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POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN

Large. and. ASSOCIATES. Consulting Engineers. POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN. Illustrated Lecture from John Large. 13 December 2006, ECSSR Abu Dhabi. The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research. Kavir. Tehran. Natanz. Arak. Saghand. Esfahan.

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POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN

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  1. Large and ASSOCIATES Consulting Engineers POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN IRAN Illustrated Lecture from John Large 13 December 2006, ECSSR Abu Dhabi The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research

  2. Kavir Tehran Natanz Arak Saghand Esfahan Anarak Bushehr Gchine

  3. 1967 US INSTALLS 5MWt TEHRAN RESEARCH REACTOR PROGRAMME 1970 IRAN RATIFIES NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY 1975 KRAFTWERK CONTRACT FOR 2 PWR 1,000MWe REACTORS AT BUSHEHR 1979/82 KRAFTWERK CONTRACT FOR BUSHEHR ABANDONED

  4. 1985 IRAN COMMENCES WEAPONS PROGRAMME 1985 IRAN COMMENCES WEAPONS PROGRAMME 1988/92 PLUTONIUM-239 EXTRACTION AT TEHRAN 1991 PROCURES URANIUM 1,800kg FEEDSTOCK FROM CHINA 1993 POLONIUM-210 IRRADIATION AND EXTRACTION 1995 RUSSIAN FEDERATION AGREE TO COMPLETE 1 REACTOR AT BUSHEHR

  5. 1996 CHINA AGREES TO SUPPLY URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE PLANT AT ESFAHAN 2003 IRAN SIGNS IAEA NPT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL 2003 PARTICLES OF HEU FOUND BY IAEA 2004 HF6 CONVERSION OF 37 TONNES OF URANIUM COMMENCES 2004 URANIUM CONVERSION/ENRICHMENT SUSPENDED TO EU-3 AGREEMENT

  6. 2006 RESUMES ENRICHMENT PREPARATONS AT NATANZ 2006 HEAVY ARAK WATER PLANT COMMENCES PRODUCTION 2006 NORTH KOREA DETONATES NUCLEAR WEAPON LAST WEEK UN SECURITY COUNCIL DRAFT SANCTIONS YESTERDAY ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER STRONGLY HINTS (12 December 2006) OF ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ENDING ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY POLICY

  7. It’s about the size of an office trash can It’s about 800mm long by 300mm diameter and weighs 130kg Oh, I almost forgot, it packs a 150 to 170 kiloton nuclear punch Let’s start with a modern nuclear weapon Here’s one – this is a US W80-1 thermonuclear warhead

  8. ThermoNuclear H-Bomb A-Bomb ELECTRONICS & BATTERY PACK FISSILE PACKAGE FUSION or HYDROGEN PACKAGE

  9. CASING HE SHAPED LENS FISSILE PIT

  10. FISSILE PIT plutonium-239 TAMPER uranium-238 REFLECTOR sintered beryllium PUSHER zirconium alloy

  11. neutron source

  12. SPANGLE polonium CAPSULE beryllium

  13. COMPRESSION WARHEAD SHOPPING LIST FISSILE PIT plutonium-239 TAMPER uranium-238 REFLECTOR sintered beryllium SPANGLE polonium PUSHER zirconium alloy CAPSULE beryllium

  14. Here’s a button, let’s see if it works!

  15. 1 COMPRESS Zr PUSHER holds spherical geometry Pu Sphere compressed to critical mass 2 NEUTRON INITIATE Po-210 & Be fuse together to generate neutrons Let’s click through that sequence! U-238 tamper contains the neutrons Be Reflector multiplies fast neutrons 3 SUPERCRITICAL FISSION

  16. So, basically, the trick is to compress a fissile material down to its critical mass very quickly There is another way to achieve a critical mass but it requires a different fissile material

  17. INITIATOR Tritium SHAPED CHARGE HEU SLUG U-235 BARREL SUB-CRITICAL HE uranium-235

  18. 100mm 950mm SUB-CRITICAL HE uranium-235 INITIATOR Tritium BARREL HEU SLUG U-235 SHAPED CHARGE 110kg

  19. This baby is the US W79 with dial-a-yield of 2 to 10 kilotons – wanna see it go nuke ? and it converts with a tritium boost to an enhanced radiation or neutron bomb

  20. So, Iran’s nuclear weapon development relates to its procurement of these IAEA SAFEGUARDED materials Be BERYLLIUM ATOMIC BOMB COMPRESSION & GUN TYPES SHOPPING LIST Zr ZIRCONIUM IAEA NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY controls the processing, trading in and availability of these materials DU DEPLETED URANIUM-238 PLUTONIUM-239 Pu-239 POLONIUM-210 Po-210 TRITIUM H3 ENRICHED URANIUM-235 HEU

  21. Tritium Nothing much to speak of Zirconium for its Bushehr fuel fabrication plans Only Low Enriched Uranium for the Bushehr and Tehran reactor fuel development No plutonium Depleted uranium from reactor fuel enrichment IRAN No polonium This is what Iran claims to have capacity for So let’s examine those areas where the IAEA and Iran are in dispute Be BUT the IAEA found several milligrams of plutonium nitrate from extraction activities during 1988 and 1992 Zr BUT the IAEA found traces of polonium in 1993 DU BUT the IAEA found several particles of HEU in cascades in 2003 – this led to the current IAEA-IRAN crisis. Pu-239 Po-210 H3 HEU

  22. Uranium Enrichment Milling & Separation Uranium Hexafluoride Uranium Fuel Nuclear Power Plant Nuclear Fuel Fabrication BUSHEHR ESFAHAN URANIUM ENRICHMENT Iran claims its enrichment programme is solely for the civil nuclear reactor at Bushehr If so, that’s a lot of trouble and expense from mining to fuel in the reactor SAGHAND ESFAHAN NATANZ SAGHAND Uranium Ore Mining

  23. NATANZ NATANZ From the cooling capacity you can backtrack to the size of the enrichment cascades which, here, is about 30,000 centrifuge units TUNNEL PORTAL SUPPORT (COOLING) SERVICES UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES 2004 2002

  24. Natural Uranium ~0.7% U-235 LEU Fuel for Bushehr ~2 to 4% U-235 - 30 tonnes/year HEU for Nuclear Warhead >93% U-235 - 25kg/warhead

  25. Milling & Separation Uranium Hexafluoride Uranium Ore Mining Radioactive Waste Nuclear Weapons Uranium Fuel So, if the IAEA cannot access the Natanz plant it looks at the radioactive waste for traces of HEU This is what caused the IAEA-Iran spat in 2003 when the IAEA found >36% HEU particles at Kalaye HEU Gun Type Warhead Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Uranium Enrichment The IAEA’s concern is that HEU can be diverted at Natanz

  26. IRAN ISRAEL N KOREA Now we can fill in IRAN’s DU and HEU capacity Be Zr DU Pu-239 Po-210 H3 HEU

  27. Now let’s look at Iran’s progress with materials for the compression weapon Pu-239 Po-210

  28. RUSSIAN FEDERATION Uranium Fuel BUSHEHR Spent Fuel PLUTONIUM SEPARATION For this route, fissile plutonium has to be extracted from natural uranium U-238 irradiated in a reactor So the IAEA require the Bushehr fuel to be supplied by and RETURNED to Russia Iran could do this by reprocessing the uranium fuel from Bushehr

  29. Heavy Water Plant Uranium Fuel Uranium Hexafluoride ARAK HEU & Pu WARHEADS ARAK So, to overcome this, Iran builds a new, high capacity research reactor, thereby bypassing Bushehr Nuclear Fuel Fabrication The ARAK Heavy Water plant was started this year, it produces ~10 to 15 tonnes HW per year and the RD-40 reactor requires an initial 60-80 tonnes – so 4 to 5 years before it is commissioned To separate the plutonium from the fuel a small reprocessing plant Pu-239 A plant to provide the Heavy Water for the reactor Chemical Separation HEU Milling & Separation Uranium Enrichment

  30. RD-40 HEAVY WATER REACTOR HEAVY WATER PLANT

  31. IRAN ISRAEL N KOREA Now we can fill in IRAN’s plutonium capacity Be Zr DU Pu-239 Po-210 H3 HEU

  32. IRAN ISRAEL N KOREA The RD-40 reactor will also provide a Polonium-210 generator Be Zr DU Pu-239 Po-210 H3 HEU

  33. IRAN ISRAEL N KOREA And the heavy water moderator is a rich source of tritium Be Zr DU Pu-239 Po-210 H3 HEU

  34. Uranium Fuel Uranium Fuel Uranium Hexafluoride Bushehr Tehran Heavy Water Plant HEU & Pu WARHEADS Let’s compare the Iran, North Korea and Israel nuclear programmes Bushehr and Tehran reactors are safeguarded under IAEA Fuel Fabrication Pu Breeding Reactor Pu-239 Chemical Separation Iran’s programme is dual-role and complex HEU Milling & Separation Uranium Enrichment

  35. Nuclear Weapons Spent Fuel Uranium Fuel Pu Production Reactor Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Graphite Moderated Plutonium Fuel Reprocessing Plant North Korea Economy Model No Frills One Track Military

  36. Nuclear Weapons Spent Fuel Uranium Fuel Pu Production Reactor Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Heavy Water Moderated Tritium Deuterium Oxide Plutonium Fuel Reprocessing Plant Israel One Track Military Sophisticated Thermonuclear

  37. Uranium Fuel Bushehr Tehran North Korea Iran Israel

  38. Iran has experimented with and is now building the technology – so when will it break out?

  39. Zr - Be Po-210 HEU U-238 tritium Pu-239 2011 NOW 2 YEARS UP TO 4 YEARS 1 TO 4 YEARS NOW 4 YEARS TAKE TEHRAN REACTOR OUT OF SAFEGUARDS OR WAIT FOR RD-40 AT ARAK TROUBLE AT NATANZ WITH MULTIPLE CASCADES WAIT FOR ARAK RD-40 REACTOR TO COMMISSION MUCH OF THIS MATERIALS TECHNOLOGY IN PLACE AT ESFAHAN COULD BE PROCURED AND POLISHED AT ESFAHAN 2-4 Years + 1 to enrich = 3 to 5 years 4 Years + 1 to Pu Breed/Separate = 5 years

  40. Whatever, one outcome is there is now to be UN Security Council sanctions against Iran Or is it a confused civil nuclear power programme? Is IRAN on a dash for nuclear weapons Well, what’s it to be ? Remember what the US and Brits concluded about Iraq’s WMD !

  41. (likely) UN Security Council Sanctions } Most Nuclear Technology Transfer NUCLEAR SAFETY Information Training Education Exchange

  42. BUSHEHR - largest source of radioactivity in region

  43. Radiological Aftermath of a Severely Damaging Incident at Bushehr [from ~September 2007] Airborne Concentration /m3 Ground Deposition /m2 48 hours from 12:00 17 July 2006 I-131 prophylaxis decontamination evacuation sheltering

  44. It may be that the risk is not be directly with Iran’s nuclear weapons programme but, because of UN sanctions, a breakdown of nuclear safety at Bushehr!

  45. Large and ASSOCIATES Consulting Engineers http://www.largeassociates.com/

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