Global Nuclear Expansion ~ Challenges and Opportunities~

1. Tsutomu Arai Director, International Nuclear Energy Cooperation Division Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Global Nuclear Expansion ~Challenges and Opportunities~

2. Contents • Introduction: Nuclear Renaissance • Global Nuclear Expansion: Risk and Risk Management • Nuclear Safety • Nuclear Security • Nuclear Non-Proliferation/Safeguards • Management of Radioactive Waste • Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy • Conclusion 2

3. 1 Nuclear Renaissance Global competition for energy resources Climate change concerns NPG, which lowers greenhouse gas (CO2) emissions, could provide a basic source of power supply. World trend of introducing or expanding NPG • Countries planning to introduce NPG • Countries planning to expand NPG 3

4. 1.1 Countries and regions planning to introduce NPG Poland Belarus Mongolia Turkey Bangladesh Albania Jordan Vietnam Italy Georgia Libya Thailand Kazakhstan Morocco Philippine Israel Tunisia Singapore Algeria Venezuela Iran Ghana Malaysia Nigeria United Arab Emirates Indonesia Egypt Yemen Chile GCC Countries（UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia)

5. 1.2 Countries and regions planning to expand NPG Finland Sweden Slovakia Czech Lithuania Germany Russia Canada Ukraine Netherlands United States China Switzerland South Korea Mexico United Kingdom Japan Armenia Belgium Taiwan Pakistan Spain India Brazil France South Africa Slovenia Argentina Hungary Rumania Reference: World Nuclear Association web site URL http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/ractors.html Bulgaria 5

6. 2. Global Nuclear Expansion: Risk and Risk Management • Nuclear safetyprevention of accidents A large scale accident in one country could have negative impact onpeaceful uses of nuclear energy in other countries. • Nuclear security counter-terrorism measures Should nuclear terrorism happen, the global trend of nuclear renaissance could be reversed. • Nuclear Non-Proliferation/Safeguards prevention of diversion of nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, etc. Compatibility of nuclear power utilization with non-proliferation requirements Global efforts are required for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation/safeguards, safety and security 6

7. 2.1 Nuclear Safety : Challenges • Continued operation of old-type reactors • Safety of nuclear reactors has been improved since large accidents. (ex.) Three Mile Island accident (1979), Chernobyl accident (1986) • Human resources development • Countries introducing NPG should develop their human resources in the field of regulation as well as operation. • Countries expanding NPG should develop additional human resources and maintain nuclear safety culture. 7

8. 2.1 Nuclear Safety : International Efforts • International conventions (ex.) Nuclear Safety Convention, RadWaste Safety Convention • IAEA activities Development of Nuclear Safety Standards Conduct of peer reviews ANSN (Asian Nuclear Safety Network) • Bilateral cooperation (ex.) Japan conducts bilateral cooperation between regulatory authorities of ROK, China, US, etc. • Non-governmental cooperation WANO (World Association of Nuclear Operators) 8

9. 2.2 Nuclear Security: Challenges • Threat of nuclear terrorism • Nuclear power plants Theft of nuclear material for malicious acts, sabotage of facilities, etc. • Radioactive sources utilization theft of radioactive sources for malicious acts (ex. “dirty bomb”) International community has taken various measures to address threats of nuclear terrorism. 9

10. 2.2 Nuclear Security • Security issues • Security of nuclear material • Importance of physical protection of nuclear material both at facilities and during transport • IAEA illicit trafficking data base (ITDB) 15 incidents ---unauthorized possession and related criminal activities involving HEU and plutonium (during1993-2008) 10

11. 2.2 Security of Radioactive Sources • Need to secure radioactive sources (Co60, Cs137, etc.) • Radioactive sources are applied in various fields (medicine, industry, agriculture, etc.) • Relatively easy access to radioactive sources (ex. hospitals) • International documents • IAEA Code of Conduct on Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (2003) • IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources (2004) • IAEA Recommendation on Security of Radioactive Sources and Related Facilities (to be published) • The Communiqué of Nuclear Security Summit (2010) also refers to the security of radioactive substances 11

12. 2.2 Nuclear Security: International Efforts • International Conventions • Nuclear Terrorism Convention • Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment • IAEA guidelines and documents • INFCIRC/225 (Rev.5 will be published by the end of this year), other Nuclear Security Series documents • International efforts to improve capabilities IAEA supports (through its Nuclear Security Fund), GICNT(Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism),G8 Global Partnership, GTRI (Global Threat Reduction Initiative), etc. 12

13. 2.2 Nuclear Security Summit • Background:Need to strengthen nuclear security worldwide Collect political will to address nuclear security at the highest level • Participants: 47 countries and 3 international organizations (UN, IAEA and EU) • Outcomes: Share of the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, adoption of the Communiqué and Work Plan • Next Summit: 2012, In Seoul 13

14. 2.2 Nuclear Security Summit: Outcomes • Full implementation of all existing efforts (implementation of relative conventions, GICNT, G8GP) • Support of the Nuclear Terrorism Convention, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment • Minimization of use of HEU where technically and economically feasible • Emphasis on the important role of the IAEA • Cooperation for prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear material • Importance of the role of industry, promotion of nuclear security culture WINS(World Institute for Nuclear Security) • Security of radioactive substances Japan will start the radioactive source registration system from January 2011. 14

15. Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit Nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means to prevent terrorists, criminals, or other unauthorized actors from acquiring nuclear materials. In addition to our shared goals of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, we also all share the objective of nuclear security. Therefore those gathered here in Washington, D.C. on April 13, 2010, commit to strengthen nuclear security and reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism. Success will require responsible national actions and sustained and effective international cooperation. We welcome and join President Obama’s call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years, as we work together to enhance nuclear security. Therefore, we: 15

16. Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 1. Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective international obligations, to maintain effective security of all nuclear materials, which includes nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons, and nuclear facilities under their control; to prevent non-state actors from obtaining the information or technology required to use such material for malicious purposes; and emphasize the importance of robust national legislative and regulatory frameworks for nuclear security; 2. Call on States to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary; 3. Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special precautions and agree to promote measures to secure, account for, and consolidate these materials, as appropriate; and encourage the conversion of reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel and minimization of use of highly enriched uranium, where technically and economically feasible; 16

17. Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 4. Endeavor to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work toward acceding to those not yet joined, consistent with national laws, policies and procedures; 5. Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as amended, and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, as essential elements of the global nuclear security architecture; 6. Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the international nuclear security framework and will work to ensure that it continues to have the appropriate structure, resources and expertise needed to carry out its mandated nuclear security activities in accordance with its Statute, relevant General Conference resolutions and its Nuclear Security Plans; 7. Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations as well as the contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G-8-led Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction within their respective mandates and memberships; 17

18. Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 8. Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels for the promotion of nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education, and training; and stress the importance of optimizing international cooperation and coordination of assistance; 9. Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking; and agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms in relevant areas such as nuclear detection, forensics, law enforcement, and the development of new technologies; 10. Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry, including the private sector, in nuclear security and will work with industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy, and security culture; 11. Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices that will not infringe upon the rights of States to develop and utilize nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and technology and will facilitate international cooperation in the field of nuclear security; and 18

19. Communiqué of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit 12. Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in relation to the security of radioactive substances and encourage efforts to secure those materials as well. Maintaining effective nuclear security will require continuous national efforts facilitated by international cooperation and undertaken on a voluntary basis by States. We will promote the strengthening of global nuclear security through dialogue and cooperation with all states. Thus, we issue the Work Plan as guidance for national and international action including through cooperation within the context of relevant international fora and organizations. We will hold the next Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea in 2012. April 13, 2010 19

20. 2.3 Nuclear Nonproliferation • Light water reactors (using LEU) will be mainly deployed in countries introducing NPG • Nonproliferation issues • Prevention of spread of sensitive technologies/equipment (ex) enrichment and reprocessing technology • Strengthening of the IAEA safeguards Increase of facilities to be covered by the IAEA safeguards Need to address budget increase and to enhance effectiveness of safeguard activities Contribution of the NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) through the improvement and strengthening of international export controls of nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies. 20

21. 2.4 Management of Radioactive Waste • Global nuclear expansion Increase of spent fuel and radioactive waste worldwide • Radioactive waste disposal • Technical issue (ensuring safety and security) • Financial issue (cost to process and dispose) • Public acceptance (ex.) Interim storage of HLW at Rokkasho, Aomori Pref. in Japan Public acceptance is a common problem for all countries utilizing NPG. 21

22. 3.1 Japan’s Domestic Nuclear Energy Activities: General • Starting the operation of the first nuclear power plant in 1966, and adding the capacity continuously. • 10 electric power companies are now operating 54 LWRs (30 BWRs and 24 PWRs) that supply about 30% of electricity. • 2 units are under construction and 12 units are in preparation. 22

23. 3.2 Japan’s Domestic Nuclear Energy Activities: Ensuring 3S • Non-Proliferation/Safeguards • Conclusion of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol • The Integrated Safeguards have been applied since 2004. • Nuclear Safety • Concluding all international conventions related to nuclear safety • Sharing experience and lessons learned from the earthquake in Niigata Pref. in 2007 • Nuclear Security • Conclusion of Nuclear Terrorism Convention and Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material • Implementation of INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 • Implementation of CoC, Import-Export Guidance 23

24. 3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Bilateral Agreements • Ensuring 3S (nuclear Non-Proliferation/Safeguards, Safety and Security) including conclusion of Additional Protocol • Other factors Prospect for concrete plan to introduce NPG, general bilateral relations (including economic relations) • Additional Protocol • Strengthening the safeguards system, in particular the Agency’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities in States with Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. • Verifying not only the correctness of States’ declarations of nuclear material, but also their completeness (i.e. the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities). 24

25. 3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Basic Elements of Bilateral Agreements • Peaceful use • Non-Proliferation/Safeguards • Nuclear safety • Physical protection / nuclear security • Control on transfer to third countries +α 25

26. 3.3 Japan’s Nuclear Energy Diplomacy: Status of Japan’s Bilateral Agreements • Concluded: 6 countries and 1 international organization Australia, Canada, China, France, UK, US, Euratom • Signed: 3 countries Russia, Kazakhstan, Jordan • Agreed on substance: 3 countries UAE, Vietnam, South Korea • In negotiation: 2 countries South Africa, India 26

27. Conclusion • Taking measures for ensuring non-proliferation/ safeguards, safety and security by each country using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes • International efforts are required to address common challenges, including international cooperation in capacity building for countries introducing NPG • Development of proliferation-resistance technology as a long-term goal 27

28. Thank you!