INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM (IBF) INTRODUCTION

1. INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM(IBF)INTRODUCTION

2. Pre-IBF Background • 1920-es: first ITF-ISF coordination around ILO maritime meetings • Up to late 1940-es: relationship restricted to ILO business • 1948 – ITF FOC Campaign • 1978 - ISF/ITF “Understanding”on wage rates for non-dom seafarers on nationalflag ships (under UK “pay parity” regime) • 1990-es: ITF-ISF consultations (inability to engage in pay negotiations; no mandate to discuss wages on behalf of national federations; some national owners associations’ without sufficient constitutional status; decisions not compulsory upon members) • 1993: ISF’s “London Committee for Asian Crews” changes name to “IMEC”, focuses on ITF FOC standards • 1994: IMEC involved in ITF negotiations in India and Philippines • 1997: ISF rejects ITF pay increase and negotiations. IMEC takes over. • 2000: ITF - IMEC Joint Negotiating Forum; IMEC Model TCC Agreement (with the ITF Benchmark still set unilaterally by ITF)

3. Year 2003Expectations out of the new system: • Continuity of agreements • Real counterpart in place of internal argument • Compliance / enforcement • New mechanisms to amicably settle with companies • More vessels under ITF agreements • Inspectors to concentrate on other targets • Global scale • New areas of cooperation / mutual interest For the ITF: For the Employers: • Continuity of agreements • Equal participation in discussion in place of ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offers • Competitive benefits / advantage for members • Recognition of training and other costs • More members to join • Mechanisms to amicably resolve problems with Inspectors / affiliates • Global scale • New areas of cooperation / mutual interest

4. Creation of the IBF May 2003, Yokohama Parties: ITF and JNG (IMMAJ + IMEC)

5. Parties to the IBF, as of 2013: International Bargaining Forum ITF JNG IMEC ITF maritime affiliates worldwide ISEG (IMMAJ+Evergreen) KSA

6. IBF Settlements (pay, contractual and partnership issues) • November 2003 (San Francisco) • October 2005 (Tokyo) • September 2007 (London) • October 2009 (Manila) • July 2011 (Miami) Model Ship (“Bag”) methodology: wages; company and union funding; vertical & horizontal distribution parameters; complex central-to-local transformations No pay negotiations; DER (SEPF/SPF) New methodology: only wages and union funding (part “A”); each specific local agreement affected

7. Pay Outcomes: • 2003 - 8% on IBF Model Ship for two years: 2004 and 2005 • 2005 - 5% on Model Ship in 2006, plus further 5% in 2007. Also: extra $10 to ITF WFF in 2006, plus additional $10 in 2007. • 2007 - 8% on Model Ship for two years: 2008 and 2009. (Further extended throughout 2010 and 2011) • 2011 - 2% in 2012; 2.5% in 2013 and 3% in 2014. Applicable only upon part "A" of the scale Contractual:amendments to terms and conditions envisaged by CBA; Special Agreement and Employment Contract Partnership:all MOU issues, incl. ILO; IMO; piracy, disputes, training, welfare, manning agents, P&I, joint secretariats, data exchange, administration and etc

8. OTHER FEATURES: • POSSIBILITY OF HIGHER REBATE FROM ITF WFF • AS INCENTIVE TO ENROLL MORE VESSELS • (total number of fleets to increase: +2% in 2012; +2% in 2013 and + 1% in 2014) • MINIMUM CRITERIA FOR NEW JNG MEMBERS / NEW IBF AGREEMENTS • INDEXATION OF COMPESATION LEVELS • ALL CBAs SUBJECT TO APPROVAL • JOINT CBA VETTING MECHANISM • JOINT WARLIKE OPERATIONS AREAS COMMITTEE / SOS CAMPAIGN • JOINT OPERATION OF TRAINING AND WELFARE FUNDS • CONSTANT INTER-SECRETARIAT COOPERATION

9. Balancing between “market” and “policy”(ITF’s view, as example): Benefits of having “real” counterparts: guarantee of implementation; argument outside ITF Dangers: external market supply-and-demand rules • What is artificial / excessive • from employers point of view: • Ratings wages and compensations could be • lower. • Some CBA benefits beyond P&I coverage. • Wish to negotiate with labor supply only. • Why pay beneficial unions and ITF? • Why pay for “DER” needs? • No need for MOUs, • talk onboard conditions only • What is insufficient • from the ITF point of view: • Ratings wages slow increase • No uniform benchmarks • Officers beyond the ITF’s scope • CBA could be better • MOU cooperation could be more • Balanced outcome: • Ratings level maintained despite market and crisis and, steadily, increased. • Officers wages still not reflected fully, but minimum figures guaranteed. • ITF Beneficial Ownership and other policies – recognized and working. • Improving wages, CBA and MOU slow and difficult, but happens regularly. • No cuts or downgrading once a level is achieved. • Vetting complicated by the variety, but possible.

10. IBF bargaining process • Central negotiations: • Claims consideration & settlement: • Amicable • Prior paperwork / correspondence • Thorough discussion (working groups; experts) • Secretariats • Argument / Persuasion • Reference to objective data • Invite third-parties and sources • Counter-proposal • Counter-balance against other issues • Compromise • Local / National negotiations: • Implementation of central outcome in existing agreements • Considerable flexibility • System may not be perfect, but time-tested, stable and working!

11. INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING FORUM 10 YEARS EFFICIENT! IBF