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Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) CREATE Conference

Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) CREATE Conference. Bill Colston Director November 18, 2004. The life sciences revolution is producing knowledge that has immediate biodefense implications.

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Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) CREATE Conference

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  1. Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC)CREATE Conference Bill Colston Director November 18, 2004

  2. The life sciences revolution is producing knowledge that has immediate biodefense implications • Complete genome of more than 100 microbial pathogens, including smallpox, anthrax, botulism, and plague are already freely available on the internet • Dual use problem: “experiments of concern”* • Force multipliers • Virulence • Transmissibility • Host range • Dissemination • Weaponization • Evading biological countermeasures • Diagnostics (environmental and medical) • Therapeutics (vaccines, Ab/Av resistance) *National Academies Report - “Biotechnology Research in the Age of Terrorism”, NAS, October 8, 2003

  3. “The biggest impediment to all-source analysis… is the human resistance to sharing information”9/11 • Intra- and Inter-agency silos • By mission: Intelligence, Law enforcement, Public Health, etc. • By domain: genomics, assessments, transportation, etc. • No distributed, secure network • Old mainframe model • Privacy/classification concerns not addressed (OUO to SCI) • Not readily scaleable to future needs

  4. Knowledge Interface Template Subgraphs Semantic Graph Ontology Information Interface The mission of the BKC is to provide scientifically rigorous, actionable information to all stakeholders BKC Knowledge integration & discovery Policy guidelines Analysis and interpretation Subject matter experts Secure, tailored access S&T knowledge products Stakeholders

  5. The goal of the BKC is to enable better, more timely understanding of the threat from bioterrorism …you know …you don’t know • Integrate all biodefense related knowledge Actionable information Identified gaps You know • Accelerate understanding of the bioterrorist threat Biodefense Knowledge Center You don’t know Non-accessed information Unidentified gaps • Enable understanding through technology

  6. Last week we provided DHS senior staff with an info bulletin to exercise our reachback processes • Soybean rust is foreign plant pathogen • Economic losses are expected to be from $640 million to $1.3 billion in FY05 • Research restricted to one USDA lab in US

  7. Long term studies include Material Threat Assessments (MTAs) • “Material threats” include biological, chemical, and radiological agents • Category A biological agents (anthrax, smallpox, etc.) • Chemical weapons • Radiation dispersal devices • There are several high-level goals for the MTAs • Identify plausible worst case attack methods • Determine the technical and operational feasibility of the attacks • Estimate the number of people exposed • Determine critical knowledge gaps

  8. The MTAs are designed to inform Bioshield countermeasures procurements Bioshield Act: July 21, 2004. "By authorizing unprecedented funding and providing new capabilities, Project BioShield will help America purchase, develop and deploy cutting-edge defenses against catastrophic attack,"

  9. Example scenario: FMD outbreaks recently occurred in South America • Common questions include: • Are we at risk? • Do we trade livestock products with those regions? • Are there frequent travelers from those regions to the US? • Are we prepared? • Do we have vaccine in the vaccine bank that matches the outbreak strain? • Do we have protein/nucleic acid assays capable of detecting that strain? • Do we have sufficient reagents on-hand to enable surge testing? • Do we know key virus info (species-preference, incubation period, etc.) • Do unique features of the outbreaks suggest foul play? • Are known adversaries located near the outbreaks? • Has the outbreak strain been seen in S. America before? • Do we know how it was introduced? • Have recent intel reports suggested intentional use of FMD is likely?

  10. By fusing disparate data sources, we can address some of these questions North American Vaccine Bank FMDV Vaccine Jordan Contains Protects against Operates in Sero-Type O Known Adversary Group Previously isolated in Form of Form of Has discussed Operates in Deployed Assay Signature Genetic Sequence from Isolate FMDV Monte Alegre District Related to Subset of Related to Related to Located in Potential Data Sources: Outbreak ProMed email Describes Intelligence data ProMed Message Genomic data Vaccine stockpile data

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