CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC)

1. CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA Task SL53.2: Safety Important Components (SIC) Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits Task SL53.4a: Outline of the description of the maintenance programme

2. CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4aTasks Organisation and QA CIEMAT CO-ORDINATES, REVIEW DRAFTS, AND ACCEPTS REPORTS PRIOR TO SUBMITTAL Project co-ordinator: Beatriz Brañas, assisted by Pablo Zuloaga Support by Safety Department: Caridad Roldán, Paloma Díaz-Arocas PUBLIC CALL FOR BIDS: Spec with all Project and QA requirements Commented by EFDA, ITER-France before consultation Public consultation published in Official Journal (BOE) Assigned to IBERTEF Task 53.8 (Hot cell functions during decommissioning) not yet launched, pending on design approval).

3. CIEMAT: SL 53-2 & 53-4a Tasks Organisation and QA IBERTEF (Empresarios Agrupados - Sener) QA manual Three task groups with specific task leaders: SL53.2 SIC Xavier Jardi SL53.2 OLC J A Carretero SL53.4a ODMP Olga Asuar IBERTEF produces draft reports sent to CIEMAT for review, and reports including CIEMAT comments CIEMAT keeps responsibility and presents reports to EFDA ITER

4. Task SL53.2:Safety Important Components (SIC)

5. Task Objectives: For RPrS • Definition of criteria for the safety classification of ITER systems and components • As a function of the above criteria, preparation of a list of safety-important systems and components (SIC), including: • Type of component (isolation valve, cryopump, etc) • Safety function of the component • How the component performs its safety function • Seismic classification

6. Task Objectives: For support document • Identification of applicable codes and standards • Demonstration that the list of systems and components classified as SIC is complete by cross-checking it with the normal, incidental and accidental situations

7. Level of Completion

8. SIC Classification Criteria SIC structures, systems and components are those relied upon to remain functional during and following the reference events to ensure: • Confinement safety function, including the ancillary safety functions protecting it, and • Personnel protection by limitation of exposure to radiation of workers and environment

9. Seismic Classification Criteria Three seismic categories will be considered: • ITER structures that must remain integral and systems and components (including their foundations and supports) that must remain functional or retain their confinement barriers in the event of a SL-2 earthquake are designated Seismic Category I (SCI). • Structures, systems and components that perform no safety function, but whose structural failure or interaction could degrade the functioning of a Seismic Category I item to an unacceptable level of safety are designated Seismic Category II (SCII). These items are designed to structurally withstand the effects of a SL-2. • Structures, systems and components that are not categorized as Seismic Category I or II are designated noSeismic Category (NSC).

10. Systems classified (1/2):

11. Systems classified (2/2):

12. Systems to be classified:

13. Task sample for RPrS : WBS 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3

14. Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (1/2)

15. Task sample for RPrS : WBS 2.6 (2/2)

16. SIC Classification Summary (sample)

17. Sample of cross-checking:

18. Task SL53.2: Safety operational limits

19. Introduction (1/2) OLCs are a set of operating rules that include safety limits, safety system settings and operational limits on equipment and conditions on inventories, surveillance and administrative requirements. • Objectives: • To ensuresafe operation and protection of site personnel, the public and the environment from radiological hazards • To guarantee the required operation flexibility Most of the limits are controlled automatically, such as for pressure or concentration. Others (such as inventories) are controlled through administrative procedures.

20. Introduction (2/2) OLC interrelationship OLC classification in France: LC: limites de conduite LF: limites de fonctionnement LS: limites de sûreté LD: limites de dimensionnement

21. Task Objectives: (1/2) OLCs updating Review of previous study of operational domain (Definition of Authorized Operational Domain for ITER licensing, final report of task EFDA 93/851-JA (2005)) • Review and updating of OLCs based on current project documents: PSR, GSSR, DRG1, DRG2, PID, DDDs • Incorporating of OLCs resulting of new experiments: TBM (Test Blanket Module), NBI (Neutral Beam Injection), diagnostics, etc, and DCR (Design Change Request) OLCs

22. Task Objectives: (2/2) Top Safety OLCs Selection of a series of limits more representative for safety (Top Level Safety OLCs), combining them in a reduced group of parameters • With a view to their inclusion in the DAC (Décret d´Autorisation de Création) • The result has been embodied in a report(Top Level Safety OLCs)

23. Review of Input Documents • Input data: ITER Technical Web (Baseline Documentation) • New versions: • PID: Project integration document, Release 2.0 September 2005 • No OLC changes • Other/New Inputs ? • New experiments, Test Blanket Module, Neutral Beam Injection, diagnostics, DCR… Open issue

24. Safety Top OLCs: Methodology 1. OLCs of the various systems were grouped per parameter (for example: tritium inventory and content, dust amount, dose, pressure, loads, temperature, leaktightness, etc). 2. The most significant parameters for safety (confinement, limitation of external exposure, residual power evacuation) were selected.

25. Safety Top OLCs: List (1) • Tritium inventory in vacuum vessel, tritium plant and hot cell • Tritium concentration in water systems • Tritium concentration to isolate and initiate ADS • Efficiency of Detritiation System • Dust and activated products in vacuum vessel and water systems

26. Safety Top OLCs: List (2) • Radiation and dose levels for personnel evacuation • Leak tightness in system components forming part of primary or secondary confinement barriers, in tritium plant, ventilation and detritiation, in cooling water and heat rejection system and in buildings • Pressure of primary and secondary confinement barriers • VVPSS bleed and drain line actuation pressure, and opening pressure of VVPSS rupture disks • Level of water in VVPSS tank

27. Activities in course • Documentation of the cross-checking performed between Top OLCs and the Reference Events. • Table of the surveillance method / instrumentation foreseen in the project for Top OLC.

28. Safety Top OLCs: List (3) • VV temperature in Baking • Degraded levels of Voltage/Time delays for initiating full transfer/start of Class III loads (switch DG) • Time intervention of Fusion Power Shutdown System • Top OLCs to be discussed • Maximum fusion power • TF magnetic energy dumping • VV heat transfer system

29. Top Level OLCs EX Table Sample

30. Conclusions and Comments (1/2) • OLCs are based on the safety analysis taking into account the provisions made in the design. Therefore, OLCs and their correlated procedures will be updated throughout the various ITER phases, like detailed design, commissioning test and results of specific R&D like those on tritium and dust measurement and control. • The surveillance programme relevant to all OLCs -including the frequency, the detailed procedures to carry out, the evaluation of the results and the corrective actions, when necessary- will be defined at a later stage of the ITER project. • In certain cases (like tritium inventory in vacuum vessel) the OLC is a more restrictive value than the assessment used in the GSSR safety analysis. Lower project guidelines are set to account for uncertainties and these values are pending confirmation of feasibility.

31. Conclusions and Comments (2/2) TOP Safety OLC document derives a minimum set of conditions which define the top main safety parameters that should be retained with regard to the DAC (Décret d´Autorisation de Création), grouping various constraints as much as practical and reducing the total list. Therefore, this document intends to show a group of the most representative parameters analyzed in previous study and these top level safety OLCs can be completed or modified in accordance with different criteria, changes or design upgrades.  “Definition of Authorized Operational Domain for ITER Licensing”, Issue Rev 0, March 2005 (Task order EFDA 93/851-JA)”

32. Task SL53.4a: Outline of the description of the maintenance programme O. Asuar M. Vázquez

33. Task Objectives • Identification of SIC systems and components • Description of the systems above, • Find their flow diagrams, • Identification of their main components, location and amount. • Identify hands-on schedule maintenance requirements for the SIC systems/components identified above • Breakdown of the maintenance operations including: • Objective, • Operation sequence, • Initial conditions of the components, • Tools, • Waste estimation, • Reference documents. • Non-active support systems (e.g., electrical systems) are excluded from this report as they do not have any impact on worker dosis.

34. OBJECTIVE % Identification of SIC systems and components Identification of systems 90% Double check against task EISS-5 SL53-2 40% System descriptions (16 systems) Description 100% Flow diagrams 100% Location of all SIC components 40% Hands on maintenance requirements Conventional components (pumps, valves, compressors) 80% ITER specific components ( cryopumps, roughing pumps, ZrCo beds) 40% Breakdown of maintenance operations ( about 30 tasks so far) Identification of all task 80% Task completion 50% SUMMARY 60% Level of Completion

35. Document Structure

36. Components and maintenance requirementsExample:

37. Appendix A: Breakdown of maintenance operationsTask sample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (1/3)

38. Handling Sequence: Estimated Time man-hr/task Operation Worker Position Comments • Disassembly Next to the component 1.1 Remove actuator 10 1.2 Remove valve cover 10 1.3 Remove valve stem and valve disc 20 2 Inspection Next to the component 2 3 Clean all valve components Next to the component 3.1 Inspect valve body and look for any cracks using dye penetrating, if necessary. 20 3.2 Inspect valve seat. 5 4 Assembly Next to the component 4.1 Repeat operations done in the disassembly but in reverse order 30 4.2 Lube all screws and nuts 2 Task sample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (2/3)

39. HANDLING TOOL Tooling Function: Characteristics Manipulator (for handling and cleaning) Outstanding Issues Issue of concern Resolution References • CE-T-MM-0271 Revisión general válvula motorizada de globo, tipo UN-122, CN Almaraz-Trillo Task aample : motor driven valve maintenance operations (3/3) Screw driver Manufacturer requirements

40. Difficulties/Issues of concern • Estimated times • Tools • Which components are repaired in situ and which ones are replaced? Related with bullet 1. • Difficulties with general plant layout. Cannot find all components (all roughing pumps, all cryopumps) • Difficulties with maintenance operations of ITER specific components (cryopumps, roughing pumps, ZrCo beds) . Designers help/inputs required. • Difficulties with conventional components. Sometimes not enough information; e.g. pumps: vertical/ horizontal, big/small. It´s not the same. Manufacturers information not yet available. • Diagnostics. Impossible to identify all of them. Not enough information • Initial conditions of the components ( radioactivity, waste amounts…) Reference documentation is required.