Understanding Theory of Mind |

1. Theory of Mind Folk Psychology I. Human action explained in terms of internal mental states II. Examples: Appearance/Reality False belief II. Necessary for everyday social interaction III. Necessary for scientific advances Developmental claim: around the age of 4 children undergo a major conceptual change; A. to a representational theory of mind B. from a desire psychology to a belief-desire psychology V. Evidence A. Appearance reality tasks B. False belief tasks

2. Theory of Mind Folk Psychology I. Human action explained in terms of internal mental states II. Examples: Appearance/Reality False belief II. Necessary for everyday social interaction III. Necessary for scientific advances Developmental claim: around the age of 4 children undergo a major conceptual change; A. to a representational theory of mind B. from a desire psychology to a belief-desire psychology V. Evidence A. Appearance reality tasks B. False belief tasks

3. Desire Psychology Desires motivate behavior--cause actors to: engage in goal directed behavior: persist until achieve goal overcome obstacles to achieve goal experience emotional reactions: getting what you want yields positive emotion not getting it produces frustration, unhappiness Attributes to the actor certain internal desires. Recruits knowledge about the world. Generates inferences about how actions in the world stem from and fulfill actor’s desire. Limitations: On some occasions must take into account belief. Two different actors with the same desires but different beliefs will engage in different actions. Adding belief explains why someone would do something that might actually thwart his or her desires--when one wrongly believes that the action would help.

4. Wellman & Woolly (1990)Stories used in Experiment 1 Finds-Wanted Stories Here’s Johnny. He wants to find his dog [to take his dog to the park, ‘cause that’s what he really wants to do]. His dog might be in the house, or it might be in the garage. So, he’s looking for his dog [to take it to the park]. Watch, he’s looking for his dog in the garage. Look. He finds his dog. Here’s Linda. She wants to find her mittens [so she can go outside and play with her snowman, ‘cause that’s what she really wants to do]. Her mittens might be in the closet, or they might be in her backpack. So, she’s going to look for her mittens [so she can go outside]. Watch, she’s looking for her mittens in her backpack. Look. She finds her mittens. Finds-Nothing Stories Here’s Betsy. She wants to find her horse [to take her horse to the pond, ‘cause that’s what she really wants to do]. Her horse might be in the red barn, or it might be in the green barn. So, she’s going to look for her horse [to take it to the pond]. Watch, she’s looking for her horse in the green barn. Look. She doesn’t find her horse. Here’s Peter. He wants to find his bike [to ride his bike on the sidewalk, ‘cause that’s what he really wants to do]. His bike might be in the garage or it might be in the playroom. So, he’s going to look for his bike [to ride it on the sidewalk]. Watch, he’s looking for his bike in the playroom. Look. He doesn’t find his bike.

5. Finds-Substitute Stories Here’s Annie. She wants to find her crayons [to take her crayons to her friend’s house, ‘cause that’s what she really wants to do]. Her crayons might be in the desk, or they might be in the toybox. So, she’s going to look for her crayons [to take them to her friend’s house]. Watch, she’s looking for her crayons in the toybox. Look. She finds some mittens. Here’s Sam. He wants to find his rabbit [to take his rabbit to school to show to his friends, ‘cause that’s what he really wants to do]. His rabbit might be in the shed, or it might be in the garden. So, he’s looking for his rabbit [to take it to school]. Watch, he’s looking for his rabbit in the garden. Look. He finds a dog. ________________________________________________ The main text presents information included in Emotion stories. Text in brackets indicates information that was included in the Action stories but omitted from the Emotion stories.

6. Finds-Substitute Stories Here’s Annie. She wants to find her crayons [to take her crayons to her friend’s house, ‘cause that’s what she really wants to do]. Her crayons might be in the desk, or they might be in the toybox. So, she’s going to look for her crayons [to take them to her friend’s house]. Watch, she’s looking for her crayons in the toybox. Look. She finds some mittens. Here’s Sam. He wants to find his rabbit [to take his rabbit to school to show to his friends, ‘cause that’s what he really wants to do]. His rabbit might be in the shed, or it might be in the garden. So, he’s looking for his rabbit [to take it to school]. Watch, he’s looking for his rabbit in the garden. Look. He finds a dog. ________________________________________________ The main text presents information included in Emotion stories. Text in brackets indicates information that was included in the Action stories but omitted from the Emotion stories.

8. I. Extensive review of the literature A. roughly 180 studies B. almost 600 conditions II. Analyzed results according to several factors A. The task used 1. “unexpected identity” (Appearance/Reality) 2. unexpected contents 3. unexpected location B. Nature of the protagonist (puppet, pictured character, videotaped person, real person) C. Self versus other D. Nature of target object (real and present, or not) ____________________________________________________ E. Motive for the transformation: was deception mentioned F. Participation in the transformation G. Salience of the protagonist’s mental state had to be inferred from character’s absence whether absence was emphasized and explicitly noted whether the belief state was demonstrated on children themselves whether mental state was explicitly mentioned H. Type of question (look, do, think, say) ___________________________________________________ I. Temporal marker (Where will Max look first?)

9. III. Results A. Factors A-D don’t matter B. Factors E-H result in improved performance, but no interaction with age . That is older children benefit as well as younger. C. Temporal markers did interact with age, but only the older children benefited IV. Criteria needed to argue for early competence without conceptual change: A. Improvement must interact with age. If young children have basic competence that is being masked by task demands, then they should be the ones to benefit from changed demands. B. Improvement should result in above chance performance in the younger children. “No set of manipulations boosted younger children’s performance to above chance.” They go from below chance to chance. C. Above chance performance must be obtained for children beyond the transitional age. Conclusion: The original developmental difference claimed for false belief tasks remains valid.

10. Implications for Adults Adults retain vestiges of these problems with a representational theory of mind: B. The fundamental attribution error naïve realism false belief

11. False consensus That’s how the world is so my response dictated by reality. Get overconfidence of how others would respond. Fail to make adequate allowance for situation or that you may construe things differently than I do. Naïve realism I see the world the way it is see others as biased, or lacking information My view closer to reality

12. Anecdotal Evidence for earlier understanding

13. Hansen & Markman (2005) • Assumption is that looks like refers to perceptual appearance. • But consider: “It looks like the meeting will be tomorrow.” or “That looks like John over there.” • So looks like can refer to likely reality. Similar to “I think that…” • How do we know which meaning is intended? • Pragmatic/Gricean principle: when the listener and speaker can both be sure they know what the reality is, then looks like can refer to appearance. Otherwise, it refers to reality.

14. Cognitive Psychology 50 (2005) 233-263Appearance questions can be misleading: A discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problemM. Hansen & E. Markman Table 1 Mean percent correct answers to appearance questions in Studies 2 and 3 Condition Study 2 Study 3 Mean SD Mean SD Common Knowledge 91 20 85 30 Standard 47 42 50 42 Study 2: Compared “what does this look like” “to what does the sponge look like.”

15. Cognitive Psychology 50 (2005) 233-263Appearance questions can be misleading: A discourse-based account of the appearance-reality problemM. Hansen & E. Markman Table 2 Mean percent correct answers to appearance-reality questions by order in Study 4 Condition Order Standard first Contrastive first Mean SD Mean SD Contrastive 88 35 81 35 Standard 38 40 78 37

16. Origins of Theory of Mind I. Empirical Studies A. Infants’ (5 month olds) perception of intentional action (goal directed reaching) (Woodward). B. Infants’ (12 month olds) recognition of mentalistic agents (Johnson) C. Infants’ (15-18 month olds) understanding of a speaker’s intent to refer (Baldwin) D. Infants’ (12 month olds) understanding of the intended referent of an emotional reaction (Baldwin and Moses) How does the core concept of “intention” emerge? or What evidence might babies use to infer intention, agency? A. Violations of lay physics/mechanics/physical causality 1. self-propelled action 2. irregular path of movement 3. nonrigid transformation 4. action at a distance (communication) B. Features of animate beings 1. face, eyes 2. texture, movement, etc. 3. symmetry along major axis

17. Woodward’s predictions Habituation Condition Arm Rod Test Condition Old object/new location Decrease Increase looking looking New object/old location Increase Decrease looking looking

18. G. Gergely et al. / Cognition 56 (1995) 165-193 Fig 1. An illustration of the habituation events for the rational approach group. (a) The large circle expands then contracts, regaining its original size, and it is immediately followed by a similar expansion-contraction sequence performed by the small circle. This sequence of events is then repeated again and then the small circle starts to move towards the large circle. (b) It stops in front of the rectangular figure and then retreats to its original position and starts out again towards the large circle. This time it jumps over the obstacle and, landing in front of the large circle, continues to approach it until they make contact. When they touch each other, the large circle exhibits the contraction-expansion routine, which is immediately reciprocated by an identical response performed by the small circle, and this interchange is repeated a second time.

19. G. Gergely et al. / Cognition 56 (1995) 165-193 Fig 2. Habituation events for the nonrational approach group. The sequence of the actions is identical to those for the rational approach group (see Fig. 1), but the rectangular figure is placed behind the small circle, rather than in between the two.

20. New Action Old Action Fig. 3. Test events in the dishabituation phase. (a) The small circle approaches the large one through the shortest straight pathway (new action). (b) The small circle exhibits the same behavior as in the habituation phase (see Figs. 1 and 2) in the absence of the rectangle figure (old action).

21. New Action Old Action Fig. 3. Test events in the dishabituation phase. (a) The small circle approaches the large one through the shortest straight pathway (new action). (b) The small circle exhibits the same behavior as in the habituation phase (see Figs. 1 and 2) in the absence of the rectangle figure (old action).

22. 60 50 40 30 20 10 •———• Rational Approach Group •---------• Non-rational Approach Group Mean looking times 1 2 3 -4 -3 -2 -1 Fig. 4 Mean looking times of the rational approach and nonrational approach group in the first three and last four trials in the habituation phase. (Note that the last four habituation trials are numbered backward from the trial in which the habituation criterion was reached.