NGOs in Bangladesh: Activities, Resources, and Governance

1. NGOs in Bangladesh: Activities, Resources, and Governance Varun Gauri, The World Bank

2. Examples of low service quality • Bangladesh: Absenteeism rates for doctors in primary health care centers: 74 percent • Zimbabwe: 13 percent of respondents gave as a reason for not delivering babies in public facilities that “nurses hit mothers during delivery” • Guinea: 70 percent of government drugs disappeared

3. Increasing public spending is not enough * Percent deviation from rate predicted by GDP per capita Source: Spending and GDP from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003

4. Similar changes in public spending can be associated with vastly different changes in outcomes Sources: Spending data from World Development Indicators database. School completion from Bruns, Mingat and Rakatomalala 2003

5. Market Failure and State Failure in Service Delivery: Are NGOs the Answer ? • Altruism to overcome incomplete contracts • Flexibility for allocative and productive efficiency • 47% of World Bank projects involved NGOs/CBOs (1997) • 37% of USAID budget channeled through NGOs (2001) • Even Jesse Helms likes development NGOs

6. Theories about what makes NGOs tick? • Altruism • Benefits for founders and managers • Worker control LITTLE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

7. ‘Massive proliferation’ of NGOs in Bangladesh • 27,000 registered with MSA, 1600 with NAB • 90% of villages have an NGO (2000) • One large NGO claimed to have reached 70% of villages and 70 million people (2003) • Largest NGOs employ 10 to 70 thousand staff members • About 10% of ODA channeled through NGOs • Business entrepreneurs: cell phones, dairy, publishing, handicrafts

8. A bit of history • Bangladesh began as a nearly ‘failed state’ in 1971 due to civil war and cyclones of 1972 • Recurrent floods and cyclones (1988 and 1991) • Donors poured resources into NGOs • NGOs moved from humanitarian relief and reconstruction to ‘development’ tasks • NGOs moved from ‘consciousness raising’ to ‘service provision’ • Donors encouraged self-sufficiency

9. Conflicts with the state • 1991 NGO Affairs Bureau established • 1991-2002 slow approval process, transparency issues and for-profit activities • 2001-2003 perceived politicization of NGOs • 2003 division of apex body • 2004 push for new regulations

10. Objectives of the Survey • Descriptive statistics • NGO characteristics • Community perceptions • What works? • Pilot survey for use in other contexts

11. Sampling Overview • Thana selection • 35 chosen; random sampling weighted by NGO activity • Within each thana: • Divided into ‘big’ NGOs and ‘other’ NGOs • Sample 100 ‘big’ NGOs • Collect lists of other NGOs during ‘big’ interviews • Choose six other NGOs in each thana randomly from list

12. Methodology • NGO interview • Conducted with branch managers • Quantitative and qualitative data collected on a range of aspects of NGO operations • Focus group • Conducted with selection of community members / NGO clients • Qualitative perceptions of NGO services and activities

13. Questionnaires • NGO survey topics • Activities • Sources and uses of funds • Relations with community, other NGO’s, government • Governance structures • Focus group topics • Various measures of NGO ‘performance’ • Community characteristics

14. Field Implementation • Field implementation: March – April 2003 • Six ‘other’ NGOs refused interviews • Only 2 ‘other’ NGOs in two thanas • One NGO in operation for less than one year • Field staff interviewed only four NGOs in one thana • 193 ‘other’ NGOs in sample, 310 total

15. Table 1: Number of NGOs in each selected thana on initial list, updated based on enumeration, and surveyed

16. Figure 1: NGOs per Thana, Bangladesh 2003

17. Table 2: Average number of NGOs per capita, by income and wealth quintile

18. Figure 2: Relative percentages of NGO types in Bangladesh

19. What do NGOs do? Sectors and Activities

20. Figure 3: Percentage of NGOs that provide each of the specified services

21. Table 3: Percentage of NGOs that raise awareness concerning selected subjects

22. Methods of raising public awareness

23. Beyond Service Provision:NGOs and Lobbying • 131 NGOs lobby national government • 97 NGOs had at least one meeting with national government in last year • 93 at least one meeting with local government • 58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with national • 58 ‘other’ NGOs had meetings with local

24. Figure 5: Breakdown of NGO partnerships with government agencies

25. Figure 6: Membership in umbrella organizations

26. NGO Resources Finances and staff

27. Figure 7a: Breakdown of NGO revenues, as a percentage of totals

28. Figure 7b: Breakdown of NGO expenditures, as a percentage of totals

29. Figure 8a-b: Service provision by big and small NGOs, free services vs. paid services

30. Financing of Activities • Dominant source of fund is fee for service: • Full sample: 50% of funds • Big NGOs: 62% of funds • Other NGOs: 43% of funds • Membership fees – common but small amounts • Over 90% of organizations collect membership fees • Represent less than 3% of overall revenues

31. Fraction of organizations with other sources of revenues

32. Figure 10: Composition of NGO staff, broken down by function and work status. (Big NGOs displayed on the left, small on the right).

33. Table 5: Average size and salary of NGOs’ specialized staff

34. Specialized Labor: Summary • Teaching is most prevalent type of skilled labor • Majority of NGOs that provide education services have skilled teachers (67%) • Relatively few healthcare organizations employ doctors or nurses (31% and 25%)

35. Median size and labor intensity of NGOs

36. Constraints on improvement

37. Constraints: Summary • Smaller NGOs report greater resource constraints • Government restrictions are not an (self-reported) impediment

38. Governance Autonomy, Evaluation, Participation, Accountability, and Management

39. Table 6: Which decisions are made by the NGO without consulting the supervising branch/headquarters?

40. Table 8: Percentage of NGOs needing permission from an oversight committee to perform the specified activities

41. Table 9: How the NGO manager was chosen

42. Table 7: Methods used by NGOs to collect information about community needs

43. Figure 11: Percentage of NGOs involving community members in provision of services

44. Figure 12: Methods used by NGOs to collect feedback about how well they are meeting community needs

45. Employee Review

46. Additional elements of accountability • Auditing of accounts: 70% • Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs • Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency • Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36% • Ever visited by thana/local government: 55% • Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%

47. Employee Review

48. Additional elements of accountability • Auditing of accounts: 70% • Organization has Board of Directors: 65% of ‘other’ NGOs • Donor oversight: 84% of grant recipients (n=57) visited by granting agency in last year, 75% had community assessment conducted with agency • Ever visited by NGO Affairs Bureau: 36% • Ever visited by thana/local government: 55% • Ever visited by one or more line ministry: 26%

49. Table 10: Characteristics of NGO managers

50. Summary: An Institutional Isomorphism • Branch and headquarters structure • Overwhelming focus on credit services • Service fees / operations main sources of revenue • Salaried and professional staff, not volunteers • No religious affiliation • Partnerships, little sub-contracting w/ government • Middle-class, college-educated male managers