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Overview of Corporate Governance research in China . Chen Xinyuan Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. Outlines . Why CG is important in China? Institutional Background Theoretical Framework Current Research Progresses Future Research Directions . Why CG is important in China?.
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Overview of Corporate Governance research in China Chen Xinyuan Shanghai University of Finance and Economics China Research Incubator, 2004
Outlines • Why CG is important in China? • Institutional Background • Theoretical Framework • Current Research Progresses • Future Research Directions China Research Incubator, 2004
Why CG is important in China? • The focus of CG • “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” (Shleifer and Vishny,1997) • Protect investors and/or stakeholders’ interests • To assure the inside controller to maximize firm value not at expense of any investor and/or stakeholder’s interests. China Research Incubator, 2004
Why CG is important in China? • Weak CG may slow the stock market development. Data source: China Economy database China Research Incubator, 2004
Why CG is important in China? • By the end of 2002, about 1.5 percent of the total population (about 20,000,000) are active investors in China stock markets. • Financing from direct stock markets is about 10 percent of that from bank loan. • CG is especially important when China is facing the SOE transition. • Many scandals show that weak CG might be bottleneck in the capital market. China Research Incubator, 2004
Institutional Background • Transition economy • Plan economy to market economy • Traditional government to modern government • Social democracy tradition • Weak law protection and strong implicit contracts China Research Incubator, 2004
Theoretical Framework • Transition economy • Learning process • How to privatize SOEs? • Ideology lag • dual-class-ownership structure, tight gov’t control on state-owned-shares’ transfer • Regulation • Regulation on capital and personnel resources allocation • Moral hazard • Decentralization or deregulation • Federalism • Delegation of control rights to firms who have special knowledge- “Fang Quan Rang Li”(放权让利) China Research Incubator, 2004
Theoretical Framework • Social democracy tradition • Public interest • Local and/or central gov’t interests may penetrate firm interests. • Local protection/collusion between local gov’t and firms • Soft-budget constrain • Politician’s private interests • Rent-creating and rent-seeking activities • State capture China Research Incubator, 2004
Theoretical Framework • Weak law protection and strong implicit contracts • Reputation • An important way to facilitate long-term co-operation • Tight-relationship-based groups • Firm groups • Groups between different persons • Family codes • Insecurity of property rights • Governments’ reputation China Research Incubator, 2004
A fundamental picture Ambiguous property rights Multi-firm-objectives Un-efficient specialization Low economic performance China Research Incubator, 2004
Current Six-Year Research Progresses • Period (1998~2003) • Journals covered • 9 main academic journals • <经济研究><中国社会科学><金融研究><中国会计与财务研究><管理世界><会计研究><财经研究><审计研究><中国工业经济> • 6 main international journals (in process) • JF, JFE • AR, JAR, JAE, CAR China Research Incubator, 2004
Current Six-Year Research Progresses China Research Incubator, 2004
Current Six-Year Research Progresses China Research Incubator, 2004
Current Six-Year Research Progresses • Most empirical studies lay emphases on the following 7 subjects: • Block shareholders 24% • Audit quality 10% • The market for corporate control 9% • Gov’t intervention/regulation 9% • Managerial incentive plans 7% • Management structure 5% • Transparency policy 5% China Research Incubator, 2004
Current Six-Year Research Progresses • Few empirical study on the following subjects: • Competition in the product market 0% • Law protection 0% • Audit committee 0% • Self-discipline 0% • Social responsibility 0% • Internal labor market 1% • Non-exec directors 1% • Employee 1% • Reputation 1% • Debtholder monitoring 3% • Managerial labor market 1% • Institution investors 1% China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on block shareholder • Classification of block shareholders • SOE vs private • Concentrated vs non-concentrated • Family vs non family • SOE, TVE, Joint venture, foreign investor • SAMB (state assets management bureau) vs SOC (state-owned-corporate) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on block shareholder • Findings • Performance (孙永祥&黄祖辉,1999;陈晓&江东,2000;刘小玄,2000;朱武祥&宋勇,2001;陈小悦&徐晓东,2001;卢文彬&朱红军,2001;杜莹&刘立国,2002;吴淑琨,2002;平新乔&范瑛&郝朝艳,2003;苏启林&朱文,2003;施东晖,2003;刘芍佳&孙霈&刘乃全,2003;刘小玄,2003;聂长海&姜秀华&杜煊军,2003;宾国强&舒元,2003;向朝进&谢明,2003;Sun&Tong,2003) • Dividend policy (吕长江&王克敏,1999;原红旗,2001;陈信元&陈冬华&时旭,2003) • Financing (袁国良&郑江淮&胡志乾,1999;郑江淮&何旭强&王华,2001;孙永祥,2001) • Expropriation (唐宗明&蒋位,2002) • Related party transaction (秦玉熙,2003) • Firm reputation (李维安&李建标,2003) • Ownership structure determinants (王红领&李稻葵&雷鼎鸣,2001;李涛,2002;冯根福&韩冰&闫冰,2002) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on audit quality • Quick introduction of relevant background • Audit market emerges since the end of 1980s • De-affiliation reform in 1998 and 1999 (脱钩改制) • Qualification regulation on listed company auditing • Most CPA firms are of limited liability • Independent auditing standards have been promulgated since 1995 China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on audit quality • Findings • Earnings management (夏立军&杨海斌,2001;李爽&吴溪,2003) • Fraud (胡奕明&周智辉&郑德成,2002;葛家澍&黄世忠,2002) • Market reaction (李增泉,1999;Chen&Su&Zhao,2000) • Auditor independence (王跃堂&陈世敏,2001;刘峰&张立民&雷科罗,2002;原红旗&李海建,2003;Defond&Wong&Li,2000) • Auditor change (李爽&吴溪,2001;耿建新&杨鹤,2001;李东平&黄德华&王振林,2001;陆正飞&童盼,2003) • Audit quality (刘明辉&李黎&张羽,2003) • Auditing fee (刘斌&叶建中&廖莹毅,2003;夏冬林,2003) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on the market for corporate control • Quick introduction of institutional background • Most listed companies are controlled by gov’t • The transfer rights of state shares are held by gov’t • Privatization in listed company are facing many implicit regulations which researchers might have not totally known yet. China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on the market for corporate control • Findings • Hostile takeover (刘守刚,1999) • Accounting performance (朱宝宪&王怡凯,1998;王跃堂,1999;冯根福&吴林江,2001;李心丹等,2003) • Market performance (陈信元&张田余,1999;洪锡熙&沈艺峰,2001;李善民&陈玉罡,2002) • CEO turnover (朱红军,2002) • Predicting takeover targets (李善民&曾昭灶,2003) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on gov’t intervention/regulation • Quick introduction of institutional background • CSRC regulates how capital allocate in the market • One of the most important measure CSRC uses to regulate is accounting numbers • Gov’ts may require firms to fulfill some gov’t targets China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on gov’t intervention/regulation • Findings • Earnings management (陆建桥,1999;孙铮&王跃堂,1999;陈小悦&肖星&过晓艳,2000;Aharony&Lee&Wong,2000;陈晓&李静,2001;陈信元&叶鹏飞&陈冬华,2003) • Gov’t regulation and transparency (刘峰,2001;王立彦&刘军霞,2003) • Financing (叶鹏飞,2000) • Management appointment (中国企业家调查系统,2000) • The efficiency of regulation (宁向东&张海文,2001) • Standard setting (陈冬华&陈信元,2003) • Subsidies (陈冬华,2003) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on managerial incentive plans • Quick introduction of institutional background • Manager compensation for SOEs are regulated by gov’t • Intuitively, monetary income only accounts for a small part of SOE managers’ total income, of which most parts are not easily observable, like perking, rent-seeking, promotion, gov’t secret bonus, etc. • Listed companies are not required to disclose the details of incentive plans China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on managerial incentive plans • Findings • Firm performance (刘小玄&郑京海,1998;李增泉,2000;魏刚,2000;李勇,2002;*新民&刘善敏,2003;林浚清&黄祖辉&孙永祥,2003;周建波&孙菊生,2003;张俊瑞&赵进文&张建,2003;刘斌等,2003) • MBO (毛道维&蔡雷&任佩瑜,2003) • Incentive plan design (“效绩评价余年薪制研究”课题组,2003) • Capital structure (吴晓求&应展宇,2003) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on management structure • Quick introduction of institutional background • Managers, especially key members, are appointed by gov’t and how managers are appointed is unobservable • Most managers are sent from parent company • Soft budget constrain make it very difficult to measure manager performance • Absence of an efficient managerial labor market China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on management structure • Findings • Performance (吴淑琨&柏杰&席酉民,1998;孙铮&姜秀华&任强,2001;于东智,2003) • Manager turnover (王珺,2001;龚玉池,2001;张建琦&王凡,2003) • Accounting transparency (刘立国&杜莹,2003) China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on transparency policy • Quick introduction of institutional background • Listed companies disclosure is regulated by CSRC • Accounting and auditing standards setters are MOF and CICPA respectively • Like most Asian firms, the organization of Chinese firms is complicated • Punishment on fraud is weak China Research Incubator, 2004
Current CG research on transparency policy • Findings • Descriptive studies (原红旗,1998;李婉丽&张晓岚,2002;李明辉&何海&马夕奎,2003;张立民&钱华&李敏仪,2003) • Transparency and firm financing (王宣喻&储小平,2002) China Research Incubator, 2004
Future Research Directions • For areas where we have done quite a lot of studies, further studies are needed. • For the rest areas, are there some questions we should not miss? China Research Incubator, 2004
Future Directions for China CG Research • Block shareholders • Why are ownership structures formed? • Audit quality • What are the contracting roles of audit? • How to measure audit quality? • The market for corporate control • Is there really a market for corporate control? • Is there any other mechanisms which can induce corporate control change? If yes, how about their economic consequences? • Gov’t intervention/regulation • Will gov’t regulations lower the efficiency of resources allocation? • Managerial incentive plans • How promotion incentives affect manager efforts? China Research Incubator, 2004
Future Directions for China CG Research • Management structure • What are the determinants of current management structures. • Transparency policy • How do firms choose transparency policy? • Competition in the product market • How competition shape CG? • Non-exec directors • How are independent directors selected? • Employee • What are employee’s rights in the firms? And how about the enforcements of these rights? • How are employee’s rights protected or expropriated? China Research Incubator, 2004
Future Directions for China CG Research • Reputation • Is reputation a mechanism to mitigate the weak law protection? • Will SOEs be motivated to establish reputation when property rights are ambiguous? • How does reputation affect firm performance? • Debtholder monitoring • Who are debtholders? How about debtholders’ governances? What are debtholders’ objectives? • Which mechanisms are used by debtholders to monitor firms? Contracts or reputation? • Managerial labor market • Is there a quasi-market for SOE managers inside the gov’t? • For private firms, is managerial labor market pressure effective? China Research Incubator, 2004