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“The future is another country; they do things differently there.” L. P. Hartley

“The future is another country; they do things differently there.” L. P. Hartley. In view of the preceding discussion, what would the US Army look like if it were reorganized as outlined in Breaking the Phalanx ?. ARMY GROUND FORCES IN THE 21st CENTURY. Close Battle Echelon

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“The future is another country; they do things differently there.” L. P. Hartley

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  1. “The future is another country; they do things differently there.” L. P. Hartley In view of the preceding discussion, what would the US Army look like if it were reorganized as outlined in Breaking the Phalanx?

  2. ARMY GROUND FORCES IN THE 21st CENTURY Close Battle Echelon (8) Airborne-Air Assault Groups (3) Recon-Srike Groups(New Equipment) (15) Combat Maneuver Groups Deep Battle Echelon (3) Rocket Artillery Groups (324 MLRS) (4) Aviation Strike Groups (400 AH64Ds) (4) Aviation Support Groups (500 UH60s) (4) Air Defense Groups (TBM/GLCM/ADA) (7) C4I Groups (New Equipment) Rear Battle Echelon (8) JTF Support Groups; ((3-4) Early Deploying Groups) (3+) Specialized Support Groups(MP, MED,..) (7) Engineer Groups Existing assets are re-organized to achieve greater strategic agility, as well as monetary savings. Items highlighted in red indicate the requirement for new sets of equipment. Many of these sets of equipment can be leased off the shelf!

  3. Readiness and Training in Information Age Army Ground Forces Reorganization creates a larger pool of ready, available forces that can be rapidly deployed to regional commands with a combination of strategic air and fast sealift to arrive in strategically pivotal regions before the “Peace is lost.” What follows is a description of how the new paradigm works.

  4. In the Group-based structure, Army Forces are involved in one of three 180 day operational readiness cycles in peacetime. • Training Cycle (six months): Unit and Individual Training under Service control. • Deployment Cycle (six months): Units are ready for deployment to Joint Command and Control and become part of the pool that responds to Major Theater of War or Lesser Theater of War contingencies. • Reconstitution Cycle (six months): Unit returns to home station for re-fitting, modernization (if required) and leave. This approach creates a pool of 35-40,000 ready, CONUS-based Army Expeditionary Forces who are always in the Deployment Cycle. They can deploy 24 hours a day, seven days a week to fight, to conduct any mission the NCA decide to assign. This reduces personnel tempo while making deployments and costs more predictable.

  5. Ground Force Deployment Readiness in theClose CombatEchelon of the Group-based Force Structure CONUS

  6. The new organization for combat requires new personnel policies! • The individual replacement system is at the heart of much of the Army’s readiness problems in the new strategic environment. • The current individual replacement system, instituted during World War I is based on the fundamental concept of industrial mass production and is designed to mobilize large numbers of soldiers for deployment to a combat theater. • Soldiers are treated as interchangeable parts in systems that required stereotyped behaviors (“by the numbers”). • Unit performance is presumed to be a simple summation of individual soldier skill.

  7. Unit Replacement system supports rotational readiness and the expeditionary character of the Information Age Army! • Psychologically strengthens units for combat by increasing cohesion, trust in the chain of command and discipline; • Provides unified commands with ready, trained • combat units on short notice; • Increases training opportunities provided to all • combat units; • Also: • Provides a Global orientation to all Army forces; • Shares the burden of forward presence more equitably; • Decreases Permanent Change of Station (PCS) costs; • Increases family stability at a designated CONUS base; • Decreases the number of family members overseas; • Decreases demand for family housing and support overseas.

  8. How does the Army find and educate leaders today? • In the absence of objective criteria to measure competence, the current system of officer education and selection does several things: • Centralizes all promotion and selection decisions in the hands of a few key players in the Department of the Army and relies exclusively on the highly subjective Officer Evaluation Report; • Ignores the requirement for objective performance evaluations in the form of competence-based testing and examination to off-set favoritism and subjective judgment; • As a result, selection is based on cronyism, not competence or talent. This undermines trust, crushes initiative, breeds “Yes Men” and reinforces the Single Service warfighting structure and Service parochialism!

  9. How does the Army find and educate leaders for the Information Age? • Joint Warfighting is only possible when people and systems have a shared, common understanding of operations. This requires change to make the military educational experience relevant: • Abolish the Single-Service War College to save money and personnel spaces; • Establish Entrance Examinations for Army General Staff College and Joint War College Selection that compels officers to study their profession; • Evaluate Command performance at the Training Centers and Battle Command Training Program to find the Leaders who are competent and inspire performance in their soldiers; • Only General Staff College Graduates receive fully funded Civilian Graduate Education.

  10. What does the new Joint Operational Architecture look like? • Positions Warfighting C2 in the unified commands and flattens the Army’s hierarchical structure to permit rapid decision making and planning. • Operational C2 in the unified commands reduces timelines for deployment and enhances responsiveness to crisis. • Embeds “Jointness” in the organization through Joint C4ISR. • Eliminates a large number of “no value added” headquarters and returns the personnel savings back to the tactical units that deploy and fight!

  11. Current New Information Age New Information Age Command and Control Command and Control Command and Control Warfighting Warfighting Warfighting Paradigm : Paradigm Paradigm CINC JTF or Theater CDR JTF or Theater CDR Army XXXX JFLCC This is where the C2 This is where the C2 Corps XXX structure is flattened! structure is flattened! Division XX Group Group Brigade X Battalion Battalion Battalion Battalion Company Company Company Company Implications of Change for Command and Control in a Group-based Information Age Army

  12. Warfighting Commander-in-Chief in a Regional Unified Command JFACC JFLCC JFNCC This Joint HQTRS is structured to control land forces and includes (1) LTG in command with (3) MGs oriented on Deep/Close/Rear functions. These can be Marine or Army-based HQTRS with at least one of the MGs from the other Service. There can be two types of JFLCCs : Standing JFLCCs with assigned forces and Contingency JFLCCs without assigned forces. With embedded operational C2, JTFs can be formed as necessary for regional employment.

  13. OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL IS POSITIONED IN THE UNIFIED COMMANDS TO FACILITATE RAPID DEPLOYMENT AND JOINT INTEROPERABILITY

  14. Operational Command and Control of Army Forces Must be Joint!

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