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Keith Gottschalk UCT EMS 2018. Hydro-politics & Hydro-power: the century-long saga of the Grand Inga project. a t the Inga rapids on the Congo. 42 000 cubic metres of water per second fall through 92 metres & could generate 39 600 MW of electricity
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Keith GottschalkUCT EMS 2018 Hydro-politics & Hydro-power:the century-long saga of the Grand Inga project
at the Inga rapids on the Congo • 42 000 cubic metres of water per second • fall through 92 metres • & could generate 39 600 MW of electricity • (in practice, need to plan for driest year per century, & will also need to leave some water in river)
Inga timeline • 1920 colonial forced removals. • found village Lubwaku meaning “thrown away” • 1929-1939 Syneba consortium in Belgian Congo. • 1952-1955 Sydelco corporate research group in Belgian Congo. • Colonial Government offers lump sum compensation of 781,000 Belgian francs – but nothing paid by • 1960 Congo wins independence.
Inga timeline continued • 1970 SociétéNationaled'électricité (SNEL) founded; nationalizes existing power companies by end of decade • 1972 Inga 1 synchronized with the grid: 351 MW for Kinshasa & district.
Henry Olivier • 1976 • proposes Pan-African grid
Inga timeline continued • 1982 Inga 2 synchronized with the grid: 1 424 MW for Katanga province, its mines, & smelters. • 1995 Inga 2 starts wheeling 100 MW electricity through Southern African Power Pool to Eskom
Inga 2 transmission cable • built 1982 • 1 424 MW • 1 774 kms • World long distance record for transmission
WESTKOR • 2003: incorporate Westkor in Botswana – to build Inga 3 & a “western power corridor” running directly south through Angola & Namibia to Cape Town @ 600 000 volts to minimize losses; • 2004: MoU • 2005 “pre-feasibility study” • But Eskom puts up no capital (unlike R8b in PBMR), so DRC withdraws in 2010 • Westkor wound up in 2012
Grand Inga Treaty29 October 2013 • Eskom to provide 15% of the equity towards construction; • to become the anchor customer and buy 2500 MW from Inga 3; • plus between 20% and 30% of generation from further developments (Treaty 2013, Article 9[4]). (“20-30%” is between 10 000 – 13 000 MW) • to build transmission cables from SA to DRC
Inga timeline • 2013 Presidents Kabila & Zuma sign Inga treaty. • 2016: at World Bank insistence, ADEPI (Inga Development Authority) established. • Kabila appoints as ADEPI director Bruno Kapandji, veteran electricity technocrat
Inga timeline continued • 2018 earliest possible date for building start on Inga 3. • 2026 earliest feasible date for Inga 3 to synchronize with the grid: • 4 800 MW for domestic, corporate, & foreign clients. • 2030s – 2040s earliest possible construction of remaining 5 stages of Grand Inga in seven year phases: up to 10 000 MW for each of the DRC, Egypt, & SAPP; 8 000 MW for WAPP.
Inga 2 no longer enough • lack of maintenance reduces power from Inga 1 & 2 • 2014: electricity caps imposed on Katanga mines & smelters • who now import 100 MW from Zambia • 91% Congolese no access to electricity • the 9% of Congolese households electrified • suffer average 3 hours of power failure per day • which cuts 1.7% off DRC’s GDP
1995: Southern African Power Pool • Iinks national power grids of SA, B,L,N,S, DRC, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe • Inga 2 transmits 110 MW exported to Eskom • through 3 757 kms of cables through DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana to SA (current world long distance record?) • “Western Power Corridor” also proposed in 2003; Eskom sent land surveyors to DRC, Angola, Namibia to finalize route – but not yet built!
update • 2016 World Bank withdraws in protest that ADEPI is not independent enough from President’s office • 2017 Kabila asks Chinese and Spanish tender finalists to merge bids – presumably with vendor financing (plus NDB, AfDB, DBSA, IDC, Harith) • 2017 Bruno Kapandji (director ADEPI) proposes Inga 3 be doubled in size to generate 10 000 MW to benefit from economies of scale • SNEL – still stalling on paying compensation to the fourth generation of descendants of evictees of 1920
Conclusions • Incremental shift of SA to imported hydro-power will save 500 billion litres of cooling water per year • 9 600 MW from new nuclear power stations unneeded, & more expensive than Grand Inga. • Hydropower good fit with solar & wind energy; flexible at switching on & off; • Historically, state mega-projects cost about double what was originally claimed; but even so Inga hydro-power will be less expensive electricity than alternatives;
More Conclusions • Congolese & other kleptocrats will try hard to get slice of capex; • Democratization will be useful in DRC & other states • partly conditional on the above, deepening diplomatic & economic integration between SA, DRC, & other SADC states will be a net positive factor for both peace & development
Keith Gottschalk (2016): Hydro-politics and hydro-power: the century-long saga of the Inga project, Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des étudesafricaines • To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2016.1222297