The Uvalde CISD’s written active shooter plan directed its police chief to assume command and control of the response to an active shooter. The chief of police was one of the first responders on the scene. But as events unfolded, he failed to perform or to transfer to another person the role of incident commander. This was an essential duty he had assigned to himself in the plan mentioned above, yet it was not effectively performed by anyone. The void of leadership could have contributed to the loss of life as injured victims waited over an hour for help, and the attacker continued to sporadically fire his weapon. Page 11

20. A command post could have transformed chaos into order, including the deliberate assignment of tasks and the flow of the information necessary to inform critical decision making. Notably, nobody ensured that responders making key decisions inside the building received information that students and teachers had survived the initial burst of gunfire, were trapped in Rooms 111 and 112, and had called out for help. Some responders outside and inside the building knew that information through radio communications. But nobody in command analyzed this information to recognize that the attacker was preventing critically injured victims from obtaining medical care. Instead of continuing to act as if they were addressing a barricaded subject scenario in which responders had time on their side, they should have reassessed the scenario as one involving an active shooter. Correcting this error should have sparked greater urgency to immediately breach the classroom by any possible means, to subdue the attacker, and to deliver immediate aid to surviving victims. Recognition of an active shooter scenario also should have prompted responders to prioritize the rescue of innocent victims over the precious time wasted in a search for door keys and shields to enhance the safety of law enforcement responders. An effective incident commander located away from the drama unfolding inside the building would have realized that radios were mostly ineffective, and that responders needed other lines of communication to communicate important information like the victims’ phone calls from inside the classrooms. An offsite overall incident commander likely could have located a master key more quickly—several people on campus had one. An offsite overall incident commander may have suggested checking to see if officers could open the door without a key—in hindsight, they probably could have. An offsite overall incident commander who properly categorized the crisis as an active shooter scenario should have urged using other secondary means to breach the classroom, such as using a sledgehammer as suggested in active shooter training or entering through the exterior windows. Uvalde CISD and its police department failed to implement their active shooter plan and failed to exercise command and control of law enforcement responding to the tragedy. But these local officials were not the only ones expected to supply the leadership needed during this tragedy. Hundreds of responders from numerous law enforcement agencies—many of whom were better trained and better equipped than the school district police—quickly arrived on the scene. Those other responders, who also had received training on active shooter response and the interrelation of law enforcement agencies, could have helped to address the unfolding chaos. Yet in this crisis, no responder seized the initiative to establish an incident command post. Despite an obvious atmosphere of chaos, the ranking officers of other responding agencies did not approach the Uvalde CISD chief of police or anyone else perceived to be in command to point out the lack of and need for a command post, or Page 12

21. to offer that specific assistance. Several will suggest they were misled by false or misleading information they received as they arrived; however, the “chaos” described by almost all of them demonstrates that at a minimum, responders should have asked more questions. This suggests a training deficiency, in that responding officers failed to adequately question the absence of command. Other responders failed to be sufficiently assertive by identifying the incident commander and offering their assistance or guidance, or by assuming command in the absence of any other responder having expressly done so. In this sense, the entirety of law enforcement and its training, preparation, and response shares systemic responsibility for many missed opportunities on that tragic day. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf [vii] One motive that drove the man behind the massacre at Robb Elementary School was a desire for notoriety and fame. The Committee refuses to perpetuate his memory in that way; our focus is to ensure that Texas never forgets the children and beloved teachers who have been lost and the lessons this tragedy can teach. So, instead of naming him, we call him by a generic term used in active shooter training: “the attacker.” In consultation with the local community in Uvalde, the Committee arranged to show victims’ families, in advance of public release, a prudently edited version of Robb Elementary’s hallway surveillance video that did not include images of him. We regret that others, under cover of anonymity and for their own motives, have sensationalized evidence of this horrible tragedy at the risk of glorifying a monster. (…) The attacker was born in Fargo, North Dakota on May 16, 2004, the second child born to the mother, Uvalde native A.R., and her then-boyfriend, S.R. (…) Records show the attacker had declining attendance, with more than one hundred absences annually beginning in 2018, along with failing grades and increasingly dismal performance on standardized and end-of-course exams. While Uvalde CISD “school success officers” do try to bring truant children back to school, many Uvalde students have spotty attendance, and the local judicial system reportedly does not consistently enforce truancy rules. It is unclear whether any school resource officers ever visited the home of the attacker. Despite his absences, or perhaps because of them, the attacker had almost no disciplinary history at school. The single infraction on his school record is for “mutual combat” with another student in a hallway in late 2018, resulting in a three-day suspension. Page 13

22. By 2021, at age seventeen, the attacker had only completed the ninth grade. On October 28, 2021, Uvalde High School involuntarily withdrew him, citing poor academic performance and lack of attendance. In a year distinguished by the general school-age population’s return to school in Uvalde and elsewhere after the COVID pandemic, the attacker dropped out of school and turned down a dark path. While in earlier years, notes in his phone reflect that he unsuccessfully sought to fit in (including a fixation with weight and fitness that resulted in an eating disorder), in 2021 he appears to have increasingly withdrew and isolated himself. (…) The attacker wrote about his difficulty connecting to other people or feeling empathy for them; he said he was “not human,” and he called others “humans,” apparently intending it as an insult. Later internet usage suggests he may have wondered if he was a sociopath and sought out information on the condition. His internet research resulted in him receiving an email about obtaining psychological treatment for sociopathy. The attacker became focused on achieving notoriety. He believed his TikTok and YouTube channels would be successful. The small number of views he received led him to tell those with whom he interacted that he was “famous,” that they were mere “randoms” by comparison, and that they were lucky to interact with him. On Yubo, the attacker spoke enviously of publicity given to a murderer and animal abuser whose story became widely known after a Netflix documentary. In late 2021, he shared a video online that showed him driving around with “someone he met on the internet” holding a clear plastic bag that contained a dead cat, which he discarded in the street and spit on while his driver laughed. The video then showed the attacker wearing a tactical plate carrier, went on to show him dryfiring BB guns at people, and ended with footage of emergency services responding to a serious car accident, which he claimed his driver had caused. The attacker got a job in late 2021. He first worked at Whataburger, where a friend’s grandmother saw him. She snapped a picture and sent it to her grandson, warning that it was “an example of what your life will be if you quit school”—a sentiment some of his peers expressed to him directly. His employer fired him after a month for threatening a female coworker, and he fared similarly at his next job at Wendy’s. A coworker there described him as “not a good person” and “troubled,” someone who “put himself in a box and would not talk or associate with anyone he worked with.” An exception to that approach was when he tried discussing guns with another employee. When the other employee received the discussion negatively, the attacker challenged him to a fight. The attacker also occasionally worked with his grandfather, who had an air conditioning business and paid him in cash. Living at home, the attacker had no real expenses and hoarded money, telling acquaintances that he was “saving for something big” and that they would all see him in the news one day. Family members believed he was saving money for his own apartment or car, but clues to his real plans surfaced near the end of 2021. That Page 14

23. is when he ordered rifle slings, a red dot sight, and shin guards, as well as the body armor carrier worn in both the video he shared and on the day of the Robb Elementary massacre. Still seventeen at the time, the attacker asked at least two different people to buy guns for him, which they both refused to do. Interviews conducted by other investigators indicate that family members and friends were aware of his efforts to buy guns before he was legally permitted to do so. Finally, the attacker developed a fascination with school shootings, of which he made no secret. His comments about them coupled with his wild threats of violence and rape earned him the nickname “Yubo’s school shooter” on that platform. Those with whom he played games taunted him with a similar nickname so often that it became a running joke. Even those he personally knew in his local chat group began calling him “the school shooter” after he shared pictures of himself wearing the plate carrier he’d bought and posing with a BB gun he tried to convince them was real. None of his online behavior was ever reported to law enforcement, and if it was reported by other users to any social media platform, it does not appear that actions were taken to restrict his access or to report him to authorities as a threat. (…) While a vague idea for a school shooting appears to have been in the attacker’s mind as early as late 2021, he began to pursue his evil plan in early 2022 after a falling-out with his mother. A blowout argument between them was livestreamed on Instagram, and several members of their family viewed it. Although sheriff ’s deputies responded to a call, they made no arrests. Soon afterwards, the attacker left home and moved in with his grandmother, just blocks away from Robb Elementary School. His relationship with his mother never improved. He retained similar antipathy toward his father, who last saw him about a month before the shooting. The father felt his son had no love left for him. He noticed that the attacker had cuts on his own face that appeared to be self-inflicted (something other witnesses had observed on prior occasions), and he claimed he was “doing something” soon. The attacker had moved into his grandmother’s small home, where he had no room of his own and slept on the living-room floor. A few days before the shooting, he confided in an older cousin who was also staying there, telling her that he did not want to live anymore. After a lengthy heart-to-heart, the cousin believed she’d gotten through to him. The attacker’s uncle also recalled having similar discussions with him. Meanwhile, the attacker’s planning and preparation became more focused. The Committee received extensive documentation compiled and created by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives in the course of its investigation of the attacker’s purchases. He began buying more firearms accessories beginning in Page 15

24. February 2022, including 60 30-round magazines, a holographic weapon sight, and a Hellfire Gen 2 snap-on trigger system. On March 23, 2022, a suspicious person dressed in all black with a backpack was seen canvasing Robb Elementary, but no one ever identified the person. As soon as the attacker turned eighteen on May 16, 2022—just one week before the shooting on May 24, 2022—he was finally able to purchase guns and ammunition. An online retailer shipped 1,740 rounds of 5.56mm 75-grain boat tail hollow point to his doorstep, at a cost of $1,761.50. He ordered a Daniel Defense DDM4 V7 (an AR-15-style rifle) for shipment to a gun store in Uvalde, at a cost of $2,054.28 (including tax and transfer fee). On May 17, 2022, he bought a Smith and Wesson M&P15 (also an AR-15-style rifle) at the same store in Uvalde, at a cost of $1,081.42. He returned the next day for 375 rounds of M193, a 5.56mm 55- grain round with a full metal jacket, which has a soft core surrounded by a harder metal. He returned again to pick up his other rifle when it arrived on May 20, 2022, and he had store staff install the holographic sight on it after the transfer was completed. The owner of the gun store described the attacker as an “average customer with no ‘red flags’ or suspicious conditions”—just that he was always alone and quiet. The owner of the store remembered asking how an 18- year-old could afford such purchases (the rifles alone were over $3,000), and the attacker simply said he had saved up. Patrons of the store who saw him told a different story in FBI interviews, saying after the tragedy that the attacker was “very nervous looking” and that he “appeared odd and looked like one of those school shooters”; another described his all-black clothing as simply giving off “bad vibes.” A background check was conducted, and the attacker qualified for the purchases. While multiple gun sales within such a short period are and were reported to the ATF, the law only requires purchases of handguns to be reported to the local sheriff. Here, the information about the attacker’s gun purchases remained in federal hands. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf [viii] The Committee submits this report with great humility and the deepest respect for the victims and their families. It is the Committee’s sincere hope that this brings some clarity for them as to the facts that happened. This report is meant to honor them. You will notice the name of the attacker is not mentioned. We also will not use his image, so as not to glorify him. Page 16

25. Nevaeh Alyssa Bravo: Neveah is remembered as a playful girl who put a smile on the faces of everyone around her. Her family meant the world to her, and she often helped her father around the house. Neveah loved the colors pink and purple and enjoyed playing softball and riding her bike. Jacklyn “Jackie” Jaylen Cazares: Jackie is remembered as a caring girl who enjoyed singing and making TikTok videos. Jackie loved animals (especially her four dogs) and wanted to become a veterinarian; she also dreamt of visiting Paris. Jackie was known as someone who would go out of her way to help anyone. Makenna Lee Elrod: Makenna is remembered as the light in the lives of those who knew her. She loved the color purple, softball and gymnastics, and spending time with her family—especially time on the ranch with her dad. Her smile lit up rooms, and she liked to leave hidden notes for her family to find. Jose Manuel Flores, Jr: Jose is remembered as loving and kind. He was an honor roll student who wanted to be a police officer when he grew up to help protect other people. Jose was an amazing big brother who looked out for his siblings, and his parents called him “a helper” because he was always pitching in at home. Elianha “Ellie” Amyah Garcia: Ellie is remembered as a gentle, kindhearted girl who loved spending time with her family and was very close with her grandparents. She enjoyed playing basketball and wanted to be a cheerleader one day. Ellie adored the colors pink and purple and loved a nice bowl of ramen noodles. She was a long-term planner who was already picking dresses and dances for her quinceañera five years away. Irma Garcia: Irma is remembered as courageous and selfless—a wife and mother of four who was always willing to lend a helping hand to anyone who needed one. She was a 23-year teacher. Irma died protecting her students, and her heroism will be remembered forever. Uziyah Sergio Garcia: Uziyah is remembered as an outgoing boy who loved his family as well as his “cousins and brothers from another mother.” He was always fair and full of life, and he enjoyed running, swimming, football, and playing his Nintendo Switch and Oculus. Page 17

26. Amerie Jo Garza: Amerie is remembered as considerate and fun-loving. She was protective of her three-year- old brother and would kiss him every morning before she went to school. Amerie loved swimming, drawing, and vanilla bean frappés from Starbucks. She dreamt of becoming an art teacher one day. Xavier James Lopez: Xavier is remembered as an active boy who loved swimming and playing little league baseball for his team, the Blue Jays. He was lively, energetic, and always eager to dance, especially the cumbia with his grandmother. Xavier was known for wearing stylish clothes and had a smile that could cheer anyone up. Jayce Carmelo Luevanos: Jayce is remembered as a happy, thoughtful boy with many friends who always seemed to be running around his yard with him. He made his grandparents a pot of coffee every morning and would leave notes saying that he loved them. Dinosaurs were one of his favorite things. Tess Marie Mata: Tess is remembered as a natural athlete who enjoyed softball, soccer, and gymnastics—she especially loved doing backbends in gymnastics. Tess was a fan of the Houston Astros and even played the same position as her favorite player, José Altuve, in softball. She was saving up money for a family vacation to Disney World. Maranda Gail Mathis: Maranda is remembered as smart and nice, a shy tomboy who loved the color purple, especially when it was on unicorns and mermaids. Maranda also enjoyed spending time outdoors and had an incredible imagination. Eva Mireles: Eva is remembered as dedicated and vibrant. She enjoyed CrossFit, hiking, spending time with her dog, Kane, and being with her family. Her smile was bright and her commitment to her students was still unwavering after 17 years as an educator. She was a hero who never gave up throughout an impossible ordeal. Alithia Haven Ramirez: Alithia is remembered as talented and bighearted. She was a gifted artist who wanted to go to art school in Paris one day. She was also a mature role model to her siblings and was always thoughtful about helping those in need. Annabell Gauadalupe Rodrigues: Annabell is remembered as empathetic and loyal. She enjoyed spending time with her sisters and watching TikToks. Her favorite color was blue—especially blue found on butterflies. Page 18

27. Annabell was on the honor roll and known for being a sharp student. Maite Yuleana Rodriguez: Maite is remembered as sweet and competitive. She loved learning about animals and the ocean, especially dolphins, whales, and dogs. She was an honor student who dreamt of attending Texas A&M to become a marine biologist. Her favorite color was green, and she enjoyed a #13 from Whataburger— always with a side of sliced jalapenos. Alexandria “Lexi” Aniyah Rubio: Lexi is remembered as intelligent and driven. She had a contagious smile and enjoyed playing softball and basketball, which she excelled at. Lexi was an all-A student who wanted to become a lawyer one day, and she was interested in social and political issues because she wanted to make a difference. Layla Marie Salazar: Layla is remembered as witty and lively. She loved singing with her parents while coming to and from school and going with her grandparents for tacos. She was also an avid swimmer, dancer, and runner who’d won six races at a recent field day. Jailah Nicole Silguero: Jailah is remembered as a joy to be around, a pure delight who enjoyed making TikToks to show off to her family and friends. Jailah was always dancing and liked to spend time outdoors as well. Eliahna Torres: Eliahna is remembered as loving and compassionate. She enjoyed making other people laugh and was a “master of jests.” She was also an amazing softball player up for a spot on the city’s all-star team. Eliahna was a natural leader who was also known for her warmth and selflessness. Rojelio Fernandez Torres: Rojelio is remembered as a clever, positive boy who enjoyed being outdoors in his free time as well as playing football and videogames like Pokémon. Rojelio was always eager to help others and had a real love for life. Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary-Investigative-Committee- Report.pdf Page 19

28. [ix] Mandy Gutierrez, principal of Robb Elementary School in Texas, was suspended with pay Monday, her attorney, Ricardo Cedillo, confirmed to ABC News. A special legislative investigation into the May 24 massacre at the school found that Gutierrez was aware of security problems prior to a shooter accessing the school -- killing 19 students and two teachers -- but she had not had the problems fixed. District officials declined to discuss the suspension or what it means. Gutierrez joins school district police chief Pete Arredondo, still on unpaid administrative leave. The Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District has recommended Arredondo be fired. The chief has been singled out for a series of catastrophic failures in leading the police response to the massacre that ignored the possibility that children and teachers could be saved had the teenage gunman been confronted and neutralized, as standard police protocol dictates. News about Gutierrez’s suspension began circulating just before a regularly scheduled school board meeting Monday night. During the session, the board announced that the 2022-23 school year would start on Sept.6 as the district puts in place a series of security improvements and arrangements for emotional and social support services. Uvalde school district suspends Robb Elementary School principal. ABC News.: https://abcnews.go.com/US/uvalde-school- district-suspends-robb-elementary-school-principal/story?id=87400644 [x] Mandy Gutierrez, the principal of Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas, was reinstated Thursday to her position, her attorney, Ricardo Cedillo, confirmed to ABC News. "Ms. Gutierrez's administrative leave with pay has been lifted and she has been fully reinstated to her position, where she will continue to discharge her duties and continue to serve all the families of the UCISD," a statement read. Uvalde Consolidated Independent School District superintendent Hal Harrell thanked Gutierrez in a letter obtained by ABC News for submitting responses to the House Investigative report into the May 24 mass shooting that left 19 children and two adults dead. "As a result of our review, you will be allowed to return to work," Harrell said in the letter. The reinstatement comes a day after Gutierrez responded to criticisms lodged against her and her leadership team by the special investigative committee of the Texas House. Gutierrez was suspended earlier in the week by Harrell. There was no reason given as to why Gutierrez was placed on administrative leave but the decision came two weeks after a report by the Texas legislative committee into the shooting. The report found that Gutierrez, in her first year at Robb Elementary School, was aware of security problems such as a door not locking properly for one of the classrooms the gunman entered, but did not fix them. Uvalde principal reinstated at Robb Elementary School following suspension. ABC News.: https://abcnews.go.com/US/uvalde- principal-reinstated-robb-elementary-school-suspension/story?id=87600921 Page 20

29. The principal of Robb Elementary School, who was briefly suspended before being reinstated last month, will be leaving the school for a position in district administration, the school district announced. Mandy Gutierrez has accepted a position as assistant director of special education, Hal Harrell, the superintendent of the Uvalde Unified Consolidated Independent School District, said in an update to the school community on Friday. Gutierrez will be "fulfilling her desire to support special education students across the district," Harrell said. In her place, Christy Perez, previously the assistant principal of Uvalde High School, will serve as principal of the elementary school, Harrell said. "Her background as both a teacher and a counselor will be invaluable in ensuring students have the support they need during the upcoming school year," the superintendent said of Perez. The move is the latest development in leadership at the elementary school, the site of one of the worst school shootings in U.S. history after a gunman killed 19 students and two teachers in May. Uvalde elementary school principal moving to district administrative post. ABC News.: https://abcnews.go.com/US/ulvade- elementary-school-principal-moving-district-administrative-post/story?id=88043965 [xi] Uvalde school officials on Friday canceled a meeting to decide the future of embattled district Police Chief Pete Arredondo, who was facing the possibility of becoming the first officer to be fired over the slow law enforcement response to the Robb Elementary School massacre. Arredondo’s job was set to be discussed in an abruptly called school board meeting that was scheduled for Saturday. But in a statement Friday, the district said it had canceled the meeting at the request of Arredondo’s attorney and because of “due process requirements.” The district said the the police chief’s potential firing would be considered later but did not specify when. The reversal comes just two days after Uvalde’s superintendent moved to fire Arredondo amid mounting public pressure and growing impatience in South Texas for accountability after police body camera footage and a damning new report revealed how officers waited in the school hallway for more than 70 minutes instead of confronting the gunman inside a fourth-grade classroom. Nineteen children and two teachers were killed in the deadliest school shooting in Texas history. The district said Arredondo will remain on unpaid administrative leave. So far, no officer has lost their job as a result of their actions or decisions during their May 24 tragedy. Nearly 400 officers rushed to the scene of the school during the shooting, according to findings by a Texas House committee. Meeting over Uvalde school police chief’s future canceled. Associated Press.: https://apnews.com/article/uvalde-school-shooting-police- shootings-texas-6ae9b16cefc8bf0aeca3025eff035bfe Page 21

30. [xii] Despite intense public pressure for accountability, school district officials in Uvalde, Texas, said on Friday that they were postponing a meeting that had been scheduled to consider terminating their school police chief, Pete Arredondo, for his role in the delayed police response to a mass shooting that left 21 people dead at an elementary school. In a brief announcement, the district said that a meeting that had been scheduled for Saturday to consider the chief’s continued employment had been indefinitely postponed. “In conformity with due process requirements, and at the request of his attorney, the meeting to consider the termination of Chief Arredondo will be held at a later date which has yet to be determined,” Anne Marie Espinoza, the district’s communications director, said in a statement. The district had initially said that the school board would meet in closed session to consider a recommendation from the superintendent, Hal Harrell, that the police chief be fired. But the superintendent cautioned parents who had been demanding his termination that removing the chief was complicated because he was considered a contract employee. The school district has not disclosed the terms of the contract. But under general education union policies in Texas, school boards have a right to terminate a school district employee, including an administrator, for a failure to perform duties or for good cause, though employees would usually have the right to challenge that decision in court. (…) School police chiefs in Texas do not have the same kinds of contracts and due process protections from firing that educators do, said Chief Bill Avera, a vice president of the Texas School District Police Chiefs’ Association. Still, districts often give their professional employees, such as police chiefs, employment contracts, Chief Avera said, though he cautioned that he did not know what Chief Arredondo’s arrangement had been. “My suspicion might be that his lawyer wants to negotiate an exit,” he said. “You want to work out the best deal you can for your client.” Nineteen students and two teachers were killed in the attack on May 24 at Robb Elementary School that has left the small community in South Texas reeling, with widespread public demands for police officials who took more than an hour to halt the gunman’s siege to be held to account. Mr. Arredondo has been on unpaid suspension since late June and resigned a seat he recently won on the City Council. The superintendent’s recommendation to fire him came less than a week after a Texas House committee released a damning report that blamed the chief and hundreds of other responding officers for “systemic failures and egregiously poor decision making.” In the weeks since the shooting in May, Uvalde residents have packed City Council and school board meetings to demand answers. Much of that anger has been directed at Chief Arredondo, who under the school district’s mass shooting protocol was supposed to lead the response. He has said that he was not in charge, but the legislative committee said the overall response was hindered by chaos and misinformation. Instead of speedily entering a pair of connected classrooms where the gunman was holed up, the committee found, police officers Page 22

31. searched for shields, backup and keys for a classroom door that was ultimately found to be unlocked. The state investigators concluded that some of the victims died on their way to the hospital. “It is plausible that some victims could have survived if they had not had to wait 73 additional minutes for rescue,” the report said. (…) The mayor of Uvalde, Don McLaughlin, has also announced that the acting city police chief during the shooting, Lt. Mariano Pargas, has been placed on administrative leave and that the city had begun its own internal inquiry. The Texas state police said they had opened their own investigation to determine whether any of the scores of state officers who responded to the scene, which included Texas Rangers and state troopers, broke any laws or department policies by not confronting the gunman sooner. The Border Patrol also said it would examine the actions of its officers. Uvalde Postpones Decision to Fire School Police Chief. The New York Times.: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/22/us/uvalde-school-district-police-chief-arredondo.html [xiii] This Committee’s chief goal from the very beginning has been to provide accurate information from dependable sources. The public’s need for accurate information only has intensified as we have investigated the facts surrounding the tragedy. Problems with the flow of information have plagued government, media, and public discussion about what happened at Robb Elementary from the outset—damaging public trust, inflicting a very real toll on the people of Uvalde, and creating an imperative to provide a reliable set of facts. Shortly after the shooting, authorities first reported to the public that the shooter killed fourteen students and one teacher, and the attacker was reported dead at that time. The next day, state leaders looked to law enforcement for more information in preparation for a broader press conference. The briefing was planned to be led by a Uvalde police lieutenant who had been at the scene, but that officer literally passed out while waiting in the hallway beforehand. In his place, the DPS Regional Director for South Texas, Victor Escalon, agreed to conduct the briefing. Director Escalon, who is not based in Uvalde, had arrived on the scene shortly before the attacker was killed. He did not personally witness the bulk of the day’s events, leaving him to depend on secondhand knowledge acquired from other law enforcement officers who had been part of the response. That briefing was the basis for the press conference the day after the shooting, in which Governor Abbott and other leaders relied on the information law enforcement gave them. After correcting the death toll to nineteen students and two teachers, they made statements based upon Director Escalon’s briefing (which itself was based entirely on secondhand knowledge). These statements repeated a false narrative that the entire incident lasted as little as forty minutes thanks to officers who rapidly devised a plan, stacked up, and neutralized the attacker. The general sentiments shared that day were that law enforcement responders were courageous in Page 23

32. keeping the attacker pinned down while children were evacuated. Another press conference was held the next day outside of Robb Elementary School, and new details emerged. One was: “The back door was propped open. It wasn’t supposed to be…a teacher…propped it open and that was an access point that the subject used.” The idea that the door was propped open led to public outcry, and even a teacher who was not implicated was devastated as she wondered whether she had accidentally left a door open. The truth – confirmed by video – that while a teacher had propped open the west exterior door, she actually saw the attacker approaching and slammed that door shut as she called 911 for help. The door was closed; it simply was either already unlocked or the lock failed to engage, which she could not have known because the doors lock from the outside. On May 31, it was confirmed that her account was correct. The media repeated the communication failures of relevant authorities, supplemented by leaks released uncritically. The Committee certainly does not question the role or value or reporting by the press, but it is unfortunate that caution and context have been so uncommon. Various people commenting publicly perpetually have taken information at face value, presenting it as definitive when provided as tentative, and they rarely have characterized it as one small part of a vastly larger body of evidence. (To their credit, some outlets did produce original investigative pieces questioning many of the inconsistencies documented earlier.) The Committee recognizes the natural tension between providing the public with immediate information and the need for accuracy. A complete and thorough investigation can take months or even years to confirm every detail, especially when this many law enforcement officers are involved. However, one would expect law enforcement during a briefing would be very careful to state what facts are verifiable, and which ones are not. (…) The problem, of course, is the power, speed, and unaccountable nature of social media. While it allows the truth to spread, it had done far more to amplify incorrect or incomplete information. (…) Mark Twain said it best: “A lie can travel halfway around the world before the truth puts on its shoes.” Texas House of Representative.: https://house.texas.gov/_media/pdf/committees/reports/87interim/Robb-Elementary- Investigative-Committee-Report.pdf Page 24

33. [xiv] E-mail Sent by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W on June 10th 2022 at around 9:30 P.M Good afternoon, Thank you for your FOIA request to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). We have interpreted your request to mean you are seeking the following records: [1] your discussions about the decision of the Minnesota Department of Human Rights “to file a charge of discrimination against the City of Minneapolis to investigate (…) a pattern or practice of race discrimination;” [2] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has “reviewed approximately 700 hours of body worn camera footage and nearly 480,000 pages of City and Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) documents, such as training materials, policies and procedures, officers’ disciplinary records, policy development materials, reports and assessments, internal and external communication and correspondence, documents reflecting interagency agreements, public messaging documents, and data from MPD’s covert social media account” for the purpose of determining whether a pattern or practice of race discrimination existed in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; [3] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has interviewed “MPD patrol officers, sergeants, lieutenants, command staff, inspectors who serve as the leaders for each of MPD’s five precincts, current and former Police Chiefs, current and former Assistant and Deputy Chiefs, police dispatchers, civilian staff, and community navigators who serve as liaisons between MPD and specific community groups” to determine whether a pattern or practice of race discrimination existed in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; [4] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has interviewed “City of Minneapolis staff who are involved with the City’s public safety system and elected officials, including current and former Mayors and City Council Members, Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights staff, Office of Police Conduct Review staff, Office of Violence Prevention staff, Human Resources staff, appointed members of the Police Conduct Oversight Commission, and prosecutors from the City Attorney’s Office” for the purpose of determining whether a pattern or practice of race discrimination existed in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD: [5] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has interviewed “prosecutors from the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Hennepin County Public Defenders, Minneapolis firefighters, health care professionals in Minneapolis, private attorneys in the Twin Cities, and representatives from violence prevention and support service organizations in Minneapolis” for the purpose of determining whether a pattern or practice of race discrimination existed in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; [6] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has “interviewed and reviewed statements from over 2,200 community members about their experiences with MPD” for the purpose of determining whether a pattern or practice of race discrimination existed in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; [7] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil Page 25

34. rights enforcement agency, which was informed by “some City and MPD leaders, as well as some MPD officers (…) that disproportionality in policing in Minneapolis is due to factors other than race;” [8] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has “compared use of force incidents against Black and white individuals in similar circumstances” to “determine if race is the likely reason that MPD officers use higher rates of force against Black individuals;” [9] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “race is the likely reason that MPD officers use higher rates of more severe force against Black individuals compared to white individuals in similar circumstances;” iii [10] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which defines a neck restraint as a “method by which a person applies sufficient pressure to a person to make breathing difficult or impossible;” iv [11] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “MPD officers were almost twice as likely to use neck restraints against Black individuals than white individuals who were recorded as behaving in the same way when interacting with police;” [12] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that the “use of neck restraints against Black and white community members may be even greater” because “MPD officers failed to report at least 6% of the neck restraints they use;” v [13] the obligations of your police/sheriff departments on documenting the force they have used for the purpose of an arrest and/or a detention; [14] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “MPD are more likely to use chemical irritants against Black individuals compared to white individuals in similar circumstances;” vi [15] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “MPD officers are more frequently injured when they use neck restraints against community members and when they use inappropriate levels of force;” vii [16] the mechanism by which members of your police/sheriff department’s report the injury they have sustained as a direct consequence of an arrest and/or a detention; [17] the policy of your city/county government on compiling statistics of injuries incurred by members of your police/sheriff department as a direct consequence of an arrest and/or a detention; [18] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “MPD officers are more likely to stop vehicles with people of color and indigenous individuals when officers are more likely to identify the race/ethnicity of a vehicle’s occupants;” [19] the definition in use by your city/county/state/federal government for what constitutes “racial profiling;” viii [20] the policy adopted by your city/county/state/federal government to deter racial profiling for the purpose of not exacerbating racial disparities; [21] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has examined the “collateral consequences of unjustified citations” on people of African descent; ix [22] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found that “MPD’s covert social media accounts were used to conduct surveillance, unrelated to criminal activity, and to falsely engage with Black individuals, Black leaders, and Black organizations;” x [23] the name(s), the academic background(s), the professional responsibility(ies) of your city/county/state/federal government employees who are members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the National Urban League; [24] the policy of your city/county/state/federal government on retaining as a matter of record your discussions with the NAACP and the National Urban League; [25] the formal/informal discussions held between your city/county/state/federal government and representatives of the NAACP and the National Urban League on the subject of police brutality; [26] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which has documented systemic chauvinism, discrimination, misogyny, racism and sexism in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; xi [27] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which holds the structure of the MPD responsible for the existence of systemic chauvinism, discrimination, Page 26

35. misogyny, racism and sexism in the City of Minneapolis and the MPD; xii [28] your discussions about the Minnesota Department of Human Rights as a civil rights enforcement agency, which found the MPD and the City of Minneapolis guilty of withholding exculpatory evidence even after an “Entry of Appearance” (or a request for information) had been filed in a criminal case where police brutality was at play; xiii [29] the work- sharing agreement concluded between the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights; [30] the discussions between the EEOC and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights on the subject of their April 27th 2022 report entitled “Investigation into the City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department: Findings from the Minnesota Department of Human Rights;” xiv [31] your discussions about the May 20th 2022 memorandum adopted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the subject of their use-of-force policy; xv [32] your discussions about the May 25th 2022 executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris White House administration to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety;” xvi [33] your discussions about Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W as a Black man, who has in August 2020 obtained documents about the internship he had completed in 2011 with the Callaway County government and the 13th Judicial Circuit Court of Missouri; [34] your discussions about Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W as a Black man, who has for the purpose of his 2011 internship spent a non-negligible amount of time with several elected city/county/state officials in the State of Missouri; [35] your discussions about Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W as a Black man, who was in 2011 officially considered in the eyes of the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Westminster College (in Fulton, Missouri) as an “international student;” [36] your discussions about Westminster College as a post-secondary academic institution, which defines a “full-time undergraduate student” as a person who is taking at least 12 credit hours per semester; xvii [37] your discussions about Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W as a Black man, who was considered a “full-time undergraduate student” taking at least 12 credit hours per semester between January 2010 and May 2013; [38] your discussions about Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W as a Black man, who was informed in 2010 and 2011 that his work activities in the U.S.A needed to align with his major area of study for the purpose of a “Curricular Practical Training (CPT);” xviii [39] the discussions between your city/county/state/federal government and the colleges/universities (in your geographical area) about recruiting their students as interns and/or employees; [40] whether your city/county/state/federal government ever had international students on an F-1 visa perform a CPT and/or an OPT in your offices; [41] whether your city/county/state/federal government ever offered an employment contract to international students on an F-1 visa who have previously performed a CPT and/or an Optional Practical Training (OPT) with your offices. For item numbers 31 and 32, would you accept: [31] COPS Office emails discussing the COPS Office implementation of the May 20th 2022 memorandum adopted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the subject of their use-of-force policy; and [32] COPS Office emails discussing the COPS Office implementation of the May 25th 2022 executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris White House administration to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety;”. Please confirm that our understanding of your FOIA request is accurate. The COPS FOIA reference number for this request is COPS-2022-FOI-0101. Please refer to this number when Page 27

36. contacting our office about this request. Best, Nicole Lee Government Information Specialist Excerpt of E-mail Sent by Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W to the Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) on June 13th 2022 at 6:58 A.M Hello, Thank you for your email. I am in receipt of it. I am writing this letter in response to your correspondence from June 10th 2022 to express concerns about the search you propose. Please be advised that I have concerns with your correspondence because of your failure to adequately address [1] the formal/informal ties, which exist between the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Minnesota Police Department (MPD); [2] whether the COPS provided funding to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022; [3] whether any objection(s) were made to COPS providing funding to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022 (if you have indeed previously given them money); [4] whether you have had any discussions about the MSNBC news coverage of the May 25th 2022 executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris White House administration to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety;” [5] the names, the academic backgrounds, the professional responsibilities and the annual salaries of people who are looking into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [6] the deadline set by the DOJ for the completion of their report into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [7] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report the funding provided to the Uvalde Police Department by COPS (if you have indeed previously given them money); [8] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report any objection(s) made by community members about providing the Uvalde Police Department the money of the U.S Federal government taking into consideration their reaction after being informed that Latino children were being killed at Robb Elementary School; [9] whether the DOJ will take a leading role in restoring trust between the Latino community and law-enforcement personnel in Uvalde, Texas. Page 28

37. As a representative of the media and a member of the general public, I ask that you perform a more thorough search for responsive records detailing [1] the formal/informal ties, which exist between the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Minnesota Police Department (MPD); [2] the funds provided by COPS to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022; [3] the objection(s) made to COPS providing funding to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022 (if you have indeed previously given them money); [4] your discussions about the May 20th 2022 memorandum adopted by the DOJ on the subject of their use of force policy; [5] your discussions about the May 25th 2022 executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris White House administration to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety;” [6] your discussions about the MSNBC news coverage on the subject of the May 25th 2022 executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden/Kamala Harris White House administration to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety;” [7] the names, the academic backgrounds, the professional responsibilities and the annual salaries of people who are looking into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [8] the deadline set by the DOJ for the completion of their report into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [9] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report the funding provided to the Uvalde Police Department by COPS (if you have indeed previously given them money); [10] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report any objection(s) made by community members about providing the Uvalde Police Department the money of the U.S Federal government taking into consideration their reaction after being informed that Latino children were being killed at Robb Elementary School; [11] whether the DOJ will take a leading role in restoring trust between the Latino community and law-enforcement personnel in Uvalde, Texas; [12] whether the DOJ ever had international students on an F-1 visa perform a Curricular Practical Training (CPT) or an Optional Practical Training (OPT) with your offices; [13] the name(s), the academic background(s) and the professional responsibility(ies) of international students doing a CPT or an OPT with the DOJ; [14] the name(s), the academic background(s), the professional responsibility(ies), the annual salary(ies) of NAACP and National Urban League members who are employed with the DOJ. I sincerely hope you reconsider your response. Be well. Take care. Keep yourselves at arms distance. W (AACL) Michael A. Ayele Anti-Racist Human Rights Activist Audio-Visual Media Analyst Anti-Propaganda Journalist Page 29

38. E-mail Sent by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) to Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W on July 14th 2022 at 4:25 P.M Good morning, Thank you for your email dated June 13, 2022. After reviewing your clarification of the records you are seeking, we have narrowed the scope of your request to the following: [1] the formal/informal ties, which exist between the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and the Minnesota Police Department (MPD); [2] whether the COPS provided funding to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022; [3] whether any objection(s) were made to COPS providing funding to the MPD between January 01st 1991 and May 29th 2022 (if you have indeed previously given them money); [4] COPS Office emails/email attachments from 5/25/2022 through the present on the MSNBC news coverage of executive order (EO) adopted by the Joe Biden to “advance effective, accountable policing and strengthen public safety” [5] the names, the academic backgrounds, the professional responsibilities and the annual salaries of people who are looking into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [6] the deadline set by the DOJ for the completion of their report into the “law enforcement response to the Uvalde, Texas elementary school shooting that left 19 children and two teachers dead;” [7] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report the funding provided to the Uvalde Police Department by COPS (if you have indeed previously given them money); [8] whether the DOJ will discuss in their upcoming report any objection(s) made by community members about providing the Uvalde Police Department the money of the U.S Federal government taking into consideration their reaction after being informed that Latino children were being killed at Robb Elementary School; [9] whether the DOJ will take a leading role in restoring trust between the Latino community and law-enforcement personnel in Uvalde, Texas. Please confirm that our understanding of your FOIA request is accurate. Best, Nicole Lee Government Information Specialist Page 30

39. Excerpt of E-mail Sent by Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) on July 14th 2022 at 6:50 P.M Hello, Thank you for your email. I am in receipt of it. Thank you also for accurately summarizing the content of my FOIA request. Please proceed with the search for responsive records. Be well. Take care. W (AACL) Michael A. Ayele Anti-Racist Human Rights Activist Audio-Visual Media Analyst Anti-Propaganda Journalist [xv] See E-mail Sent by the MODMH on November 23rd 2021 at 10: 16 P.M to Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W W, This letter is in response to your Missouri Open Meetings and Records (“Sunshine Law”) request, which the Department of Mental Health received from you by email on November 19, 2021. The Sunshine Law, RSMo § Page 31

40. 610.023.3, requires the Department to respond within three days. This letter serves as the required response. You submitted a request for thirty sets of records in the attached document. We are searching for records that may be responsive to your request for items (26) and (27). Some records may be closed or confidential under Missouri law. See § 610.021, RSMo. For item (1), the department does not have a responsive record. For items requested (2) through (25), (28), (29), and (30), the description of the records are not clear or are without adequate specificity in order to be able to conduct an efficient and effective search for records and/or describe records that are not maintained by the department in the regular course of business (Eliza Dushku, EEOC’s policies and definitions and statistics). The earliest date that responsive records, if any, for (26) and (27) may be available is December 7, 2021. Before providing records, our office must obtain all responsive records from various divisions and departments, ensure they are in an accessible format, review records for closed or privileged information, make necessary redactions, and compile completed and reviewed records to provide to you. These steps depend on the availability of staff, the volume of the request, the number of other active Sunshine requests, and other ongoing work activities of staff reviewers. The date provided above considers these circumstances and our efforts to provide responsive records at the earliest possible date. Section 610.026 also allows us to collect certain fees from requesters, including search, research, and staff time to respond to the request. After the search for records responsive to items (26) and (27) have been completed, I will notify you of the estimated cost, if any. Sincerely, Janet Gordon Records Custodian Department of Mental Health Resources: Stressed by COVID-19? Access these resources for your emotional health: https://dmh.mo.gov/disaster- services/covid-19-information DHSS COVID-19 24 hour hotline: 877-435-8411 Page 32

41. Disaster Distress Helpline: Phone 800/985-5990. Text “TalkWithUs” to 66746 Social Justice: https://dmh.mo.gov/disaster-services/coping-with-community-unrest MO Show Me Hope Crisis Counseling Program: https://www.moshowmehope.org/ CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail communication and any attachments may contain confidential and privileged information for the use of the designated recipients named above. The designated recipients are prohibited from redisclosing this information to any other party without authorization and are required to destroy the information after its stated need has been fulfilled. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you have received this communication in error and that any review, disclosure, dissemination, distribution or copying of it or its contents is prohibited by federal or state law. If you have received this communication in error, please notify me immediately by telephone at 573.751.8067, and destroy all copies of this communication and any attachments. See E-mail Sent by the MODMH on December 17th 2021 at 8:47 P.M to Michael A. Ayele (a.k.a) W W, For #26 and #27, we have identified four times the Department of Mental Health engaged in mediation sessions and five times when the department opted not to mediate. Sincerely, Janet Gordon Records Custodian Department of Mental Health Resources: Stressed by COVID-19? Access these resources for your emotional health: https://dmh.mo.gov/disaster- Page 33

42. services/covid-19-information DHSS COVID-19 24 hour hotline: 877-435-8411 Disaster Distress Helpline: Phone 800/985-5990. Text “TalkWithUs” to 66746 Social Justice: https://dmh.mo.gov/disaster-services/coping-with-community-unrest MO Show Me Hope Crisis Counseling Program: https://www.moshowmehope.org/ [xvi] Plaintiff March for Our Lives Florida (“MFOL”) is the state chapter of March for Our Lives, a membership organization formed after the same tragic events at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School that prompted the creation of the Commission. MFOL advocates evidence-based policies to stop gun violence, which is the second leading cause of death of young people in America. Unlike the policies advocated by the Commission, MFOL’s recommendations take into account the ways gun violence is inextricably bound with the fight for racial justice, economic justice, immigrant rights, and the rights of LGBTQ people. MFOL rejects the claim that guns are the solution to gun violence. Instead it advocates for higher standards for gun ownership, bans on dangerous assault weapons and high-capacity magazines, stronger government action to combat gun violence, better mental health care funding, better oversight of state use of violence, and increased participation of young people in politics. (…) Plaintiff bring this action to permanently enjoin the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission (“the Commission”) from violating Florida’s Sunshine Laws. Plaintiffs are organizations and individuals representing Florida students who the Commission prevented from speaking at its public meeting on October 15 – 16, 2019. These advocates wanted to provide a voice the Commission has ignored – that of the very students it was created to protect. They planned to explain to the Commission how the policies it has recommended to make Florida’s students less, not more, safe, to ask the Commission to reconsider its initial recommendations, and to influence 2020 legislative recommendations about which the Commission was meeting. (…) The Commission held its October 15-16 meeting at a remote resort far from public transportation, with posted parking rates of $18-32. This choice was a significant barrier to interested members of the public who lacked resources to cover the cost of private transportation or the advertised cost of parking. (…) The Commission then prevented those people who were not deterred by the meeting location from testifying with a bait-and-switch: publicly announcing before and throughout the meeting that it would take public comments at 4:45 p.m. on October 16, but then suddenly announcing at 2:00 p.m. that day that it would instead take comments immediately from only those present at that time and adjourn long before 4:45. (…) These actions were illegal. Florida law requires that public meetings be “open to the public” and be held in Page 34

43. locations that do not “discriminate on the basis of … economic status or … operate in such a manner as to unreasonably restrict public access….” § 286.011, Fla. Stat. Florida Courts have also recognized that a pubic entity’s “need to conduct” a meeting at an inaccessible location must be balanced against “the interests of the public in having a reasonable opportunity to attend.” Rhea v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua Cty., 636 So. 2d 1383, 1385 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). (…) Florida law also requires that “[m]embers of the public shall be given a reasonable opportunity to be heard on a proposition before a board or commission.” § 286.0114(4)(d), Fla. Stat. The Commission denied Plaintiffs that opportunity by deceiving them about when public comment would be received. (…) The Commission’s actions were part of a continuing pattern of ignoring the voices of the people most directly affected by its recommendations—students in public schools. (…) The majority of the voting commissioners have a law enforcement background and no professional expertise in public education, school administration, youth development, or mental health. (…) The Commission lacks representation from experts that could provide perspectives on how its proposals would affect vulnerable student groups, including children with disabilities and children of color, who are disproportionately and unfairly targeted by over-policing in the name of school safety. (…) The Commission has no voting members who are people of color, students, or current educators. (…) The Commission has not sought out significant input from these groups regarding its recommendations and report. (…) To the contrary, as the events of this lawsuit show, the Commission has actively avoided hearing from people in all of these communities of interest. (…) The Commission’s lack of expertise and unwillingness to listen to stakeholders like Plaintiffs has resulted in recommendations that are harmful to the very people it is trying to protect. It has advocated for putting more police and armed guards in schools, even though research shows that increasing the number of guns in a location makes children less, not more, safe. It has advocated for “zero-tolerance” disciplinary policies that will worsen existing racial disparities in school discipline and arrests. And, it has advocated funding unproven and expensive “school hardening” that does not address the underlying causes of gun violence. (…) Plaintiffs have brought these matters to the Commission’s attention by letter, but, consistent with its disregard for community input, the Commission has not replied. (…) Plaintiffs have therefore filed this suit as a last-ditch effort to compel the Commission to comply with the law and listen to the voices of students it has silenced. They seek an injunction requiring the Commission to comply with its legal responsibilities by selecting accessible locations for future meetings and abiding by its posted schedules for public comment. They also seek to compel the Commission to accept the public comments it refused to hear on October 16 and refrain from making future recommendations until it has done so. March for Our Lives et al v Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission et al. SPLC.: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/msdcomplaint.pdf [xvii] June 22nd 2022 Conversation Between Ana Kasparian and Wosny Lambre on the mass-shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas Wosny Lambre (WL).: I feel like the shamefulness of it all is like: ‘Well, the good guys with the guns are going to save it all (…)’ That’s not how these things work in reality (…) The best thing that can happen is to keep Page 35

44. these weapons from the hands of the people who would carry out this type of thing but again, we don’t have our mental health infrastructure in line in this country. We don’t take care of people. We’re the kind of country that produces the type of people who shoot and kill 30 or 40 people at a time. As messed up as it sounds, that’s just the facts. Ana Kasparian (AK).: Yeah, you made several good points there. Every scapegoat and every talking points we usually hear about in response to a mass-shooting was debunked with what happened in Uvalde. They say: ‘You got to have school police.’ Well, they had school police. They say: ‘Well, if you had a good guy with a gun, they’d be able to stop bad guys with a gun.’ A lot of alleged good guys with guns meaning the cops: they were there from the very beginning and they didn’t stop the shooter for over an hour. They say: ‘Oh, you need to have security measures.’ Well, they had those security measures, but those security measures failed. Everything that gun advocates say would prevent mass shootings was debunked on May 24th 2022. Senate Reaches Bipartisan Agreement on Gun Bill. The Young Turks on YouTube.: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Qz2mXK1-40 Your request will be forwarded to the relevant Texas Workforce Commission department(s) to locate the information you seek and to determine the volume and any costs associated with satisfying your request. You will be contacted about the availability and/or provided with copies of the records in question. PLEASE NOTE: Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code, the Public Information Act, does not require a governmental body to create new information, to do legal research, or to answer questions. You can monitor the progress of your request at the link below and you'll receive an email when your request has been completed. Again, thank you for using the Open Records Center. Texas Workforce Commission To monitor the progress or update this request please log into the Open Records Center Page 36

45. DocuSign Envelope ID' 158F0B9B-B94C-4162-13896-829EBD264B78 WORKSHARING AGREEMENT BETWEEN Texas Workforce Commission, Civil Rights Division and THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION Dallas District Office FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020 I. INTRODUCTION A. The Texas Workforce Commission, Civil Rights Division, hereinafter referred to as the FEPA, has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimination filed against employers of 15 or more employees occurring within the State of Texas based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, mental or physical disability and genetic information pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Texas Labor Code, Chapter 21. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, hereinafter referred to as the EEOC, has jurisdiction over allegations of employment discrimination occurring throughout the United States where such charges are based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, all pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)) (hereinafter referred to as Title VII). The EEOC has jurisdiction to investigate and determine charges of discrimination based on age (40 or older) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended (29 U.S.C.§ 621 et. seq.)(ADEA), for unequal wages based on sex under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended (29 U.S.C. § 206) (EPA), and over allegations of employment discrimination based on disability pursuant to Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended (42 U.S.C. § 12101) (ADA), and over the use or acquisition of genetic information as the basis for employment decisions pursuant to Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008. B. In recognition of, and to the extent of the common jurisdiction and goals of the two (2) Agencies, and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants contained herein, the FEPA and the EEOC hereby agree to the terms of this Worlcsharing Agreement, which is designed to provide individuals with an efficient procedure for obtaining redress for their grievances under appropriate State of Texas and Federal laws. II. FILING OF CHARGES OF DISCRIMINATION A. In order to facilitate the assertion of employment rights, the EEOC and the FEPA each designate the other as its agent for the purpose of receiving and drafting charges, including those that are not jurisdictional with the agency that initially receives the charges. The EEOC's receipt of charges on the FEPA's behalf will automatically initiate the proceedings of both the EEOC and the FEPA for the purposes of Section 706 (c) and (e) (1) of Title VII. This delegation of authority to receive 1

46. DocuSign Envelope ID 158F0B9B-B94C-4162-13896-829EB0264B78 charges does not include the right of one Agency to determine the jurisdiction of the other Agency over a charge. Charges can be transferred from one agency to another in accordance with the terms of this agreement or by other mutual agreement. B. The FEPA shall take all charges alleging a violation of Title VII, the ADEA, the EPA, GINA or the ADA where both the FEPA and the EEOC have mutual jurisdiction, or where the EEOC only has jurisdiction, so long as the allegations meet the minimum requirements of those Acts, and for charges specified in Section III. A. 1. below, refer them to the EEOC for initial processing. C. Each Agency will inform individuals of their rights to file charges directly with the other Agency and or assist any person alleging employment discrimination to draft a charge in a manner that will satisfy the requirements of both agencies to the extent of their common jurisdiction. Normally, once an agency begins an investigation, it resolves the charge. Charges may be transferred between the EEOC and the FEPA within the framework of a mutually agreeable system. Each agency will advise Charging Parties that charges will be resolved by the agency taking the charge except when the agency taking the charge lacks jurisdiction or when the charge is to be transferred in accordance with Section III (DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES). D. For charges that are to be dual-filed, each Agency will use EEOC Charge Form 5 (or alternatively, an employment discrimination charge form which within statutory limitations, is acceptable in form and content to the EEOC and the FEPA) to draft charges. When a charge is taken based on disability, the nature of the disability shall not be disclosed on the face of the charge. E. Each agency will make every effort to forward all dual filed charges to the other agency within five (5) working days of receipt. Charge data information on the charge taken by the FEPA that will be investigated by the EEOC will be entered by the FEPA in the Integrated Mission System (IMS) within five (5) days of the filing of the charge. Each agency will notify each other on a weekly basis in IMS' Dual Filing module of its intent concerning its processing of each charge and upload to IMS the EEOC Form 5 (Charge of Discrimination) for all dual filed charges. F. Within ten (10) calendar days of receipt, each Agency agrees that it will notify both the Charging Party and the Respondent of the dual-filed nature of each such charge it receives for initial processing and explain the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the applicable Federal, State, or Local statutes. III. DIVISION OF INITIAL CHARGE-PROCESSING RESPONSIBILITIES In recognition of the statutory authority granted to the FEPA by Section 706(c) and 706(d) of Title VII as amended; and by Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the transmittal of charges of age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the primary responsibility for resolving charges between the FEPA and the EEOC will be divided as follows: A. The EEOC and the FEPA will process all Title VII, ADA, GINA, and ADEA charges that they originally receive. 1. For charges originally received by the EEOC and/or to be initially processed by the EEOC, the FEPA waives its right of exclusive jurisdiction to initially process such charges for a period of 60 days for the purpose of allowing the EEOC to proceed immediately with the processing of such charges before the 61st day. In addition, the EEOC will initially process the following charges: -- All Title VII, ADA, and concurrent Title VII/ADA charges jurisdictional with the FEPA and received by the FEPA 240 days or more after the date of violation; 2

47. DocuSign Envelope ID 158F0B9B-B94C-4162-13896-829EBD264B78 -- All disability-based charges that may not be resolved by the FEPA in a manner consistent with the ADA. -- All concurrent Title VII/EPA charges; -- All GINA charges; -- All charges against the FEPA or its parent organization where such parent organization exercises direct or indirect control over the charge decision-making process; -- All charges filed by EEOC Commissioners; -- Charges also covered by the Immigration Reform and Control Act; -- Complaints referred to the EEOC by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, or Federal fund-granting agencies under 29 CFR § 1640, 1641, and 1691. -- Any charge where the EEOC is a party to a Conciliation Agreement or a Consent Decree that, upon mutual consultation and agreement, is relevant to the disposition of the charge. The EEOC will notify the FEPA of all Conciliation Agreements and Consent Decrees that have features relevant to the disposition of subsequent charges; -- Any charge alleging retaliation for filing a charge with the EEOC or for cooperating with the EEOC; and -- All charges against Respondents that are designated for initial processing by the EEOC in a supplementary memorandum to this Agreement. 2. The FEPA will initially process the following types of charges: -- Any charge alleging retaliation for filing a charge with the FEPA or cooperating with the FEPA; -- Any charge where the FEPA is a party to a Conciliation Agreement or a Consent Decree that, upon mutual consultation and agreement, is relevant to the disposition of the charge. The FEPA will provide the EEOC with an on-going list of all Conciliation Agreements and Consent Decrees that have features relevant to the disposition of subsequent charges; -- All charges that allege more than one basis of discrimination where at least one basis is not covered by the laws administered by the EEOC but is covered by the FEPA Ordinance, or where the EEOC is mandated by federal court decision or by internal administrative EEOC policy to dismiss the charge, but the FEPA can process that charge. -- All charges against Respondents that are designated for initial processing by the FEPA in a supplementary memorandum to this Agreement; and -- All disability-based charges against Respondents over which the EEOC does not have jurisdiction. B. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Agreement, the FEPA or the EEOC may request to be granted the right to initially process any charge subject to agreement of the other agency. Such variations shall not be inconsistent with the objectives of this Worksharing Agreement or the Contracting Principles. 3

48. DocuSign Envelope ID: 158F0B9B-8940-4162-B896-829EBD264B78 C. Each Agency will on a quarterly basis notify the other of all cases in litigation and will notify each other when a new suit is filed. As charges are received by one Agency against a Respondent on the other Agency's litigation list a copy of the new charge will be sent to the other Agency's litigation unit within five (5) working days. D. EEOC may defer up to a total of twenty (20) charges per month to the FEPA for investigation. IV. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION A. Both the FEPA and the EEOC shall make available for inspection and copying to appropriate officials from the other Agency any information that may assist each Agency in carrying out its responsibilities. Such information shall include, but not necessarily be limited to, investigative files, conciliation agreements, staffing information, case management printouts, charge processing documentation, and any other material and data as may be related to the processing of dual-filed charges or administration of the contract. The Agency accepting information agrees to comply with any confidentiality requirements imposed on the agency providing the information. With respect to all information obtained from the EEOC, the FEPA agrees to observe the confidentiality provisions of Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA and GINA. B. In order to expedite the resolution of charges or facilitate the working of this Agreement, either Agency may request or permit personnel of the other Agency to accompany or to observe its personnel when processing a charge. V. RESOLUTION OF CHARGES A. Both agencies will adhere to the procedures set out in the EEOC's State and Local Handbook, including current revisions thereto. B. For the purpose of according substantial weight to the FEPA final finding and order, the FEPA must submit to the EEOC copies of all documents pertinent to conducting a substantial weight review; the evaluation will be designed to determine whether the following items have been addressed in a manner sufficient to satisfy EEOC requirements; including, but not limited to: I. jurisdictional requirements, 2. investigation and resolution of all relevant issues alleging personal harm with appropriate documentation and using proper theory, 3. relief, if appropriate, 4. mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with all terms of conciliation agreements, orders after public hearing or consent orders to which the FEPA is a party. C. In order to be eligible for contract credit and/or payment, submissions must meet all the substantive and administrative requirements as stipulated in the Contracting Principles. D. For the purposes of determining eligibility for contract payment, a final action is defined as the point after which the charging party has no administrative recourse, appeal, or other avenue of redress available under applicable State and Local statutes. 4

49. DocuSign Envelope ID: 158F0B9B-B94C-4162-8896-829EBD264B78 VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORKSHARING AGREEMENT A. Each agency will designate a person as liaison official for the other agency to contact concerning the day-to-day implementation for the Agreement. The liaison for the FEPA will be Bryan Snoddy, Division Director. The liaison official for the EEOC will be Jaime Valdez, State, Local and Tribal Program Manager. B. The agencies will monitor the allocation of charge-processing responsibilities as set forth in the Agreement. Where it appears that the overall projection appears inappropriate, the appropriate portions of this Agreement will be modified to ensure full utilization of the investigation and resolution capacities of the FEPA and rapid redress for allegations of unlawful employment discrimination. C. The agencies agree to work together in furtherance of the EEOC's current Strategic Plan when assessing the allocation of charges under this agreement and to cooperate in compliance and enforcement efforts as well as training, outreach and technical assistance efforts encompassed by the Plan. D. The EEOC will provide original forms to be copied by the FEPA, in accordance with the Regulations and the Compliance Manual to be used by the FEPAs in correspondence with Charging Parties and Respondents. E. If a dispute regarding the implementation or application of this agreement cannot be resolved by the FEPA and District Office Director, the issues will be reduced to writing by both parties and forwarded to the Director of the Office of Field Programs for resolution. F. This Agreement shall operate from the first day of October 2019 to the thirtieth day of September 2020 and may be renewed or modified by mutual consent of the parties. I have read the foregoing Worlcsharing Agreement and I accept and agree to the provisions contained therein. 7,(1 a McCallister, District Director .S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Dallas District Office 4s ward erna, Executive Director Texas Workforce Commission 10/9/2019 Date 5

50. APPENDIX A.