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WEP – Wireless Encryption Protocol

WEP – Wireless Encryption Protocol. A. Gabriel W. Daleson CS 610 – Advanced Security Portland State University. WEP – Wired Equivalent Privacy. A. Gabriel W. Daleson CS 610 – Advanced Security Portland State University. WEP: Weak Encryption Protocol. A. Gabriel W. Daleson

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WEP – Wireless Encryption Protocol

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  1. WEP – Wireless Encryption Protocol A. Gabriel W. Daleson CS 610 – Advanced Security Portland State University

  2. WEP – Wired Equivalent Privacy A. Gabriel W. Daleson CS 610 – Advanced Security Portland State University

  3. WEP: Weak Encryption Protocol A. Gabriel W. Daleson CS 610 – Advanced Security Portland State University

  4. “It seemed like a good idea at the time” • Let’s make it at least as difficult to eavesdrop on wireless traffic as wired traffic… • …which, by the way, is not that hard to eavesdrop on to begin with. • So, instead, let’s just add some neat encryption to 802.11 a/b/g.

  5. Ideas, Good and Bad • WEP is based on RC4 • RC4 is a stream cipher • We use an initialization vector (IV)

  6. In the Beginning, there was the Plan (for WEP-PSK) Alice and Bob share a private shared key (PSK) K, and Alice wants to send Bob the message m. • Alice calculates m1, the message m followed by its CRC. • Alice takes an IV v and uses the stream RC4(v,K) to generate a session key k of the same length as m1.

  7. In the Beginning, there was the Plan (for WEP-PSK) cont. • Alice sends Bob the ciphertext (v,k XOR m1). • Alice picks a new IV for each packet.

  8. RC4 • RC4 is old. (1987) • There are known attacks, including a weak key being generated with probability 1 in 256 • RC4 is a stream cipher; we’re probably much better off with a block cipher for this sort of application

  9. Initialization Vectors • The only requirement of the IV is that it be 24 bits long. • Some Wi-Fi cards start with an IV of 0x000000 when they’re plugged in and just increment the IV with each packet sent. • It’s perfectly legal WEP to never change the IV at all!

  10. More Initialization Vectors • Even if the IVs are chosen randomly, the Birthday Paradox tells us that the chance of finding two packets with the same IV is 1 in 212.

  11. THE 11TH COMMANDMENT Thou shalt not encrypt two plaintexts with the same key, lest Eve and her Evil Empire crack your code and make a fool of ye. (Shamir 17:29)

  12. Why? • Suppose – f’rinstance – Alice used WEP with the same IV on two messages, m and n, and sent Bob (and thus Eve) the ciphertexts M and N.

  13. Why? cont. 1 • Eve – thanks to the fact that the IVs are included as plaintext along with the ciphertexts – will detect this awful mistake, and note that M = m XOR k and N = n XOR k. • Eve will then calculate M XOR N, and the two ks will cancel out; this is just m XOR n.

  14. Why? cont. 2 • If Eve was able to mount a known plaintext attack, she now has the other plaintext. • Even if she wasn’t, the plaintexts will be patterned enough that simple frequency analysis can get both.

  15. The IV Dictionary Attack • Eve thus sits and sniffs traffic, building a dictionary of ciphertexts, IVs, and keys (once she gets them). • Every collision of IVs makes her job easier. • She gets matches in virtually every other set of 4096 packets.

  16. Other issues • If the AP requires WEP use, Eve can use the keys she finds to encrypt her own messages and thus inject traffic. • The PSK is no defense; even if it’s perfectly random and 4096 bits long, there will still only be 224 streams in use.

  17. Defenses • The problem is that there aren’t enough streams, right? • So make some more! • Only problem is, now it’s no longer WEP as far as the standard is concerned.

  18. Easy Defense 1 • Instead of using a static PSK and only 224 IVs, make more of the key vary from packet to packet. • This is basically how SSL does it. (There, the whole 128-bit key can be random.)

  19. Easy Defense 2 • Get rid of RC4. (Use AES instead.) • At least, no stream ciphers. • Big benefit! No longer stuck using ECB mode – feedback modes like CBCs are possible.

  20. One Last Note • Where is encryption (or security, for that matter) in the OSI stack? • To use feedback modes, we need the guarantee of linearity – which TCP promises. • So why are we doing this down in the link layer?

  21. The OSI Stack • 802.11 a/b/g + WEP, TCP, and IPSec • Which layer(s) of the stack should we include confidentiality? integrity? linearity? Should these be restricted to certain layers?

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