chemical explosion in tiajin 2015

1. CHEMICAL EXPLOSION IN TIANJIN, 2015 The extremely severe fire and explosion at Ruihai International Logistics hazardous goods warehouse at Tianjin Port on 12 August 2015 COURSE TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMISTRY SUBMITTED BY: GROUP 3 SUBMITTED TO: DR. SANA ZULFIQAR SUBMISSION DATE: 12TH DECEMBER, 2023 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES

2. CONTENT • Introduction • Incident overview • Causes and Consequences • Government response • Accident Analysis • Evaluation • Regulatory bodies and their main issues • Lessons learned • Solutions for safety • Conclusion

3. INTRODUCTION • On 12 August 2015, a progression of blasts at the Port of Tianjin in Tianjin, Northern China, killed 173 individuals, as per official reports, and harmed many others. The blasts happened at a holder stockpiling station in the Binhai New Area of Tianjin, China.

4. INTRODUCTION • On 12 August 2015, the port of Tianjin turned into the focal point of one of the world's biggest counters felt non nuclear explosions1. • At 22:51:46 on 12 August 2015, first explosion a fire broke out in the delivery zone of the International Logistic located in Binhai New Area of the Tianjin City China . • The second explosion occurred at 23:34:37 which is more violent which causes 6 major fires and dozens of small fires at the scene of the accident.

5. MAP DISCUSSION In this study, the impact of an accidental fire and explosion at Tianjin Port in 2015 on the atmosphere over the Bohai Sea was explored. • Results showed sharp increases in the concentrations of several important components of fine particulate matter (e.g. NO3−, SO42−, NH4+, organic carbon, elemental carbon) over Beihuangcheng Island after the explosion. • Among them, NO3− was most affected (about 10 days), with a maximum concentration of 16.45 μg m−3. The δ15N-NO3− ranged from −1.58‰ to +8.74‰.

6. ABOUT NITROCELLULOSE • Nitrocellulose (also known as cellulose nitrate, flash paper, flash cotton, guncotton, and flash string) is a highly flammable compound formed y nitrating cellulose through exposure to nitric acid or other powerful nitrating agent. • Damping agent ethanol was Used in the packaging Nitrocellulose packaging with packaging strings, instead Of thermoplastic sealing.

7. CAUSES OF EXPLOSION • The origin of the disaster was a container of dry nitrocellulose. The container got overheated, and the damping agents inside had evaporated, which led to spontaneous ignition. • The fire caused by the dry nitrocellulose reached another hazardous substance stored in the warehouse: ammonium nitrate fertilizer. • The flames caused the fertilizer to explode. Of course, with so many dangerous substances around, it is no surprise that another explosion would follow. • Explosion reaction 4NH4NO3—→3N2 +2NO2 +8H2 O

8. CONSEQUENCES (ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION) • Air Pollution: The explosion released a massive amount of toxic gases and particulate matter into the air. Chemicals like sodium cyanide and calcium carbide were among those released, leading to severe air pollution. • Water Pollution: Hazardous chemicals, including sodium cyanide and other toxic substances, leaked into nearby waterways. This contamination posed a significant threat to water quality, potentially affecting aquatic life and water sources used for drinking and irrigation.

9. DAMAGE CAUSED BY EXPLOSION • The explosion caused a tragic loss of life. At least 173 people lost their lives, and hundreds more sustained injuries. Many of those affected were firefighters and local residents of the blast site. • The explosion severely damaged nearby buildings, including residential structures and industrial facilities. The impact extended to roads and other infrastructure in the surrounding area. • Thousands of vehicles in the vicinity of the explosion were damaged or destroyed. The force of the blast caused cars and trucks to be overturned, crushed, or burned.

11. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE • Legal investigation and Regulatory Measures • Initiated investigation and detect the main cause • Actions taken against individuals and companies responsible. • Changes in regulations and safety standards. • Legal consequences and accountability. • Compensation and Support • Government's commitment to compensating victims. • Financial assistance for affected businesses and individuals. • Support for the displaced and injured. • Safety Inspections and Regulations • Nationwide safety campaign in response to the incident. • Increased inspections of chemical facilities. Implementation of stricter safety regulations.

12. CONTD. • Environmental Protection • Measures to contain and mitigate environmental damage. • Coordination with environmental agencies for cleanup efforts. • Long-term strategies for environmental restoration. • Medical Response • Deployment of medical teams to treat injuries and casualties. • Coordination with hospitals and healthcare facilities. • Ensuring the availability of medical supplies and resources. • Recovery and Rehabilitation • Implementation of recovery plans for affected communities. • Financial assistance and support for businesses and individuals. • Rehabilitation programs for the long-term well-being of impacted areas.

13. CONTD. • Media Coverage Acknowledge Communication Improvements • Acknowledgment of communication challenges. • Efforts to enhance transparency and information dissemination. • Utilization of technology for effective communication. • Initial Reporting and Lack of Transparency • Censorship and Government Control • Government Response and Accountability • Environmental and Health Concerns • International Coverage and Comparisons

14. INCIDENT ANALYSIS • Incident Analysis with Bow-tie: • Combination of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Event Tree Analysis methods (ETA) • Analysis of the causes of an event and consequences of an accident in high hazard industries from the perspective of internal process operations.

15. Analysis Result of Bow-Tie Analysis

16. INCIDENT ANALYSIS • Analysis with AcciMap: • Identify organizational failures that are mostly external to the site. • Focuses on analyzing contributing factors of governmental supervision and intermediary agencies’ illegal actions.

17. Analysis result of AcciMap

19. EVALUATION These two analyses give ample evidence that the fire and explosion at the Ruihai site in Tianjin was the result of failures of numerous controls at many levels, including onsite risk management and emergency planning and preparedness, as well as the entire regulatory framework designed to prevent businesses from operating unsafely.

20. Regulatory bodies and Their Main Issues Following are the regulatory bodies and their main issues: • Tianjin Port (Group)Company Ltd. (TPGCL) • 1. TPGCL falsified documents and gave approvals in violation of the law, And did not sufficiently supervise hazardous goods warehouses at the port; • 2. Tianjin Port Public Security Bureau under TPGCL did not check or Supervise fire. • Tianjin Public Security Authorities (TPSA) • 1. TPSA failed to conduct fire safety monitoring, guidance and inspections

21. CONTD. Tianjin Maritime Authorities 1. TMSA did not have standard Training and evaluations of ‘Declarers for shipborne hazardous goods’ And ‘On-site inspectors for cargo containers. 2. Beijing Maritime Safety Administration and Dongjiang Maritime Safety Administration under TMSA did not conduct open-box inspections on Ruihai’sshipborne hazardous cargo containers. • Tianjin Safety Supervision Authorities(TSSA) 1. TSSA did not regularly supervise or inspect Ruihai’s business Operations in accordance with laws and regulations. 2. The authority failed to conduct regular supervision as stipulated in the regulations.

22. CONTD. • Tianjin Municipal Transportation Committee (TMTC) 1. TMTC illegally gave written approvals to Ruihai for hazardous goods Operations at the port. 2. TMTC broke laws and regulations during project reviews, leading to the Acceptance of Ruihai’s construction project of hazardous goods yard which Started without prior approval and was against relevant laws and Regulations. 3. There was a serious lack of regular supervision. • Binhai Environmental Protection Bureau (BEPB) 1. BEPB failed to review items according to policy. 2. BEPB failed to perform regular supervision with regard to Environmental protection.

23. LESSON LEARNED FROM A DISASTER • Oversight is Critical for Maintaining Safety: To begin with, this episode shows that it is so essential to have oversight from government offices or other perceived bodies that make administers and guarantee organizations consent to forestall calamities like Tianjin. • Establish an awareness campaign for all operators of hazardous industry and all levels of government that aims at dramatic improvements in the safety culture of those responsible for enforcing or implementing measures for preventing and mitigating effects of chemical incidents. • Strengthen supervision over intermediary service agencies. • Improve the safety management and technical operations of hazardous chemical industry. .

24. CONTD. • Warehouses Containing Hazardous materials Need Crisis Counteraction and Reaction Plans: organizations that work with unsafe materials ought to get ready for a crisis. Contemplating the chance of a crisis ought to begin with a counteraction technique, however it shouldn't stop there. A crisis reaction plan is likewise critical. Think about the best ways for employees to deal with an igniting or spilling of a hazardous material. • Strengthen the emergency response capacity for hazardous chemical accidents in China. When incidents occur, appropriate response measures, including evacuation, sheltering, and firefighting, should be taken in order to minimize the adverse impacts of the incident on the environment, property, and human life and health.

25. Solutions for Safety • 1. Stay informed: Keep an eye on local news and official announcements for updates on the situation. Follow credible sources for accurate information. • 2. Follow evacuation orders: If authorities issue evacuation orders, follow them promptly and calmly. Have a plan in place and know the designated evacuation routes. • 3. Shelter in place: If evacuation is not possible or advised, find a safe location indoors away from windows and doors. Close all windows and turn off ventilation systems to minimize exposure to hazardous materials. • 4. Protect yourself: If you need to go outside, cover your mouth and nose with a mask or cloth to reduce inhalation of any pollutants or harmful substances. Wear protective clothing if necessary. • 5. Avoid affected areas: Stay away from the disaster site and any areas that may have been directly impacted.

26. CONCLUSION A major incident in Tianjin, China, was the Tianjin disaster. It included a progression of blasts at a synthetic storage space, causing a ton of harm and death toll. The consequence included salvage and recuperation endeavors, examinations, and measures to forestall comparative episodes later on. It was a terrible occasion that featured the significance of security safeguards and crisis.In Tianjin, there were many regulations and standards in place that, if they had been followed, could have prevented the accident from happening, or at the very least, would have prevented loss of life and substantial damage to the surrounding community and environment.

27. REFERENCES What Caused the Tianjin Explosions? - Klinge™ Corporation https://klingecorp.com/blog/what-caused-the-tianjin-explosions/ Tianjin Explosion: The Aftermath - Global Resilience Institute https://globalresilience.northeastern.edu/tianjin-explosion-aftermath/ The Tianjin Explosion | ChinaFile https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/tianjin-explosion All Tianjin articles | Chemistry World https://www.chemistryworld.com/tianjin/382.tag

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