Logistics and Security Tom Rendall

1. Logistics and SecurityTom Rendall “If you know the enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles.” - Sun Tzu 450 BC. “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.” - Carl von Clausewitz 1816-1830.

2. Vignette From The Ugly American It was dusk before they solved the problem, and it was Jeepo who came up with the solution. He suddenly stood bolt upright, walked over the bicycle, remounted, and began to pedal furiously. Water gushed out of the outflow of the pump. Jeepo looked back over his shoulder at the lower level of the pump, then started to shout at Atkins in a loud and highly disrespectful voice in which there was the sound of discovery. It took Atkins another five minutes to understand fully what Jeepo was proposing. It was the height of simplicity. What he proposed was that a treadmill be built which could be turned by the rear wheel of an ordinary bicycle fitted into a light bamboo frame. What this meant was that a family with a single bicycle could put the bicycle in the bamboo rack, mount it, and pedal. The rear wheel would drive the treadmill which in turn the pump with an efficiency almost as great as Atkins’ original model. When anyone needed to use the bike, he could simply pick it up from the rack and ride away. "This man has made a very great discovery," Atkins said solemnly to the headman and the elders. "He has developed a way in which a tricycle can be used to drive the pump and still be used for transportation. Without Jeepo's help my idea would have been useless. What I propose is that we draw up a document giving Jeepo one-half of the profits which might come from this invention." Lederer and Burdick, W W Norton & Co Inc., 1958

3. Assumptions There must be a “business case” for the project – At minimum it must not consume more than it generates. To be viable in the short term, it must first compensate the farmers on an appropriate scale. To be viable in the long term it must eventually generate a profit. Proper analysis must be done to develop/select the right area, population and approach. It must be organized, developed and tested outside Afghanistan first. If it is strongly physically opposed, it cannot be defended. Outsiders (US Government Departments, Security Coalition Forces, International Government Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations, Corporations) can/must assist, facilitate and support. If it is attempted first in Helmand, it should be propagated elsewhere in Afghanistan. If it does not succeed in Helmand, it should still be attempted elsewhere in Afghanistan. It should be propagated outside Afghanistan. It must be done through, with and by Afghans. It must have the ability to persist beyond the Coalition. “Corruption” will be a factor that must be overcome. An “insurgent” approach is best.

4. Insurgent Structure Auxiliary PSYOP (I/O) Recruitment Propaganda Recruitment Assassination Logistics Kidnapping Security Terrorism Ambush Control over the Civilians Intelligence  Raids Counter Intelligence  Aid Desertion of HNSF personnel Auxiliary Guerrillas Leadership (Underground)

5. Societal Organizing Principle A Triad Politics Religion Law

6. Conceptual Background Department of State: Smart Power (Diplomacy, Defense and Development). Department of Defense: Whole of Government. A cotton project within an energy project. A “mix” of agricultural precursors should be incorporated Cotton Safflower Switch Grass Biomass Water It ought to be done in conjunction with an animal development project.   Supports Afghan society Selected agricultural leftovers can improve animal health.

7. Conceptual Background A mix of power sources should be employed. Examples Solar Hydro Electric Other Animal Indigenous machinery An appropriate mix of indigenous farming methods and practices must be employed. Multilateral effort among several partner nations?

8. Suggested Operating Concept Phase 1: Preparation in the US and elsewhere. Phase 2: Operational Preparation of the Environment. US and Partners Heroin “Target Complex” Afghanistan Selected Regional Nations Cotton (etc) “Target Complex” Competitors Customers Phase 3: Deployment to Afghanistan. Phase 4: Planting/supplanting. Phase 5: Facility Construction. Phase 6: Initial Operating Capability. Phase 7: Full Operating Capability.

9. Logistics Supply - Warehouse network, seed stocks, repair parts for machinery. Transportation - Local Means - NGOs/IGOs/PVOs - Contractors Facilities - Processing plants, Warehouses, Textile Facilities Maintenance Services Personnel - Priority to hiring of US and partner nationals with experience on PRTs, NGOs/PVOs, IGOs, Security Forces “in country.”

10. Security Threat Assessment: Enemy – Those who will actively/physically attack Anti Afghan Forces. Drug Trade. Non-Afghan Elements. Opposition – Those who will oppose it indirectly. Other Clans and Tribes. Other Ethnic Elements. Non-Afghan Elements. Competition – Those who will have similar ideas or programs that work towards the same or related ends. “Big Cotton” “Big Energy”

11. Security • - Inner Ring • - Outer Ring • - Afghan Security Forces • - Coalition Security Forces • - Private Security Forces • International Law Enforcement Agencies • Multinational Law Enforcement Agencies • Multinational Intelligence Organizations

12. Security All efforts must be oriented on creating a stable and secure environment. (Clausewitz: All efforts must be oriented on destruction of the enemy).

13. Bottom Line If Afghans do not want it, it cannot be done. It must be “culturally effective.” Remember the “Fast, Cheap and Good” paradox: You can have only two. Look for the plan/operation to ignite exploration of other energy sources. Will Afghanistan, like many other developing nations in history be overcome by those that seek to exploit its newly found mineral wealth such that this project suffers by comparison? Simpler is better.

14. Questions/Comments