A Bi-Modal Force for the National Maritime Strategy

1. A Bi-Modal Forceforthe National Maritime Strategy Wayne P. Hughes, Jr. Naval Postgraduate School

2. Two Propositions • Since 1950 the national strategy has been a forward maritime strategy with several variations • The current variation should be supported with a “bi-modal” force

3. 1950s: Samuel P. Huntington’s Heritage • His “Transoceanic Navy” supported a national maritime strategy • Not a speculation on a “new direction.” He described what the nation was doing and the Navy role • America didn’t need border defenses and we had command of the sea • The national interest was served best by forward ops for containment • His strategy served the people. Visibly • It helped structure the armed forces

4. 1970s and 1980s: The Zumwalt-Turner Variation • Specified four “missions” of our Navy • Deterrence of nuclear war • Sea control to keep oceans safe for trade • Power projection overseas • Presence for peacekeeping • Why change? Because the SU wouldn’t tolerate US supremacy at sea • Continued the transoceanic strategy • To confront all enemies overseas • Prominently the Soviet Union • And for positive influence on our friends • Prominently NATO and Japan

5. 1990s: After the Soviet Union’s Collapse • Resulted in forces for two contingencies • Characterization: No peer competitor, small wars disregarded, sea control (still) assumed • Navy returned to simple Power Projection • Our large ships were cost-effective—in a sea sanctuary • Fewer ships (and military overall) after 1990—but with more activity • New capabilities: information technologies, long range detection, precision weapons

6. 2001: Regard for Terrorists and “Small Wars” • More awareness of stateless enemies • Tension and competition between high- and low-end force advocates • Enemies found ways to survive new US capabilities; and ugly ways to attack • Terrorists made the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine mostly irrelevant • Can a new doctrine replace it for stateless enemies?

7. Characterizing the Bi-Modal Force • Focuses on the emerging peer power at one end of the spectrum of conflict • And on “small” operations at the other end • The two compositions are quite different • A “50-50 budget split” is not my position • Tensions (mostly healthy) must remain between high and low end advocates

8. The Peer Competitor: China • US aim is to influence, not fight, the Peoples’ Republic • Also to affect China by influencing her neighbors • “Win” in the long term is by economic and political skills, not warfare. Or so we hope • Strategy should look beyond contemporary issues (Taiwan and Korea) • Does the PLAN’s growing sea denial force foreshadow sea control aspirations?

9. America’s China-Mode Force Elements • Continue strong Asian presence • Robust nuclear deterrent • Air and sea forces are central. We shouldn’t invade China • Our ISR advantage must be preserved • Our C2 advantage must be preserved • Logistics of forward support is expensive, but can be aligned against just one state

10. Small Wars and Peacemaking • Terminology (stability ops, irregular wars, counterinsurgency, humanitarian ops, etc.) indicates the first difficulty in force design • DoD forces for messy (often non-DoD) command, control, authority, and governance indicates the second difficulty (“The NCA is a hydra-headed monster”) • Force elements and command structures are different than for China

11. America’s Small Wars Force Elements • Nuclear “deterrence” is near-meaningless • Prevention of even one WMD attack is the aspiration • Ground forces are the central component • With air combat support • And air and sea sustainment • ISR will be more heavily HUMINT • But with high-tech scouts in distributed ops • Navy C2 will be with “hastily formed networks” and must connect to the “1,000 ship navy” • Logistics must be ready to move forces swiftly and sustain it in diverse places

12. War In Between • After “designing” bi-modal forces, next test them against a threat “in the middle” • We fought wars in Korea and Vietnam with forces designed for the Soviets • Starting the bi-modal force is low risk—assuming we don’t scrap existing “two contingency” forces

13. How to Transition Gracefully • Start with operational training and education for bi-modal operations • Exploits rapid personnel turnover • C2 comes close behind: proper networks and adaptive organizations • Bi-modal equipment (ships, guns, tanks…) will be in demand and follow

14. Affordability: China • We will try to influence, compete, or collaborate with China without a war • And keep our economy strong • Help our economy by keeping the military budget flat • Keep the seas safe and anticipate a PLAN try for sea control

15. Affordability: “Small” Operations • Small operations will be frequent • Some will be long lasting • Some will involve bloodshed • Force packages should be small, to distribute or aggregate on demand • Do I need to say, “Try to be selective”?

16. Affordability for Both • Transoceanic operations are costly • A uniquely American burden • Homeland security must blend domestic defense with overseas offense • Homeland security is an all-agencies thing that we don’t shape

17. In Conclusion • The National strategy has been and remains a maritime strategy • Still transoceanic, but with a new wrinkle of homeland defense • It has adapted to changes in the world • It is still expensive (especially logistically), but worthwhile • Another transition is underway • Respond with a bi-modal force • Describe it well to hasten the transition • Present forces (the legacy) will be with us for a decade or more • A safeguard against wars-in-the-middle • But same forces will play new roles • Pursue bi-modal force elements now—they take time