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A ntitrust Economics 2013. David S. Evans University of Chicago, Global Economics Group. Elisa Mariscal CIDE, Global Economics Group. Topic 14: Vertical Restraints. Topic 14| Part 2 21 November 2013. Date. Overview. Vertical Restraints and Efficiency. Resolving Conflicts Among Firms .
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Antitrust Economics 2013 David S. Evans University of Chicago, Global Economics Group Elisa Mariscal CIDE, Global Economics Group Topic 14: Vertical Restraints Topic 14| Part 2 21 November 2013 Date
Overview of Vertical Restraints Vertical Restraints Help Resolve Conflicts
Overview of Vertical Restraints Purpose of Vertical Restraints
Major Contract Instruments for Maximizing and Splitting the Pie
Overview of Vertical Restraints Direct Pricing Methods
Overview of Vertical Restraints Indirect Pricing Mechanisms
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints • Note: In all these cases firms in a vertical chain could obtain the efficiency through vertical integration; vertical restraints solve market coordination problem through contractual mechanisms that fall short of full integration. Why do firms choose vertical restraints rather than full integration?
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Vertical Restraint and Double Marginalisation
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Two Part Tariff
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Resale price maintenance
Encouraging Optimal Sales Effort c pw p, effort Consumers Q(p,e)
Encouraging Optimal Sales Effort c pw Consumers Q(p,e)
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Retail Free Riding
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Externalities
Pro-Efficiency Reasons for Vertical Restraints Risk Sharing c Manufacturer T=F + cq Retailer p =RPM Consumers Q(p)
Using vertical restraints to foreclosure competition Essential Facilities and Monopoly Leveraging
The Single Monopoly Profit Theorem Using vertical restraints to foreclosure competition M R1 R2 Consumers Chicago Critique of Monopoly Foreclosure
Using vertical restraints to foreclosure competition Summary of Post-Chicago Models
Making It Harder for Rivals to Reach Critical Mass These are possibilities. Unclear how significant they are in practice given that rivals have counterstrategies.
Factors to Consider in Evaluating Vertical Restraints for Platforms