تاثیر تحریم اقتصادی آمریکا بر ایران

1. تاثیر تحریم اقتصادی آمریکا بر ایران محمد حافظی گروه مطالعات ایرانی دانشگاه MIT دانشجوی دکترای فیزیک نظری دانشگاه هاروارد آبان ماه ۱۳۸۳

2. Motivations Why we are studying U.S. sanction on Iran ? • Iran’s importance (oil, market, military, nuclear, multi-ethnicity etc.) • Geopolitical distinction of Iran in Middle East (Iraq’s present situation, Caspian Sea, Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda) • Success of Libyan experience

3. History of U.S. Executive orders against Iran • Carter Nov.1979: freezing Iranian assets in U.S. banks and their foreign subsidiaries. • Carter April 1979: prohibiting of all financial transaction, embargo imports, banning all travel, impounded Iranian military equipment (Iran’s claim $12 billion) • Reagan Oct.1987: embargo all import including oil, prohibiting 14 export items. (oil loopholes: third country, U.S. company) • Clinton March1995: banned all investment in Iran’s petroleum sector • Clinton May1995: prohibiting imports exports and investment of any kind. “get-tough policy” hurting Iran’s economy • Clinton ILSA August 1996: closing the third country loophole and transforming sanction into a multilateral one.

4. The impact of sanction on Iran • U.S.-Iran direct trade • U.S.-Iran indirect trade effect • Reduced U.S. and Non-U.S. export financing (no U.S. export financing from the U.S. Export-Import bank since 1990) • Higher Cost and Reduced Availability of Commercial Financing (high LC confirmation) • Reduced IMF/World bank Financing ( 8 project dropped,valued $1 billion) • Higher Debt Rescheduling Fees (U.S. rejection Paris Club rescheduling payment) • Reduced Foreign Direct Investment • Pipeline across Iran and oil swaps • Reduced Tourism Receipts • Non-participation of U.S. entities in Iran-Related Business • Psychological effects of U.S. sanction on Iranians and Non-Iranians • Impact on Iranian Economic Policies (high profile project with Japan and Europe that may not be always in Iran’s best interest)

5. Estimated Reduction in Direct Trade as a result of Sanction ($ billion) U.S.-Iran direct trade

6. Indirect trade : Dubai Effect • In 1998-1999 16.2 percent of Iran’s non-oil export ($516million) was going to Dubai. • UAE exports to Iran totaled $551 million in 1998 which were almost re-exports from a third part.

7. Reduced U.S. and Non-U.S. export financing • No U.S. export financing from the U.S. Export-Import bank since 1990. • The absence of the U.S. export financing has curtailed trade financing for Iran from other countries and also raised their rates due the absence of competition. • The estimate is based on the loss in U.S. export credit for Iran (4.3% of total credit) plus LC confirmation fees (5-10%), those will add up to a $20-30 million yearly loss. • Similarly in Commercial financing has been affected (loss per year $100 million )

8. World Bank Financing Eight World Bank projects with Iran dropped due to the U.S. opposition valued $1 billion, considering an interest difference of 2 percent will give rise to a loss roughly equal to $20 million.

9. Higher Debt Rescheduling Fees • U.S. rejection Paris Club for rescheduling Iran’s debt payment (1993-1994) • $13-55 million loss per year Reduced Foreign Direct Investment • GDP wise (or population-wise) Iran should have a $4.3 billion ($8.6 billion) share in the world’s FDI. In 1999 global FDI in Iran was only $85 million while it was $9.2 billion in Middle East. • Lost and delayed in energy FDI due to the sanction: $700-840 million (out of $10-12 billion incul. North Pars excul. Caspian) • Lost and delayed non-energy FDI : $0.5-1 billion

10. Pipeline and Oil swap • Baku-Ceyhan route: construction, maintenance, transit etc. ($300-600 million) • Oil swap: 750,000 b/d saving $90 million

11. Summery of Iran’s loss from U.S. sanction($ million)

12. The impact of sanction on U.S.($ millions) • FDI(non-energy) • FDI(energy) • Oil pipeline • Oil swaps • Financial services

13. Conclusion • Iranian Economic indicator are healthier than at any time since the early 1990’s. • The sanction hasn’t brought Islamic republic economy to it’s knees but it may handicap it in the race to rapid economic growth. • Iran can live with U.S. sanction with much less difficulty than Cuba or Vietnam, although it can’t prosper without Washington’s blessing. • American sanction has not been effective in the sense that it hasn’t induced a noticeable change in Tehran’s policies.

14. References • J. Amuzegar. 1997. “Adjusting to Sanction Foreign” Affairs 76 :31-41. • H. G. Askari et al. 2003. “Case Studies of U.S. economic sanctions: the Chinese, Cuban and Iranian experience.” Praeger Pub. London. • H. G. Askari et al. 2003. “Economic sanctions examining their philosophy and efficacy.” Praeger Pub. London. • N. Hadian. Oct 2003. “Iran: Security Threat & U.S. Policy”, Capitol Hill Testimony, U.S. Senate Washington D.C. • Hufbauer et al. 1990. “Economic sanction reconsidered” Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics

15. Backup Slides

16. Political Context and Background • Overthrown of elected prime minister, Mohammad Mussadeq, by a CIA instigated coup, 1953 • Islamic revolution 1979, American Embassy Hostage Crisis • American support towards Saddam Hussein during Iraq-Iran war, lack of support for Iran’s assertion before the UN regarding Iraq Biological Chemical Weapons, 500,000-plus casualties due to the war.

17. Iran Economic Record Iran’s debt/GDP ratio was at %9.5 and debt service ratio was around %18 at 2000 which a significant achievement for a developing country.

18. Health and Education Indices Literacy rates have increased from about 50 percent in 1987 to around 80 percent in 1997. Enrollment rate in primary education reached 100 percent in 1980.

19. Domestic Policy consideration in Iran (IMF 2000 report) • Domination of the public sector : In 1996 IMF estimated public sector holds 70 percent of the total employment. • Credit allocation and Foreign trade is controlled heavily by the government along with high tariff rate (18 percent of tax+duty in 1994) • Baby boom : the population doubled between 1979-2000 which puts a lot of pressure on infrastructure, education, health and employment. • Heavy subsidies on energy and petroleum product up to 17 percent of GDP in 2000.

20. The foundation of the Oppressed(Bonyad Mostazafan) • It was formed after revolution with confiscated asset of the Pahlavi foundation and family. • It plays a significant role in the public-sector and private-sector (est. 20 percent) economy: 1.5 percent of Iran GPD with direct employment in excess of 70,000. • Private sector laws don’t apply to this foundation and it’s only answerable to the supreme leader.

21. Five Year Development Plans(IMF 2000 report) • First FYDP(1990-94) : initiating decontrolling a significant part of domestic prices, lower income taxes, stating privatizing public enterprises, infrastructure development. • Second FYDP(1995-2000): slow progress in economic opening despite the recovery of the oil price in first three years of the plan. But finally macroeconomic instabilities and declining economic growth resulted in shifting polices and delaying the much-need structural reform. • Third FYDP (2001-2005): limited reform of the multiple exchange rate, abolition of the state monopoly in telecom, railway etc., permitting the establishment of private banks and free trade zone, polices to attract foreign investors.