A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation

1. A Case Study in Army-Air Force Co-Operation The Western Desert Air Force and the Battle for the Mareth Line, 19th – 29th March 1943

2. Introduction • Perception of tactical air power • Flexible and adaptable • 1940 – 1942 – a period of difficult gestation • Often derided as the ‘Royal Absent Force’ • Hard fought lessons • Coningham’s principles: • Air superiority • Concentration of force • Effective planning • Centralised control • Flexibility • Command relationships

3. A Hawker Hurricane Mark IID of No 6 Squadron, Royal Air Force, demonstrates the effect of its firepower on an abandoned enemy tank in Tunisia

4. Strategic Situation • By January 1943 2 key problems were identified: • The speed with which the OKW and Commando Supremo could reinforce their positions in Tunisia • The speed with which 8th Army and WDAF forces could be reinforced • Affect of the Kasserine Pass battles – Operation Sturmflut • Reorganisation of air power assets in North Africa • Formation of NATAF under Coningham • Logistical issues for the 8th Army and WDAF • Operation Capri • Strength of the Mareth Line position

5. Initial Planning • Basic plan laid out by Montgomery: • Flanking operation by the NZ Corps under Freyberg • To be supported by X Corps • Frontal attack on the Mareth Line by XXX Corps • Role of the air forces: • Broad strategic outline for future operation dictated by Coningham at Canrobert, 12 March • No. 242 Group and US XII ASC to attack airfields maintain theatre wide air superiority • WDAF to operate in support of 8th Army operations • In support of the 8th Army attack against the Mareth Line operations would consist of: • Light bombers to conduct attacks on landing grounds – Starting 15 March • Fighters to maintain command of the air in the battlespace • Fighters to operate in support of the ground forces • Medium bombers to wear out German positions • 5 fighter wings, 3 light bomber wings, 1 reconnaissance wing and 2 medium bomber wings in support

6. Operation PUGILIST • Initial attack went in by 50th Infantry Division, 20th/21st March • BAI and air superiority mission took priority • Limited reaction by Axis forces • During 21st March BAI missions continued • Failure of frontal attacks on the Mareth Line • NZ Corps halted by 21st Panzer Division • Successful use of CAS in support in NZ Corps on 22nd March • No. 6 Squadron in Hurricane IID ‘tank-busters’ • Claimed 36 tanks hit • Prevention of further operations by bad weather • German counter-attacks on 23 March against XXX Corps • Forced to shift the weight of the attack

8. Shifting Priorities • Failure of XXX Corps frontal assault • Decision to concentrate on NZ Corps left hook • Intention to thrust towards the Gabes Gap via El Hamma • Air effort was to support this new thrust • 24th/25th March No. 6 Squadron was again in action around El Hamma • Continuing attacks on airfields • 20 tanks hit by Hurricane IID’s • Maintenance of air superiority by actions of No. 242 Group and XII ASC • Army held up at El Hamma

9. Operation SUPERCHARGE II • Problem of geography • A frontal assault would be costly • Broadhurst suggested a possible solution • An ‘air blitz’ • Use of air power of roving artillery on a fixed pattern • This would allow movement by 1st Armoured Division • Situation on other fronts • Broadhurst’s appreciation • NZ Corps Operation Orders driven by the air plan

10. Air Support – The Breakthrough at El Hamma • Exploitation of allied air superiority • BAI operation to proceed the ‘air blitz’ • Outline of the ‘air blitz’ • 15:30 26th March – 3 waves of light and medium bombers launched pattern bombing • On lines laid by a pre-planned artillery programme • Relay attacks launched immediately after its completion by fighter-bombers • A strength of 2.5 squadrons was maintained over the battlespace • Relays arrived at quarter hour intervals • No. 6 Squadron Hurricane ‘tank-busters’ attacked concentrations of tanks • Air superiority maintained by a roving patrol of one Spitfire squadron • Infantry advanced at 16:00 at a rate of 100 feet a minute • Positions marked by flares • By 29th March 1st Armoured Division had breached the Gabes Gap

11. Command, Control, Intelligence and Reconnaissance • Role of 285 Wing • Reconnaissance in support of army preparations • Based on the Woodall system • Lessons of No. 2 AASC in the Western Desert • Final perfected use of the Woodall system • FAC’s deployed with 8th Armoured Brigade • Use of ‘Flying FAC’s’ • Intelligence driven interdiction campaign

12. Comments on the Battle at El Hamma ‘An interesting feature of the El Hamma battle was the readiness of the Eighth Army to modify their plans at short notice in order to fit in with what was considered to be the most effective method of employing the air forces. The air operations themselves had no specifically novel features. The conventional rules of war were applied, special attention being paid to surprise, concentrating the maximum force at the right place, and carefully co-ordinating the air plans with those of the land forces.’ AIR 23/6764 ‘Operations of the Western Desert Air Force from the capture of Tripoli, 23rd Jan 1943, until the final surrender of Axis forces in North Africa, 13th May 1943’ p. 21

13. Conclusion: A Blueprint for Success? • A fusion of lessons • The RAF was proactive rather than reactive to army needs • Readiness of army commanders to listen to their air force counterparts • Growth in inter-dependence between the army and air force • Development of command relationships • Notably Montgomery and Broadhurst • Culmination of 3 years of hard fought lessons • A notable feature of combined arms operations in Italy and North-West Europe • Introduction of WINKLE and TIMOTHY operations • Links to CABRANK • Flexible and adaptable