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Topics in Cognitive Development. Zoltan Jakab Loránd Eötvös University. I. Concepts and concept learning. What are concepts? What is their role in cognition? -- categorization -- reference -- thinking Is concept learning possible at all? Fodor’s paradox
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Topics in Cognitive Development Zoltan Jakab Loránd Eötvös University
I. Concepts and concept learning What are concepts? What is their role in cognition? -- categorization -- reference -- thinking Is concept learning possible at all? Fodor’s paradox (P1. All learning is hypothesis formation & testing. P2. But you cannot form a hypothesis without already possessing all the required concepts. C. Therefore, for concept learning to occur, you need to possess the concepts you supposedly set out to learn.) Sounds familiar? Is there a cogent response? Some objects that are not easy to categorize ‘Venus’ ‘Evening Star’
The semantics of non-referring concepts (1) In an episode, Stuart Little fell into the drain of a kitchen sink. It was terrifying. (True) (2) Stuart little does not exist. (True) ?! How can a nonexistent creature fall into the drain? Why are such issues interesting for cognitive psychology? • Referential semantics is assumed by some of the most influential views of cognition: - Brentano on intentionality - Fodor’s (and others’) theories of representational content - Symbol grounding (S. Harnad)
Perceptual development (1) The development of perceptual integration (2) How does color vision develop? BTW, why do dogs see a white band in the spectrum? (3) Vision in the newly sighted: How do those who were born blind and had their vision restored as adults see the world? Dog Human
Numerical cognition ‘ß’ ‘@’ Some answers to Fodor’s puzzle of concept learning Do we learn the concept of number, or is it innate? Can infants perform simple arithmetic operations? Can chimps learn to count? ‘#’ ‘$’ ‘~’ ‘~’ ‘$’ ‘#’ ‘@’ ‘ß’
Privileged access – who know best what I think? He believes THAT There is a snowstorm over there (1) False belief attribution and further development of mentalization (2) Transparent epistemic rules: I think I believe that p I believe that p Could you think of a counterexample? The scope and limits of introspection Freud Fodor, Nisbett and WIlson