Optimal answers and their implicatures A game-theoretic approach

1. Optimal answers and their implicatures A game-theoretic approach Anton Benz April 18th, 2006

2. Overview • Conversational Implicatures in the Standard Theory • Conventions and Meaning • Game Theoretic Pragmatics • Implicatures of Answers

3. Conversational Implicatures The Standard Theory

4. Two components of communicated meaning • Grice distinguishes between: • What is said. • What is implicated. • “Some of the boys came to the party.” • said: At least two of the boys came to the party. • implicated: Not all of the boys came to the party. • Both part of what is communicated.

5. Assumptions about Conversation • Conversation is a cooperative effort. Each participant recognises in their talk exchanges a common purpose. • Example: A stands in front of his obviously immobilised car. • A: I am out of petrol. • B: There is a garage around the corner. • Joint purpose of B’s response: • Solve A’s problem of finding petrol for his car.

6. The Cooperative Principle • Conversation is governed by a set of principles which spell out how rational agents behave in order to make language use efficient. • The most important is the so-called cooperative principle: • “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”

7. The Conversational Maxims • Maxim of Quality: • Do not say what you believe to be false. • Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. • Maxim of Quantity: • Make your contribution to the conversation as informative as is required for he current talk exchange. • Do not make your contribution to the conversation more informative than necessary. • Maxim of Relevance: make your contributions relevant. • Maxim of Manner: be perspicuous, and specifically: • Avoid obscurity. • Avoid ambiguity. • Be brief (avoid unnecessary wordiness). • Be orderly.

8. The Conversational Maxims • Maxim of Quality: Be truthful. • Maxim of Quantity: Say as much as you can. Say no more than you must. • Maxim of Relevance: Be relevant.

9. The Conversational Maxims • Be truthful (Quality) and say as much as you can (Quantity) as long as it is relevant (Relevance).

10. An example: Scalar Implicatures • Let A(x)  “x of the boys came to the party” • It holds A(all)  A(some). • The speaker said A(some). • If all of the boys came, then A(all) would have been preferred (Maxim of Quantity & Relevance). • The speaker didn’t say A(all), hence it cannot be the case that all came. • Therefore some but not all came to the party.

11. Conventions and Meaning The Lewisean Perspective

12. Conventions • A convention is: • a regularity r in behaviour • partially arbitrary • that is common ground in a community C • as a coordination device • for a recurrent coordination problem • Clark, 1996, p. 71

13. Coordination and Language • Speaker wants to communicate some meaning M. He has to choose a form F for M. • The hearer has to interpret form F. He has to assign a meaning M’ to it. • Communication is successful if M=M’.

14. Signalling Conventions • The meaning of signals • is arbitrary; • answers a recurrent coordination problem; • is common ground in a language community • A signalling convention (Lewis 1969) is a pair of • a speaker’s signalling strategy (S: MF) • a hearer’s interpretation strategy (H: FM) • such that communication is always successful.

15. The agenda • Putting Gricean pragmatics on Lewisean feet: • Start assumption: semantic meaning is defined by a signalling convention (Semantic Interpretation Game, SIG). • Gricean maxims (and other pragmatic conditions) translate into constraints on the SIG. • The explanation of a pragmatic phenomenon proceeds by a game theoretic analysis of the constrained SIG.

16. Game Theoretic Pragmatics Scalar Implicatures

17. Game Theory • In a very general sense we can say that we play a game together with other people whenever we have to decide between several actions such that the decision depends on: • the choice of actions by others • our preferences over the ultimate results. • Whether or not an utterance is successful depends on • how it is taken up by its addressee • the overall purpose of the current conversation.

18. The Game Theoretic Analysis of Scalar Implicatures(For a scale with three elements: <all, most, some>)  1; 1 “all” 50% > 100% “most” 0; 0 “some”  0; 0 “most” 50% > 50% > 1; 1 “some”  0; 0 “some”  50% < 1; 1

19. The Game Theoretic Analysis of Scalar Implicatures(Taking into account the speaker’s preferences) “all”  100% 1; 1 “most” 50% > 50% > 1; 1 “some”  1; 1 50% < In all branches that contain “some” the initial situation is “50% < ” Hence: “some” implicates “50% < ”

20. General method for calculating implicatures (informal) • Describe the utterance situation by a game (in extensive form, i.e. tree form). • Possible states of the world • Utterances the speaker can choose • Their interpretations as defined by semantics. • Preferences over outcomes (given by context) • Simplify tree by backward induction. • ‘Read off’ the implicature from the game tree that cannot be simplified anymore.

21. Implicatures of Answers Implicatures and Decision Problems

22. An example of contradicting inferences I • Situation: A stands in front of his obviously immobilised car. • A : I am out of petrol. • B: There is a garage around the corner. (G) • Implicated: The garage is open. (H) • How should one formally account for the implicature? • Set H*:= The negation of H B said that G but not that H*. H* is relevant and G  H* G. Hence if G  H*, then B should have said G  H* (Quantity). Hence H* cannot be true, and therefore H.

23. An example of contradicting inferences II • Problem: We can exchange H and H* and still get a valid inference: B said that G but not that H. H is relevant and G  H G. Hence if G  H, then B should have said G  H (Quantity). Hence H cannot be true, and therefore H*. Missing: Precise definitions of basic concepts like relevance.

24. The Utility of Answers • Questions and answers are often subordinated to a decision problem of the inquirer. • Example: Somewhere in Amsterdam • I: Where can I buy an Italian newspaper? • E: At the station and at the palace. • Decision problem of A: Where should I go to in order to buy an Italian newspaper.

25. The general situation

26. Decision Making • The Model: • Ω: a (countable) set of possible states of the world. • PI, PE: (discrete) probability measures representing the inquirer’s and the answering expert’s knowledge about the world. • A : a set of actions. • UI, UE: Payoff functions that represent the inquirer’s and expert’s preferences over final outcomes of the game. • Decision criterion: an agent chooses an action which maximises his expected utility: • EU(a) = vΩ P(w)  U(v,a)

27. An Example • John loves to dance to Salsa music and he loves to dance to Hip Hop but he can't stand it if a club mixes both styles. It is common knowledge that E knows always which kind of music plays at which place. • J: I want to dance tonight. Where can I go to? • E: Oh, tonight they play Hip Hop at the Roter Salon. • implicated: No Salsa at the Roter Salon.

28. A game tree for the situation where both Salsa and Hip Hop are playing RS = Roter Salon stay home 1 0 go-to RS “both” stay home 1 both play at RS “Salsa” 0 go-to RS stay home 1 “Hip Hop” 0 go-to RS

29. The tree after the first step of backward induction stay home 1 “both” both “Salsa” go-to RS 0 “Hip Hop” go-to RS 0 Salsa “Salsa” go-to RS 2 Hip Hop “Hip Hop” go-to RS 2

30. The tree after the second step of backward induction “both” stay home both 1 “Salsa” go-to RS Salsa 2 “Hip Hop” go-to RS Hip Hop 2 In all branches that contain “Salsa” the initial situation is such that only Salsa is playing at the Roter Salon. Hence: “Salsa” implicates that only Salsa is playing at Roter Salon

31. Another Example • J approaches the information desk at the city railway station. • J: I need a hotel. Where can I book one? • E: There is a tourist office in front of the building. • (E: *There is a hairdresser in front of the building.) • implicated: It is possible to book hotels at the tourist office.

32. The situation where it is possible to book a hotel at the tourist information, a place 2, and a place 3. go-to tourist office 1 s. a. : search anywhere 0 s. a. “tourist office” 1 go-to pl. 2 “place 2” s. a. 0 1/2 “place 3” go-to pl. 3 s. a. 0

33. The game after the first step of backward induction go-to t. o. 1 “tourist office” booking possible at tour. off. “place 2” go-to pl. 2 0 “place 3” go-to pl. 3 1/2 go-to t. o. -1 “tourist office” booking not possible “place 2” go-to pl. 2 1 “place 3” go-to pl. 3 1/2

34. The game after the second step of backward induction “tourist office” booking possible at tour. off. go-to t. o. 1 booking not possible “place 2” go-to pl. 2 1

35. Conclusions • Advantages of using Game Theory: • provides an established framework for studying cooperative agents; • basic concepts of linguistic pragmatics can be defined precisely; • extra-linguistic context can easily be represented; • allows fine-grained predictions depending on context parameters.