IDSS Thursday August 18, 2005. A Vacuum in Strategic Thinking: The Repercussions for Strategic Thinking of Globalisation

1. IDSS Thursday August 18, 2005.A Vacuum in Strategic Thinking: The Repercussions for Strategic Thinking of Globalisation By: Adjunct Professor at CBS, Ambassador J. Ørstrøm Møller. www.oerstroemmoeller.com

2. I The Global Context • Key Sentence: The cold war ended in 1990. The cold war´s geo-political structure and the way world politic and economics worked ended in February/March 2003.

3. 1.The global trends. • More egoism, more self centred attitudes, more nationalism. DAMN THE OTHERS. • The era/decade of fundamentalism • lower economic growth • multilateral trade policy loses steam. FTAs. New players. Semi-protectionism? • social disparities inside and between nation-states • new security threats: Minorities inside nation-states, social upheavals, religious fervour

4. 2.The US has thrown multilateralism over board and chosen unilateral multilateralism. • US as megapower but no international institutionalisation reflecting this new phenomenon • prevention and pre-emption, but what about other countries • coalition of the willing • new US economic policy with the shining label WHO CARES

5. 3.Already now the following seems abundantly clear • NATO, forget it fellows • US restructure its global military positioning. Saudi-Arabia and Germany out. Iraq, Central Asia, Australia in • Europe out of the American focus, Asia in. • What about UN? Wait a moment.

6. 4.Besides political and moral problems these trends give rise to a number of analytical problems. • US cannot pay for its role as a megapower ref deficit on balance of payments and the public finances. Mismatch between policy objectives and ability to pay for the party. • USA is starting to become a secluded nation-state. Not compatible with a global empire. • No Windows 2000 or XP for the global political and economic system.

7. 5.Unquestionable a global American Empire but • Not territorial possession. • An empire based upon other nation and other peoples wish to emulate American values. • A virtual empire? • The gift to the world. Meritocracy.

8. II Challenges for Asia.

9. 1.Institutionalisation • politically there is a strong need for reconciliation between China and Japan. It is not forthcoming. China is the rising power. Japan is a sullen inward looking power. India on its way. • Economically China and India must be integrated in an Asian context allowing for the advantages of the strong economic growth in these two countries to be shared with the rest of the pack. • Japan must try to get on board again

10. How to proceed? Which way to choose? • The first one: Weak political structure. US and Australia into the picture. Not free trade at least not encompassing agriculture. Ref EFTA in Europe. • The second one:. For East Asia and among the East Asian countries. Free trade in principle. Ref EEC in Europe. • The forthcoming East Asian Summit.

11. 2.Economic models. • Until the mid-19990´s all East Asian countries were on one and the same economic model. Growth by export. • Since the financial crisis and the repercussions on their economies at least three models have emerged. • The first one is export oriented. Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan. • The second one is more emphasis on domestic demand. Thailand, The Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia.

12. China is somewhere in between. Korea also • The third one is stagnation. Japan. Why? Manufacturing economy parallel to Germany, Sweden, Switzerland. • The joker. The resource-based economy is back on track. (Australia). • Conclusion: Economic models and economic policies used to be convergent but is now becoming more and more divergent.

13. 3.Two main problems: • social losers, mainly for China and the South East Asia countries. • Immigration. Japans choice.

14. 4. Key Sentences for Asia. • economically driven nations and societies • finding it difficult to get integration among themselves going • and even more to safeguard their global interests • political systems in some countries find it difficult to rise to the challenges.

15. III Europe • Totally wrong to write Europe off because the failure of the Constitution. • Most likely scenario for Europe in the next 5 – 10 years. • First phase has already started. Europe moves closer to the US. • Second phase will come in one or two years. An effort to build a new Transatlantic partnership. Will fail because the US will not pay sufficient attention to the Europeans. • Third phase. A revival of the Franco-German axis. The famous phrase ´alliances do not persists, only interests do´. • And that will lead to a new shape of European integration and a stronger one probably with different groups of members.

16. IV China and India move into the system. Challenges for US and Japan. • The world has been incredibly lucky that China and India want to join the system. Imagine China and India trying to set up an alternative system. Unimaginable? Suppose the gang of four had prevailed in China in late 70´s. • The US dilemma. Get them on board the fight against terrorism, roque states but pay the price or go alone and drain US resources.

17. The US dilemma is played on the Asian pitch. If US opens the door for China and India globalisation in its present form based upon a semi-capitalistic American model and convergence of political systems are likely. If not China and India will either ask for indeed crave a restructuring of decision making inside the system or gradually put forward another version.

18. Why China AND India, why not China OR India. • Japan could have controlled Asian integration. Now it has to accept a less important role. Seen in an historical perspective this is extremely worrying as Japanese nationalism or seclusion can resurrect. US skirts the fundamental issue of pushing Japan into an Asian integration not under Japanese leadership or using Japan to spoil the whole thing.

19. V Globalisation under pressure • Why is globalisation the preferred model Economic growth versus identity • The challenges to globalisation – 4 points • 1.The elite versus the population • 2.Growing inequalities • 3.Minorities • 4.A sinister triangle of terrorism, crime and infectious diseases

20. VI. Salient lines of the old model • Nationalism • Pursuance of national interests • Sovereignty • Von Clausewitz: Crisis – Conflict – Confrontation → War.

21. VII. Salient lines of a new model • Transnational forces • Supranational enterprises • International organisations • Cross border pressure groups • Multinational civic society

22. VIII. The transition from the old to a new model. The old model: Soviet Empire and Russian Empire constituted a threat. Actually an old-fashioned kind of threat. • Different kind of threats to deal with. • The new model: Threat against • our societies, not our nation-states, • the way our societies function, not our borders. Ref the nature of the American Empire (not territory).

23. The key under the old model as well as under the new model is survival but the character of the threat and how to survive it has changed completely. Survival of the Nation-State or survival of Globalisation New Strategic thinking: Co-operation – Compromise – Consensus → Global Governance.

24. The New Model is based upon three main elements • Interventionism • Institutionalisation • A common set of values

25. A. Interventionism. • The international community cannot and will not stand idly by if /when other players pursue policies threatening internationalism. • Foreign policy, security, military • Economic policy, currency rates and maybe trade policy • Infectious diseases. • pollution, environmental threats

26. Prevention and pre-emption may not be new but the setting is.

27. B. Institutionalisation. • Sovereignty disappears as a barrier. Sounds nice but non-provider of solutions, present excuse for inactivity, used to be protection of the weak but not any longer. • Sovereignty is defensive in its character but what are required now is active and offensive operations inside an international framework going beyond a national framework.

28. Shape our societies in conformity with and not in contradiction to international rules, behaviour, patterns. • Institutionalisation emerges as the indispensable counterpart as a safeguard against the stronger abusing the weaker. • The rule of the law.

29. C. A common set of values. • The most difficult one. Easy to say, difficult to define! • What is good, what is bad. What is permissible, what is not permissible. • What justifies action and what does not. • Tolerance • Accountability • Transparency

30. Difficult yes but not impossible. Look at recent years. • Genocide • Weapons of Mass Destruction • Certain kinds of violation of human rights • Ecological disasters.

31. Sure, there is still an element of double standards but convergence and not divergence along these lines.

32. D. Iraq war revisited in this context.

33. VII. What is the alternative?

34. We may hope and think that the existing model for internationalism may continue. Thinkable yes but……….We may try to sketch a new model in the mould of ´response to challenge´. The problems are here. They do not go away despite all kind of exorcisms.

35. If not successful: • Winners take all – the strongest. • Some kind of regional division of the world. • A revival of nationalism. • Clash of civilisations. • Some kind of chaos based upon egoism and a nice little dose of destruction..

36. Make your choice!

37. Jørgen Ørstrøm Møller www.oerstroemmoeller.com