1 / 29

The RSA Cryptosystem and Factoring Integers (II)

The RSA Cryptosystem and Factoring Integers (II). Rong-Jaye Chen. OUTLINE. [1] Modular Arithmetic Algorithms [2] The RSA Cryptosystem [3] Quadratic Residues [4] Primality Testing [5] Square Roots Modulo n [6] Factoring Algorithms [7] Other Attacks on RSA [8] The Rabin Cryptosystem

ndonald
Download Presentation

The RSA Cryptosystem and Factoring Integers (II)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. The RSA Cryptosystem and Factoring Integers (II) Rong-Jaye Chen

  2. OUTLINE • [1] Modular Arithmetic Algorithms • [2] The RSA Cryptosystem • [3] Quadratic Residues • [4] Primality Testing • [5] Square Roots Modulo n • [6] Factoring Algorithms • [7] Other Attacks on RSA • [8] The Rabin Cryptosystem • [9] Semantics Security of RSA

  3. [5] Square Roots Modulo n • 1. Fact Suppose that p is an odd prime and gcd(a,n)=1. Then the congruence y2=a (mod n) has no solutions if (a/p)=-1, and two solutions (mod n) if (a/p)=1. • 2. Theorem Suppose that p is an odd prime, e is a positive integer, and gcd(a,p)=1. Then the congruence y2=a (mod pe) has no solutions if (a/p)=-1, and two solutions (mod pe) if (a/p)=1.

  4. 3. Theorem Suppose that n > 1 is an odd integer having factorization where the pi’s are distinct primes and the ei’s are positive integers, Suppose further that gcd(a,n)=1. Then the congruence y2=a (mod n) has 2lsolutions modulo n if (a/pi)=1 for all i in {1, …, l }, and no solutions, otherwise.

  5. [6] Factoring Algorithms • 1. The Pollard’s p-1 algorithm input： an integer n , and a prespecified “bound” B output：factors of n

  6. Why? Suppose p is a prime divisor of n, and suppose that q <= B for every prime power q|(p-1). Then (p-1)|B! At the end of for loop, we have a=2B! mod n Now 2p-1=1 mod p (by Fermat’s little Thm) Since (p-1)|B!, it follows a=2B! =1 mod p and hence p|(a-1). Since we also have p|n, d=gcd(a-1, n) will be a non-trivial divisor of n (unless a=1).

  7. E.g. n=15770708441, B=180 a = 2180! = 11620221425 D = gcd(a-1, n) = 135979 In fact, the complete factorization of n into primes is 15770708441 = 135979 x 115979 The factorization succeeds because 135978 has only “small” prime factors: 135978 = 2 x 3 x 131 x 173

  8. 2. The Pollard’s rho algorithm input： an integer n output：factors of n (1) Selecting a “random” function f with integer coefficients , and any Begin with x=x0 and y=y0. (2) Repeat the two calculations until d=gcd(x-y,n)>1. (3) Do the following compare 3.1 If d<n, we have succeeded. 3.2 If d=n, the method is failed. Goto (1). (*) A typical choice of f(x)=x2+1, with a seed x0=2.

  9. 5 26 1 26 449 1 126 240 19 • Complexity of rho method We expect this method to use the function f at most • E.g：n=551, f(x)=x2+1 mod 551 and x0=2.

  10. 3. Dixon’s random squares algorithm • The idea is to locate with if gcd(x+y,n) is a nontrivial factor of n. (Why?) since n|(x-y)(x+y) but neither of x-y or x+y is divisible by n. • Eg. n=15, x=2, y=7 (22=72 mod 15) => gcd(2+7,15)=3 is a nontrivial factor of n. • Eg. n=77, x=10, y=32 (102=322 mod 77) => gcd(10+32,77)=7 is a nontrivial factor of n.

  11. factor base and pt-smooth • A factor base B={p1, p2,…,pt} consisting of the first t primes is selected. If b factors over B, b is said to be pt-smooth. • Eg：B={2,3,5}, b=23*56 is 5-smooth;b=23*76 is not 5-smooth. • We may include -1 in B to handle the negative b B={p0, p1, p2,…,pt}, with p0=-1.

  12. Algorithm input： a composite integer n and factor base B= {p1, p2,…,pt} output：factors of n (1) Suppose t+1 pairs (ai, bi=ai2 mod n) are obtained, where bi is pt-smooth over B and the factorizations are given by (2) A set S is to be selected so that has only even powers of primes appearing. (3) Let , and do the following compare 3.1 If 3.2 If

  13. 1 231 1018 2*509 (discard!) 1 105 968 23*112 2 115 3168 25*32*11 3 1006 6336 26*32*11 4 3010 8800 25*52*11 5 4014 882 2*32*72 6 4023 2816 28*11 • Eg ：n=10057, t=5, B={2,3,5,7,11} If S={4,5,6}, then x=3010*4014*4023 mod n=2748 y=27*3*5*7*11 mod n=7042 Since , we obtain a nontrivial factor gcd(x+y,n)=89, and 10057=89*113. If S={1,5}, then x=105*4014 mod n=9133 and y=22*3*7*11=924. Unfortunately, , and no useful information is obtained.

  14. Eg ：n=15770708441, t=6, B={2,3,5,7,11, 13} 83409341562 = 3*7 (mod n) 120449429442 = 2*7*13 (mod n) 27737000112 = 2*3*13 (mod n) (8340934156*12044942944*2773700011)2 = (2*3*7*13)2 (mod n) 95034357852 = 5462 (mod n) gcd(9503435785–546, 15770708441)=115759 to find the factor 115759 of n

  15. Improvements: • We may include -1 in B to handle the negative b B={p0, p1, p2,…,pt}, with p0=-1. • Define Let ai=z+m and bi= q(z) = ai2 - kn for z=0,1,-1,2,-2, … k=1,2, …

  16. Quadratic sieve algorithm (simple version) input： a composite integer n output：factors of n (1) choose a suitable P and construct a factor base (2) Define (3) Let ai=z+m and bi=q(z)=ai2-n for z=0,1,-1,2,-2,… A set S is to be selected so that has only even powers of primes appearing. (4) Let , and do the following

  17. 0 100 -57 -3*19 -1 99 -256 -28 1 101 144 24*32 -3 97 -648 -23*34 5 105 968 23*112 • Eg ：n=10057 If S={1}, then x=101 and y= =22*3. Since , we obtain a nontrivial factor gcd(x+y,n)=113, and 10057=89*113. If S={-1,-3, 5}, then x=99*97*105 and y=27*32*11. Unfortunately, , and no useful information is obtained.

  18. 4. Factoring algorithms in practice (Asymptotic running times) 1. Quadratic sieve 2. Elliptic curve (p is the smallest prime factor of n) 3. Number field sieve

  19. [7] Other Attacks on RSA Are there possible attacks on RSA other than factoring n? (Yes, see 2. 3.) • 1. Computing (n) Computing (n) is no easier than factoring n For, if n and (n) are known, and n is the product of two primes p, q, then n can be easily factored by solving n=pq (n)=(p-1)(q-1) for the two unknowns p and q. Substituting q=n/p into the 2nd eq., We have P2-(n- (n)+1)p + n = 0. The two roots will be p and q.

  20. 2. The Decryption Exponent (See sec. 5.7.2) • 3. Wiener’s Low Decryption Exponent Attack (See sec. 5.7.3)

  21. [8] The Rabin Cryptosystem • 1. Rabin scheme • Let p, q be large primes, n=pq • (p,q) be the private key • Encryption: c=m2 mod n • Decryption: find the four square roots and one is m • 2. Example • Consider p=31, q=41, so n=pq=1271 • Assume message m=814 so c = m2 mod n = 8142 mod 1271 = 405 • Decryption Solving m2  405  2 (mod 31) and m2  405  36 (mod 41) obtain m  8 (mod 31) and m  6 (mod 41) four possible roots: {240, 457} (mod 1271)

  22. 3. How to find square roots of a  Qn where n=pq ? • Factor n as pq • Let x and y satisfy following congruences • x = ap (mod p) and y = -ap (mod p) • x = aq (mod q) y = aq (mod q) • where ar denotes a square root of a modulo r • The square roots are x, -x, y, -y

  23. 4. How to find square roots of a  Qp? • In general, there is an efficient polynomial randomized algo • For p=3 (mod 4) there is a deterministic algo: By Euler’s criterion if a Qp then a(p-1)/2=1 (mod p), and (a(p+1)/4)2 = a(p-1)/2a= a (mod p). Hence two roots of a modulo p are a(p+1)/4 . • n is called Blum integer if n = pq and p=3 (mod 4), q=3 (mod 4)

  24. 5. Definition RABIN: Given n=pq and c=m2 mod n, find x, s.t. c  x2 (mod n) • 6. Theorem RABIN = FACTOR <pf> • (1) RABIN  FACTOR Given an oracle for FACTOR 1. Factor n and obtain p,q 2. Solve the square root problems c  x2 (mod p) c  x2 (mod q) 3. Apply CRT and get four roots of RABIN

  25. (2) FACTOR  RABIN Given an oracle for RABIN 1. Query RABIN oracle twice, get two roots x and y 2. With prob. ½, we can successfully get the factor of n by gcd(x+y, n)

  26. [9] Semantic Security of RSA • 1. Potential 3 adversarial goals: • Total break The adversary is able to determine Bob’s private key (in the case of a public-key cryptosystem) or the secret key (in the case of a symmetric-key cryptosystem). • Partial break The adversary is able to decrypt a previously unseen ciphertext (without knowing the key). Or the adversarial can determine some specific information about the plaintext, given the ciphertext.

  27. Distinguishability of ciphertexts With some prob. > 0.5, the adversary is able to distinguish between encryptions of 2 given plaintexts, or between an encryption of a given plaintext and a random string. • 2. Semantic security A public-key cryptosystem is said to achieve semantic security if the adversary cannot (in polynomial time) distinguish ciphertexts, provided that certain computational assumptions hold.

  28. 3. Partial information concerning plaintext bits (See sec. 5.9.1) • 4. Optimal Asymmetric encryption padding (See sec. 5.9.2)

More Related