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Going Beyond Nuclear? The Future of Warfare and the Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament . Ankie Hoogvelt – Sheffield CND (a.hoogvelt@sheffield.ac.uk). Outline of presentation. A quick recap of the nuclear arms race Time line of the expanding nuclear club
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Going Beyond Nuclear?The Future of Warfare and the Prospects for Nuclear Disarmament AnkieHoogvelt – Sheffield CND (a.hoogvelt@sheffield.ac.uk)
Outline of presentation • A quick recap of the nuclear arms race • Time line of the expanding nuclear club • Nuclear Arms Limitation and Reduction Treaties • Nuclear Warheads 2012 • Warheads and Delivery Systems • Tactical Nuclear Weapons – Modernization • Missile Defense • Defensive and Offensive use of nuclear weapons • The deterrence function and the end of the cold war • Offensive use: tactical combined with missile defense • Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach, and‘Pivot’ Pacific • Russia and China : responses, new nuclear arms race? • The future of warfare: • Drones • Cyber warfare • Conclusion • going beyond the nuclear option?
Quick recap of nuclear arms racetimeline of nuclear weapons states and membership of NPT Declared NW states NPT USA (1945) yes USSR (1949) yes UK (1952) yes France (1960) yes PR China (1964) yes [Undeclared NW state Israel (1967) no] Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) India (1974) no Pakistan (1998) no N. Korea (DPRK) 1985-2003 Dismantled NW states S Africa ? 1993 1994 Libya ? 2003 yes [Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan] yes
Nuclear Arms Limitation Treaties • Non Proliferation treaty (NPT) (1968) • Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTB) (1996) • Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) (1972-2002) • Intermediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty (1987) • Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I and II (SALT) 1973/1979 and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II (START) (1991/1992) Moscow Treaty 2002 Moscow Treaty 2010 (New START Treaty) • Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) (2003) • [Co-operative Threat Reduction Act 1991-2007- (Nunn and Lugar Act) Russia WITHDRAWS Oct 2012]
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiated in 1965- open for signatures 1968 – total number of signed up states: 196 in 2012 (Instead of expected 20+ NW states by 1975) Three Pillars Flaws • Non-proliferation ‘nuclear-weapon sharing’ (NATO) • NW states disarm if etcvague wording • Right to peaceful use of nuclear technology dual use dilemma [Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (1992) • Voluntary and informal • 34 signatories • No teeth]
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban treaty (1996) Bans all nuclear explosions whether for civilian or military purposes Signed by 157 countries to date. China and US have not ratified – so treaty has not come into effect.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM) (1972) • Negotiated between US and Soviet Union. US withdrew in 2002 • The Treaty barred the two super powers from employing nation wide defences against strategic ballistic missiles • Was at the heart of the nuclear deterrence argument: mutually assured destruction(MAD)
The Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) (1987) • Negotiated between US and Soviet Union • Required elimination of all missiles with ranges between 625 and 3,500 miles and all with ranges between 300 and 625 miles. • A total of 2,692 missiles were eliminated by 1991
SALT I and II and START I and II and SORT • Bilateral negotiations between US and S.U and next US and RussiaYear Outcome • SALT I 1973 ABM treaty • SALT II 1979 US withdraws re SU invasion Afghanistan • START I 1991 specific capsnrs. ball.missiles • START II 1993 not ratified b y US senate • Moscow Treaty 2002 limit nrsto 2,200 • Moscow Treaty 2010 limit nrs to 70 ball. Missiles and 1,550 strategic warheads • SORT (2003) remaining strategic NW taken off active deployment
[Co-operative Threat Reduction Act 1991-2007-(Nunn and Lugar Act) • $5.9 billion through annual defense appropriations since 1991 provided to ex Soviet countries. • has deactivated 7,527 strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 774 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 651 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 906 nuclear air-to-surface missiles. • To date, the Nunn-Lugar program has reduced nuclear arsenals in Russia from 30,000 in 1991 to about 12,000 warheads today. • To match the effort in Russia, the United States has dismantled more than 13,000 warheads since 1990 and destroyed 90 percent of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons, going from 7,600 to 760 warheads. • Has stored more than 75 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. This is a moment for celebration.
Nuclear Warheads – 2012(estimates) Country (strategic warheads) tactical active/total active/total USA 1,737 / 5000 500 Russia 1,492/5,500 2000/4000 UK 160/225 France 290/300 China 240 India 80 N Korea 10 Israel 80-200 Pakistan 90-110 Source: Arms Control Association : factsheets
Warheads and Delivery Systems • Nuclear bombs/warheads not the same as ability to deliver over distance • Ballistic missiles (going through space and then popping down again • short range 1000 km • Medium 1000 – 3000 km • Intermediate 3000-5000 • Intercontinental ballistic (ICBM)over 5,500 Ballistic missiles • US and USSR have all of the above and operational • China is thought to have all of above with < 50 ICBM capable of reaching US operational • France and UK have SLBMs (submarine-based ICBMs) • India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, N Korea have shorter range ones with longer range ones under development
Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Modernization • Battlefield weapons • Range of less than 300 miles • outside scope of arms limitation treaties (so far) • But stockpiles have been reduced since end of cold war (CTR Act) • US has to date 200 NATO weapons at six combat bases in Europe (another 900 stock piled) • Estimated 2000 active Russian weapons • modernization Contrary to Obama’s avowed intentions, and despite NATO countries’ misgivings, US administration is considering (2012) refurbishing and upgrading its stock piles at huge cost. Enhanced accuracy and smaller size (mini nukes) increases credible threat and crosses dividing line with ‘strategic’ weapons.
Missile Defense • Weapon system fordetection, tracking, and interception of attacking missiles • US, Russia, France, India, Israel and China have air defense systems. • Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (1983-Star Wars) began work on interception in spaceof ‘ballistic’ missiles. • US withdraws from ABM treaty in 2002 • US National Missile Defense claims to be operational since 2006 • US controls space – from Alaska and California with ground based interceptor missiles and radar. • Problem: decoys • Bigger problem: rapid response time. Not time to think or for mistakes • Biggest problem: Russia and China way behind in the space-based interceptor race: imbalance in global nuclear race • Result:Russia, China are unhappy; may want more ballistic missiles to make sure one of theirs gets through.
Defensive versus Offensive Use of NW • Deterrence function worked thanks to MAD – preserved nuclear stand off during cold war.(1945-1991) • US foreign policy and military/industrial complex miss the cold war • Project for the New American Century (1996): aims at dominance in space, sea, land, air everywhere • US foreign policy (imperialism) always rhetorically based on Countering Perceived Threats • US has competitive advantage in combination missile defense with offensive use of tactical and conventional weapons.
Obama’s European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and ‘Pivot’ Pacific (2009) and (2011) • EPAA: new approach to missile defense in Europe initially sea-based, then in phases land based (bases in Romania and Poland)-adapting as the threat ‘evolves’. • Designed to deal with threat (sic) posed by Iranian short and intermediate range ballistic missiles threatening US personnel and allies in Europe Russia regards the EPAA directed at them • Pivot Pacific (2012) rebalancing US forces towards Pacific – designed to contain ‘rising China’ • Missile defense installations in Japan and Philippines to counter N Korean missile threat (sic)
Russia and Chinaresponses • R. announces (Oct 2012) new ‘heavy’ intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2018 • R. announces (Oct 2012) upgrade ABM defense system around Moscow • R. announces (Oct 2012) withdrawal from renewing CRT collaboration • China’s response: combining ‘conventional sword’ and ‘nuclear shield’ in the same ‘second artillery’ command system: sequentially launching conventional and nuclear missiles. Escalation to nuclear war unavoidable.
Future Wars: Drones • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – low cost • Two kinds: Tactical (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance etc.) and armed UAVs • Drone proliferation: 2002 USA only(50 drones) Today US has 7,500 and 76 countries have drones • To date only US, UK, Israel known to have armed drones • To date US has carried out drone attacks in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, • US is estimated to have killed between 1900 and 3200 people (including 500+ civilians) in Pakistan over past 8 yrs.
Future Wars: Cyber Wars • Politically motivated hacking to conduct sabotage and espionage • Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain of warfare. US Cybercommand (2010) • Likewise Russia, Israel, North Korea, Iran, China etc. • US says it could use pre-emptive strike to eliminate cyber threat and respond to cyber attack with physical force • Leon Panetta warns of ‘cyber Pearl Harbour’ (April 2012) • China has plans to ‘win informationised wars by mid-21st century’ • Cyber war against ‘nuclear’ installations so far: Stuxnet (2010 US/Israel wipes out 1000-5000 centrifuges in Natanz plant in Iran-18 months set back for Iranian nuclear programme
Conclusion: Beyond the Nuclear Option? • NO! – dangerous interface between both drones and cyber wars with nuclear weapons • New generation of nuclear powered drones capable of flying for months on end without refuelling: danger of crashing. Effectively turns the drone into a dirty bomb • Nuclear command and control systems have inherent weaknesses in relation to cyber war fare • are over-reliant on computer systems • Hair trigger launch posture expands use of computers in command and control • Multiple independent launch locations make possible subversion of control by falsifying the order to launch at any number of locations down the chain of command • Distributed nature of internet based attacks makes it difficult to determine motivation and attacking party
Sources • Federation of American Scientists US Special report on cyber warfare • Arms Control Association US • New America Foundation US • Global Research Canada • Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament UK • ‘Living under Drones’ Stanford/NYU report October 2012 • Wikipedia - various
World Military Expenditure2011 • percentage share • USA 41.0% • China 8.2 • Russia 4.1 • UK 3.6 • Japan 3.4 • S. Arabia 2.8 • India 2.8 • Germany 2.7 • France ? • Brazil 1 • All the rest 25.7 • Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2012