Summary of SBDS Readiness Review

1. Summary of SBDS Readiness Review General comments and findings Answers to Reviewer’s questions Summary of recommendations Specific comments by presentation(annex) Reviewers: K.Foraz, S.Gilardoni, B.Goddard (chair), K.Li, J.Osborne, J.Somoza

2. General comments and findings The review was well-organised and complete Detailed technical and schedule breakdowns were given for the SBDS subsystems and associated planning Overall the presentations were excellent and the scope and level of detail appropriate The reviewers would like to congratulate the SBDS team on the project organisation and level of follow-up, and for the excellent technical progress to date

3. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 1. Is each work package on track for installation during LS2? Yes, overall very solid progress with clear planning and milestones. Critical path is CE execution and TIDVG5 production.

4. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 2. Is the project ready to move to (or fully in) the execution phase? Yes, almost everywhere. Prototyping essentially finished and production under way. The CE contract is being placed, and the deadline of September 2018 for freezing the design requirements is clear. Specific points where execution is (or might be) pending are: i. Full voltage testing of MKDV generator; ii. Finalisation of masks for LSS1 (scraper) and LSS5 (downstream of dump); iii. Definition of RP related needs for floor downstream of shielding; iv. Specification of future upstream shield loads and location for platform design v. Validation of chemical composition of iron shielding blocks by RP

5. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 3. Are there still technical points to be looked at more into detail before the start of LS2? • The overall concept and system designs look solid, and overall performance in terms of reduced radiation to personnel and equipment is excellent. Only very few outstanding technical points remain: i. Validate BTV camera and electronics design & location with R2E team; ii. Finalisation of Injection interlocking and dump arming, especially validation testing; iii. Review collimator aperture (for FT beams) and decide on action iv. Finalise mask designs and floor decommissioning v. The full procedure for beam dump exchange needs to be extremely solid, based on practise in the various mock-ups and on the experience from installation.

6. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 4. Is the roadmap/milestones up to the end of LS2 correct? • Although considered “feasible”, schedule through LS2 is very tight, and there is concern that the lack of overall contingency could lead to delays in HWC in the event of any problems. Specific points were: i. Excellent and continuous coordination and communication will be mandatory for success ii. Unclear from review whether EN/CV have the full scope definition of their works, and also whether they are aware of their allocated timeline and milestones iii. The CE contractor might propose alternative design for construction. Time allocated for CE design consultants to study alternative designs, but CERN should be prepared to make a timely decision on new proposals.

7. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 5. Are we on the critical path for some items? • Yes. The critical path is the civil engineering for the underground works, and the production and installation of the TIDVG block. In addition, the heavy cabling and other system installations mean co-activity needs very careful management: i. Obvious concern over the scheduling of other activities in the SPS like Fire Safety project, where the very late technical and schedule definition has meant that an integrated schedule cannot yet be fully defined; ii. Risk of delays with many back-and-forth material procuring, manufacturing and treatment steps for TIDVG5 – extremely tight coordination needed, with immediate reaction and backup plans. iii. Respecting schedule will be extremely important for VSC to connect all equipment, pump down and commission vacuum control system with new vacuum layout before closing the machine.

8. Answers to Reviewer’s questions 6. Are the identified remaining risks and their proposed mitigation measures acceptable? Are there any others risks to the ones identified? • The risks have been clearly identified and mitigations appear well thought out and acceptable. The proposed measures under 3.i and 3.ii above can be considered as additional risk mitigation suggestions, and a few specific additional proposals: i. Risk of unforeseen rock behaviour during excavation needs further mitigation. CE should ensure that the on-site team (probably ATKINS UK), subcontract to our local geological experts (GADZ), if not, CERN should hire them directly. ii. An iteration on installation readiness dates could be made to try to generate even a few weeks of contingency in the overall planning. iii. Review in detail Civil Engineering and EN-EL planning to evaluate possible coactivity at the beginning and the end of the works

9. Recommendations R1: Provide RP with final chemical composition of iron shielding blocks before purchase (STI) R2: Provide missing Injection Interlocking specification and finlise exact numbers (ABT, MPE, OP). R3: Thoroughly analyse needs for Injection Interlocking testing and validation, including timing and rearming sequences, and evaluate need for possible BETS/BIS simulators as for LHC (ABT, MPE, OP). R4: Validate BTV camera and electronics layout with R2E (BI) R5: Check spare TBSJ strategy (STI). R6. Review detailed mask status as soon as possible and finish design (LSS1+LSS5) by end 2018 at latest (LIU-SPS, STI) R7. Review TCSM aperture and decide action (LIU-SPS, OP, STI, COLL)

10. Recommendations R8. Check if air activation monitoring system in ECX5 is foreseen (RP). R9. Define location and loading of platform for upstream mask to CE for inclusion in the specification for the platform (RP, STI). R10. Review need and cost for removable floor block behind dump and decide on design before end August 2018 (RP, CE). R11. Provide EN/EL with estimated annual dose to cables behind shielding, in kGy (RP). R12. Complete and release MDHD ECR and also to add to list for LSS5 works (MSC). R13. Explicitly check electrical safety guidelines and have strategy endorsed by safety team (MSC). R14. Urgently clarify status of kicker platform fire detection works with BE/ICS (ABT).

11. Recommendations R15. Make maximum effort to rehearse and document all TIDVG and shielding handling and tests in the tunnel (HE, STI). R16. Review in detail Civil Engineering and EN-EL planning to evaluate possible coactivity at the beginning and the end of the works (ACE, CE, EL). R17. Investigate if LSS1 dismantling can be planned after LSS5 equipment readiness confirmed (ACE). R18. Quantify and include any ‘private’ contingency in planning from individual groups into the overall planning where it may do most good (ACE). R19. Identify any schedule critical safety validations and integrate into the overall planning (HSE, ACE). R20. CE should ensure that the on-site team (probably ATKINS UK), subcontract to our local geological experts (GADZ), if not, CERN should hire them directly.

13. TIDVG5, Shielding and Masks (A.PerilloMarcone, EN/STI) Core on critical path, CuCrZ delivered by end of year, many subsequent steps. Installation in EXC5 from April 2020. No budget contingency. Margin in planning, TIDVG5 finished 4 months before installation. Main identified risk is cooling performance, but solid experience from extensive prototyping activities (for the CuCrZr core) and previous TIDVGs (for first shielding). Risk of delay from vacuum acceptance tests and transports needs tight follow-up Exchange procedures will need to be established and in place (exchange might not be for years) R1: Provide RP with final chemical composition of iron shielding blocks before purchase.

14. Kicker systems (L.Ducimetiere/P.vanTrappen TE/ABT) Magnets are copies of existing systems and no specific risks identified. MKDV generators, new switch GTO technology known from LHC. Low technical risk. HV cables, MKDV delivered & some installed, MKDH ordered and prototyped ECX5 platform, already partly installed, some details still to sort out Rise time above 1.1 us at low energy OK for FT and CNGS beams Risks, complex interplay between injection and dump, solved by delaying the internal dump request by 1-2 turns (23 us) to be able to inhibit injection. R2: provide missing Injection Interlocking specification and finlise exact numbers. Tests of TSU arming, will be tested and documented. R3: Thoroughly analyse needs for Injection Interlocking testing and validation, including timing and rearming sequences, and evaluate need for possible BETS/BIS simulators as for LHC.

15. Beam instrumentation (L.Jensen BE/BI) All documentation is up to date and storage locations defined. Main new instrument is BTVD. Camera 16 m away from beamline SW integration will start next year, on track overall. All procurement will be launched by the end of 2018, no criticality. Organisation of LS2 interventions will be critical, looking at how to improve coordination inside BI across machines. Main risk is optical beamline, but no more complicated than operational systems in AWAKE and CTF. Screen survives in case of kicker failure, based on the cases defined by ABT. Will anyway be a spare module. For camera and associated electronics in tunnel, electronics is acceptable for the expected radiation levels. R4: Validate BTV camera and electronics layout with R2E.

16. Machine protection (I.Romera TE/MPE) • WIC, reconfiguration and new magnets to LSS1. HW ready, general SW upgrade in LS2 • BIS, reconfiguration with new CiBU, fibres etc. All DEC/DIC done and dependencies clear, no issues expected • New SPS injection BIS, to remove the private link between MKP and MKDV and to protect the TBSJ. R5: Check spare TBSJ strategy. Still quite complicated for the power convertors, to be sorted out for the MBSH (timing concerns). • Injection BIS requirements defined, Technical Specification still to be approved, testing will be crucial. See R2 and R3 above.

17. Vacuum (D.Murteira TE/VSC) • ECRs approved or under approval, all LIU jobs declared to MME and jobs opened. Standard components already end 2018. • All production planned, should all be ready for September 2009 - depends strongly on MME and of course on the equipment owners • Roadmap - final decision on key components needed July 2018 for production in 2019. Need still to freeze layout of masks, LSS1 masks should also be finalised before this. R6.Review detailed mask status as soon as possible and finish design (LSS1+LSS5) by end 2018 at latest. • Risks are delays in orders, but enough margin in the schedule and can in worst-case recover existing material • TCSM collimator is aperture restriction for FT beams. R7. Review TCSM aperture and decide action with LIU/OP/STI/COLL.

18. Civil engineering (S. Mcilwraith SMB/SE) • Kicker platform, still to get HSE approval for NC • Need changes for mockup in BB5 to spread load on floor • IT for main works, September FC for approval. • CE access to underground 1 April, until end December 2019. Coactivity planning crucial. • Dependencies with technical services groups defined, support OK. • Last input from CERN is needed for September 2018 - upstream shielding and downstream floor, modifications for beamline bridge • Risks analysed and identified - tight planning, 9 months for works • On-site supervision with geotechnical experts for regular checking of geology is being considered, either via consultant or directly. • Protection of kicker platform in ECA5 and machine is planned. • R20. CE should ensure that the on-site team (probably ATKINS UK), subcontract to our local geological experts (GADZ), if not, CERN should hire them directly.

19. Radioprotection (D.Bjorkmann HSE/RP) • If heavy dump use, care accessing immediately afterwards, suggest a monitoring system to control this – R8. Check if air activation monitoring system in ECX5 is foreseen. • Recommended additional marble mask at entrance to dump, to reduce forward shine, not included in the baseline. R9. Define location and loading of platform for upstream mask to CE for inclusion in the specification for the platform. • Air pocket under the dump is dealt with in the ventilation system. • Downstream area still scope for optimisation. R10. Review need and cost for removable floor block behind dump and decide on design before end August 2018. • Radiation to cable trays behind the dump block should be much less that LSS1. R11. RP to provide EN/EL with estimated annual dose to cables behind shielding, in kGy.

20. Warm magnets (J.Bauche TE/MSC) • Still need to define which team will do floor drilling for installation of supports • Working on improving traceability for coated chambers and magnets. • ECR needed for MDHD modifications for position 518, needs to go back to old power convertor, all OK but needs documentation. R12. Complete and release MDHD ECR and also to add to list for LSS5 works. • No risks identified. Electrical safety guidelines are proposed to be treated as global issue. R13. Explicitly check electrical safety guidelines and have strategy endorsed by safety team.

21. Power converter (E.CoulotTE/EPC) • New PCs ordered, to be delivered at CERN 3/19. • All on schedule and no risks identified.

22. Cables (G.Georgiev EN/EL) • Decablingand new cables defined, all groups should check that this information is correct • Kicker cabling already 20 have been done, another 73 to pull. Manpower intensive, not possible in parallel with SMB so need to find 4.3 weeks, after the CE. • New request for fire detection system and evacuation for kicker platform, final DIC not sent to EN. R14. Urgently clarify status of kicker platform fire detection works with BE/ICS. • Procurement ongoing, but modifications still coming from users – need to freeze requests now. Material will be at CERN on time. • Risks - electrical hazard relies on lockout procedure. Obsolete cables to be marked by equipment groups. Co-activity planned by ACE. • Planning being integrated by ACE with the durations needed already provided by EN/EL.

23. Transport (J.-L.Grenard EN/HE) • Lifting spreaders being designed/built for the TIDVG and shielding blocks. Finished and tested by end 2018 • Organisation of transport and handling activities ongoing, all specific machines available, still some concern about road transport of heavy radioactive objects (TIDVG4, TIDH) on public roads being discussed. • Procedure for opening of shielding and block replacement being defined, for which space is secured, working on preparation of mock-up. R15. Make maximum effort to rehearse and document all TIDVG and shielding handling and tests in the tunnel. • Risks are basically standard ones associated with heavy handling plus remote handling. These are addressed by specific procedures.

24. Planning and coordination (A. BerjillosBarranco EN/ACE) • Works from 21/1/19 until closure 21/9/2020. 20 months for works in SPS. • coactivities at start of shutdown to solve between decabling and CE works, and kicker cables. R16. Review in detail Civil Engineering and EN-EL planning to evaluate possible coactivity at the beginning and the end of the works. • P1 equipment removal being defined. Works start after June 2019 (RP). R17. Investigate if LSS1 dismantling can be planned after LSS5 equipment readiness confirmed. • Risks are resources, equipment readiness, accident and radiological aspects. Mitigations are detailed planning and respect of dates, WPA, WDP • 1 ECR needed from MDHD, all others OK • 3 WPA, will be reviewed before end July and approved in October • SPS coordination meetings will take place from September until end LS2 • Overall schedule feasible, but full length of LS2 needed for all activities • Concern about lack of contingency. On-site project coordinator to follow progress and arbitrate. R18. Quantify and include any ‘private’ contingency in from individual groups into overall planning where most effective.

25. Safety file (A.Funken BE/ASR) • Overall some hazards introduced by relocation, analysis is complete and well-known controls measures in place. Document required for HSE project clearance in progress, will be presented to SPS CSAP September 2018. • HSE needs to be in the planning loop for all schedule-critical items, since delays in validation may affect the planning. Deep involvement already at the design phase should reduce the risk of this sort of delay R19. Identify any schedule critical safety validations and integrate into the overall planning. • Planning still needs to include the other activities like fire safety – EN/ACE in the process of doing this.