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What are the pros and cons of an EU – Mercosur free trade agreement?. Housekeeping. No lectures next week Micheal Collins Course essays. Project questions.
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What are the pros and cons of an EU – Mercosur free trade agreement?
Housekeeping • No lectures next week • Micheal Collins • Course essays
Project questions • Describe the gains from trade. With reference to the stalled WTO Doha Round negotiations, discuss why governments often seem to be prepared to forego these gains. • How is a country’s competitiveness defined and measured? What policies would you propose to address a loss in competitiveness? • Draft what you think should be the Irish government position in the negotiations on the EU budget post-2013. • Critically discuss Ireland’s strategy to meet its challenging greenhouse gas emission targets. • Outline the main features of the global imbalances problem. In what ways do these imbalances pose a threat to global economic stability and what policies would you propose to address them?
Deciding the EU budget Session 8 Macroeconomic Concepts and Issues MSc Economic Policy Studies Alan Matthews
The context • Negotiations on the next EU medium-term financial framework (MFF) for the period 2014-2020? have started • Build on the budget review exercise conducted in 2007-08 • Considerable dissatisfaction with the outcome of the 2007-13 MFF • What should Ireland be looking for in these negotiations?... • …taking into account that Ireland could be a net contributor in the next MFF period
The issues • The absolute size of the future EU budget • The structure of expenditure • Possible changes in budget financing • Budget implementation issues • Addressing the issue of Member State net balances
Learning objectives • Examine the structure and operation of the EU budget • Evaluate possible outcomes of the debate on the next EU financial framework and their implications for Ireland • Note: We are not discussing EU influence on national fiscal policy, see McAleese Chapter 15.4
The MFF • Forms the framework for EU expenditure over a medium term period • Indicates the maximum value and composition of foreseeable EU expenditure • Is not a multi-annual budget • Purpose is • To stabilise the annual budget • To strengthen budgetary discipline • To keep total expenditure increase under control
The MFF has been a success story • Discipline and predictability: Ceilings have assured budgetary discipline – allowed multiannual programming. • Reliable compromises: MFF agreements have ensured smooth annual budgetary procedures. • Innovations and flexibility have been possible: Revisions since 2007 have allowed the MFF to cope with almost € 10 bn of unforeseen expenditure; EU Own Resources are serving as collateral to support crisis stabilisation mechanisms. • The Lisbon Treaty enshrines the MFF • EP Fact Sheet on the MFF
…but improvements are needed • Lack of flexibility: Reaction to unforeseen circumstances and changing priorities has been very difficult. • Excessive focus on “net balances”: The “juste retour” logic favours pre-allocated expenditure and reduces EU value added. • Domination of grants limits leverage: Instruments of financial engineering linking EU funds with loans and private funds are still very limited. • Amounts dominate over delivery: Negotiations neglect the conditions for effective implementation. • Avoid delays to put new programmes in place – early agreement needed
MFF – better system design • Duration of the MFF: 5, 7 (5+2), 10 (5+5) years ? • Flexibility: Between headings, between budget years, via bigger margins, by QMV in Council. • Structure of the MFF: aligned with EU2020, number and classification of headings • EFSM/BOP: Guaranteed lending to Member States – limited by Own Resources ceiling • To be absolutely certain that the Commission will be able to call additional OR from Member States in case of a default on a guaranteed payment, the combined total of payment appropriations the total amount of guaranteed reimbursements due (principal + interest) must not exceed 1.23% of EU GNI in any given budget year.
The flexibility dilemma • To date emergency money has been found under MFF ceilings without increasing the overall total. Mainly an accident because CAP ceilings were set too high under Chirac-Schroeder CAP agreement in 2002 • Council can raise about 4 billion using QMV (0.03%), but according to ECJ jurisprudence can only be agreed by unanimity • Contingency margin – but will operate only under principle of overall budget neutrality – one heading must compensate another, but without margins, no degrees of freedom
Rationale for government intervention • Allocation – justified by market failures (externalities, public goods, merit goods) • Regulation – setting rules for markets so that they work in the public interest (competition problems, information problems) • Distribution (equity, insurance, special interests) • Stabilisation (use of monetary and fiscal policy to promote economic policy objectives)
Fiscal federalismAt what level of government should activity take place? • Decentralisation • Closer matching with local preferences • Provision of services can better match with local requirements (informational problems) • Greater democratic accountability at local level • If we relax assumption that governments maximise citizen welfare, decentralisation promotes greater efficiency in service provision (competition among jurisdictions) • Centralisation • Where preferences are broadly similar • Where spillovers exist • Where there are economies of scale in service provision • Where there is desire to achieve uniformity in provision (equity in health and education) • (on tax side) where resources are mobile
The EU budget and fiscal federalism • Principle of subsidiarity • Stabilisation • No direct role • Distribution • Structural funds and cohesion policy • Allocation/regulation • Supervising the single market, competition policy, R&D policy • No compelling case for involvement in health, education, social welfare • Defence and external action • Agricultural policy ?
The net balances issue • The focus on net balances is heavily criticised • The fact that a Member State’s net budget balance may bear no relationship to its net benefits from EU membership does not mean that net balances are unimportant. • The obsession with net balances distorts decision-making and leads to sub-optimal EU budget - examples • Criteria for distribution of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 payments • Roberto explicitly assumed voting behaviour linked to transfer distribution • Can this weakness be addressed? • Addressing distributional outcomes explicitly removes this incentive problem
Addressing net imbalances • Four options • Hope that EU budget changes will reduce need for correction mechanisms over time • Finance EU budget solely by EU taxes • Link net balances to levels of Member State prosperity through a generalised correction mechanism (Commission proposal) • Explicitly separate distributional outcomes from allocative decisions on how to spend the EU budget
Explicitly keep distributional and allocation budget decisions separate • Idea would be to agree ex ante on the desired level of inter-MS transfers • MS would negotiate the expenditure ceilings on individual MFF headings, knowing that any decisions would not affect their ex ante agreed net balance • Would lead to improved allocative decision-making • Problems include • Agreeing the redistribution coefficient (but one is already implicit in the existing transfers, see next graph) • Payments have very different economic effects • Some are transfers (DPs), some of reimbursements for services and cost incurred…
Annual EU budget • Financial statement showing revenue and areas of expenditure in the coming year • Distinction between commitment and payment appropriations • Current payments ceiling is 1.24% GNI • Looming budget problem. Payments have lagged behind payment appropriations in first part of MFF, will have to grow rapidly to catch up.
EU budget expenditure • Initially dominated by agricultural expenditure • With successive enlargements cohesion expenditure became more important • R&D expenditure has increased due to concerns re EU competitiveness • Note EU budget not allowed to run a deficit
EU budget revenue • Initial arrangement was financing by fixed national shares • Development of ‘own resources’ to give financial autonomy • Import tariffs and agricultural levies • VAT contribution based on harmonised VAT base • Fourth resource based on GNI • Dominance of latter means that EU has now returned to system of national contributions • Limited by overall ceiling (now 1.24% GNI)
The EU budget review process“Reforming the budget, Changing Europe” • Key objectives • Analyse longer-term challenges and issues facing the EU • See how European budget can be shaped to serve EU policies and to meet the challenges ahead • Seeking a new consensus on EU spending priorities, how the budget is managed and how to fund it • Commission to present report later in 2009
Context – the crisis and beyond • Increased global challenges • Climate change, energy, security, migration… • A radically changed economic climate • Economic governance and budgetary consolidation at the heart of the political debate • Climate of budgetary austerity • The EU budget under increased scrutiny • Crisis has reduced GNI (1.05% has become 1.13%) • Letter of five • But also given new roles • EFSM - BOP • Possibly suporting economic governance
Principles for the EU budget • Delivering key policy priorities: Implement the Treaty of Lisbon, help deliver EU 2020 strategy. • EU added value: Application of the subsidiarity principle, complementarity between EU and national/regional budgets. • A results-driven budget: Performance budgeting, conditionality, simplified implementation. • Mutual benefits through solidarity: interdependence in the single market distributes benefits widely; solidarity enables geographically concentrated interventions. • A reformed financing of the budget: greater autonomy for EU Own Resources; transparency and fairness to be improved.
Budget a tool to achieve EU 2020 objectives • The EU is committed to a fundamental programme of economic reform, the EU2020 strategy, intended to unlock the potential of the EU economy to find new sources of growth and create new jobs: • Smart growth: Research and innovation, infrastructure of the future (transport and energy). • Sustainable growth: Green technology and services; reform of the CAP. • Inclusive growth: Cohesion policy to enable coherent implementation of EU2020 strategy; skills and mobility; cushion major sectoral disruptions. • Citizenship: Assist Member States to assure freedom, security and justice; strengthen European integration. • Global Europe: With globalisation, key issues (energy security, migration, climate change, security) can only be tackled at global level.
A budget delivering results • Use of resources through incentives • Possible introduction of conditionalities defining a specific set of targets on which disbursement of EU funds would depend • Other options: performance reserves or modulate co-financing rates to performance • Need to define specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed objectives as well as performance indicators. • EU budget to support economic governance: • Macroeconomic stability and structural reforms require each other, • EU budget could provide part of preventative and corrective measures, covering a broader range of expenditure. • Simplify and minimise administrative burden • Implementation procedures and control requirements are too complicated
Using the budget to leverage investment • Leverage investment • Projects with long-term potential should involve EU funds used in partnership with the private and banking sectors • Increased use of blending of grants and loans • EU project bonds • Could facilitate major cross-border infrastructure projects • Support from EU budget to project bonds issued by the private • sector or by the EIB to enhance the credit rating • Large scale projects • Require considerable investments over a time period going beyond a financial framework (Galileo, ITER, GMES) • Separate support structure set up by the project promoters, to which EU budget would make a fixed annual contribution
Reform of revenue sources • Reform proposals fall into two groups • Simplification of current system of own resources • Replacement of the VAT-based resource by GNI-based payment is widely supported • Introduction of new own resources in the form of one or more EU taxes • Modulated VAT • Tax based on corporate income • New EU Levy on Energy/CO2 (or share of existing energy taxes) • ETS auction revenues with 50% climate earmark (total worth increasing slowly to €20 billion pa in 2020) • Tax on flights • Very limited support for introduction of new EU taxes
The composition of the budget • Budget review highlighted widespread support for considerable reorientation of EU spending to meet global challenges • Ireland’s submission to EU Budget consultation • Department of Finance submission supports increased spending on European public goods, only gradual change to CAP spending and greater targeting of Structural Funds on poorer Member States
Irish government principles • The overall size of the EU Budget as a percent of EU GNI should be determined at the conclusion of the review process and should reflect the agreed policy priorities of the Union • The Review should lead to a gradual evolution of the EU Budget expenditure rather than radical changes • The need for continued food security and safety would warrant only gradual changes to the Common Agriculture Policy • There should be a greater concentration of Structural and Cohesion Funding on less developed Member States • Productivity enhancing policies should have greater emphasis in the EU Budget, particularly in R&D and technology transfer • Policies and investments that implement EU climate-energy objectives should be supported by the EU Budget • The financing of the EU Budget should continue to be mainly based on GNI and an EU wide tax would not be acceptable to Ireland • Consideration should be given to the gradual phasing out of budget rebates.
CAP still largest expenditure item • Original focus on market management to reduce price volatility and increase farm incomes • Pillar 1 (direct payments and market price support) and Pillar 2 (rural development) • Future of direct payments • Distribution of direct payments within countries • Pressure building for fairer allocation between countries
Share of cohesion spending growing rapidly • On average, SFs do benefit poorer regions • But should they be more concentrated?
Growth and competitiveness policies Source: 2008 EU budget