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Brains can tell us more about social cognition if our methods don’t presuppose the answers.

Brains can tell us more about social cognition if our methods don’t presuppose the answers. Ian Apperly. Brains can tell us more about social c ognition the cognitive basis of “theory of mind” if our methods don’t presuppose the answers. Ian Apperly. What is “Theory of Mind”?.

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Brains can tell us more about social cognition if our methods don’t presuppose the answers.

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  1. Brains can tell us more about social cognition if our methods don’t presuppose the answers. Ian Apperly

  2. Brains can tell us more about social cognitionthe cognitive basis of “theory of mind”ifour methods don’t presuppose the answers. Ian Apperly

  3. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view

  4. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view • Significant developments from infancy to early childhood • Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders

  5. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view • Significant developments from infancy to early childhood • Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders • Existent, to a degree, in non-human animals

  6. What is “Theory of Mind”? • “Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition” • Essential for everyday social interaction and communication • False belief tasks as a paradigm case • (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) • These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other person’s point of view • Significant developments from infancy to early childhood • Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other genetic and psychiatric disorders • Existent, to a degree, in non-human animals • Identifiable neural network Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

  7. Theory of mind in adults? • “But don’t adults have a theory of mind……?”

  8. Theory of mind in adults? • “But don’t adults have a theory of mind……?” • Prevailing view: • ToM is a set of concepts • Researchers should figure out who has them (and where they are in the brain)..... • ....by seeing who passes false belief tasks Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

  9. Theory of mind in adults? • “But don’t adults have a theory of mind……?” • Prevailing view: • ToM is a set of concepts • Researchers should figure out who has them (and where they are in the brain)..... • ....by seeing who passes false belief tasks • Problems with this view: • No cognitive account of ToM in adults • Severe limitations on conceptualising extended development, neural basis and disorder • Little integration with the rest of cognition Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS Temporal pole Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC TPJ TP Medial view Lateral view

  10. Background: The “theory of mind network” Anterior Anterior Posterior TPJ TPJ TP TP Right lateral view Left lateral view Temporo-parietal junction TPJ PC Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC mPFC Temporal pole TP Precuneus PC Medial view e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003 Van Overwalle, 2009

  11. Background: The “theory of mind network” Anterior Anterior Posterior TPJ TPJ TP TP Right lateral view Left lateral view Temporo-parietal junction TPJ PC Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC mPFC Temporal pole TP Precuneus PC Medial view e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003 Van Overwalle, 2009

  12. Background: The “theory of mind network” Anterior Anterior Posterior TPJ TPJ Main debate is around which regions are “really” ToM regions – i.e. Where is the ToM module? TP TP Right lateral view Left lateral view Temporo-parietal junction TPJ PC Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC mPFC Temporal pole TP Precuneus PC Medial view e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003 Van Overwalle, 2009

  13. ToM functional localiser(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......) False belief (FB) sample story John told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars though, so she believed John. — When Emily sees John’s car she thinks it is a porsche ford False photograph (FP) sample story A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to develop. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground. — The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground branch

  14. ToM functional localiser(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......) False belief (FB) sample story John told Emily that he had a Porsche. Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily doesn’t know anything about cars though, so she believed John. — When Emily sees John’s car she thinks it is a porsche ford False photograph (FP) sample story A photograph was taken of an apple hanging on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to develop. In the meantime, a strong wind blew the apple to the ground. — The developed photograph shows the apple on the ground branch R-TPJ shows greatest specificity for reasoning about mental states. Contrast with mPFC, which also shows activity for thinking about body states, internal sensations and personal characteristics. So is this the ToM module?

  15. Why ToM cannot be a Fodor-module

  16. Why ToM cannot be a Fodor-module • According to Fodor (1983, 2000) deciding what we believe is an archetypal “central” process ?

  17. Why ToM cannot be a Fodor-module • According to Fodor (1983, 2000) deciding what we believe is an archetypal “central” process • It would be odd, in the extreme, if deciding what we believed someone else believed were somehow modular ? ?

  18. What might we expect Mindreading to involve?

  19. What might we expect Mindreading to involve? Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

  20. What might we expect Mindreading to involve? Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? • Conceptual knowledge about mental states • Represent alternative perspectives Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

  21. What might we expect Mindreading to involve? Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? • Conceptual knowledge about mental states • Represent alternative perspectives • Keep up! • Avoid interference from self perspective Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

  22. What might we expect Mindreading to involve? Do you not think, Sir Rhodes, if you get caned in school you can’t concentrate? • Conceptual knowledge about mental states • Represent alternative perspectives • Keep up! • Avoid interference from self perspective • Make abductive, “best guess” inferences • Do this in the context of relevant social scripts Well, I was caned in my time and I’ve concentrated all my life You was caned? Respect man, respect

  23. Neuroimaging studies that are starting to cast light on these functions, and their neural correlates

  24. Belief-desire reasoning • Young children pass true belief tasks (~3Y) before false belief tasks (~4Y) (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1988) True belief Difficulty False belief B+ B-

  25. D- D+ Difficulty B+ B- Belief-desire reasoning • Young children pass true belief tasks before false belief tasks (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1988) • Young children pass false belief tasks at ~4 years when protagonist wishes to find object, but not until ~5 years when protagonist wishes to avoid object (e.g., Cassidy, 1998; Friedman & Leslie, 2004) True belief False belief

  26. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Behavioural study • (Apperly et al., 2011, Ch.Dev.;

  27. D- Difficulty D+ B+ B- Children’s dataApperly, Warren, et al. (2012) Errors RT to correct responses Main Effects: Belief, Desire, Age Age*Desire – but Desire significant at all ages

  28. D- Difficulty D+ B+ B- Children’s dataApperly, Warren, et al. (2012) Errors RT to correct responses Main Effects: Belief, Desire, Age Age*Desire –Desire significant only at 6-7 and 8-9 Main Effects: Belief, Desire, Age Age*Desire – but Desire significant at all ages

  29. D- Difficulty D+ B+ B- Adults’ data Consistent with German & Hehman (2006) Errors RT to correct responses Belief, Desire Belief*Desire – all comparisons significant

  30. D- Difficulty D+ B+ B- Adults’ data Consistent with German & Hehman (2006) Errors RT to correct responses Belief, Desire Belief*Desire – all comparisons significant Belief, not Desire

  31. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Behavioural study • (Apperly et al., 2011, Ch.Dev.;

  32. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • B- is harder than B+ • D- is harder than D+ • This replicates findings from children and adults • (Apperly et al., 2011, Ch.Dev.;

  33. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC Overlap

  34. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC Notably no mPFC Overlap

  35. Belief-desire task vs. ToM-localiser Belief OR Desire “ToM localiser” (False Belief – False Photo) Overlap Conjunction analysis between Belief-Desire and ToM Localiser

  36. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Varying Belief and Desire (not belief or desire per se) modulates activity in • “control” areas (ACC) – perhaps reflecting variation in condition difficulty • “ToM” areas (bilateral TPJ)

  37. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Varying Belief and Desire (not belief or desire per se) modulates activity in • “control” areas (ACC) – perhaps reflecting variation in condition difficulty • “ToM” areas (bilateral TPJ) • Varying Belief (but not Desire) modulates • “control” areas (IFG – R-IFG in particular) – only B- vs. B+ involves a perspective difference

  38. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Varying Belief and Desire (not belief or desire per se) modulates activity in • “control” areas (ACC) – perhaps reflecting variation in condition difficulty • “ToM” areas (bilateral TPJ) • Varying Belief (but not Desire) modulates • “control” areas (IFG – R-IFG in particular) – only B- vs. B+ involves a perspective difference • Why are “control” areas not observed in ToM localiser? • False Photo subtracts this from False Belief

  39. Orthogonal variation of beliefs and desires(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012) • Varying Belief and Desire (not belief or desire per se) modulates activity in • “control” areas (ACC) – perhaps reflecting variation in condition difficulty • “ToM” areas (bilateral TPJ) • Varying Belief (but not Desire) modulates • “control” areas (IFG – R-IFG in particular) – only B- vs. B+ involves a perspective difference • Why are “control” areas not observed in ToM localiser? • False Photo subtracts this from False Belief • Why is mPFC observed in localiser but not our task? • Our task does not require abductive “uncertain” inferences

  40. Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, in prep)

  41. Social abduction(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, subm.) TB vs. FB Green = D? vs. D-&D+ Green = D? vs. D-&D+&FB&TB Selective for D?

  42. Case study 2 – Temporal coordination

  43. Background: The neural basis of “theory of mind” Anterior Anterior Posterior TPJ TPJ lPFC lPFC TP TP Right lateral view Left lateral view Temporo-parietal junction TPJ PC Temporal pole TP mPFC Medial prefrontal cortex mPFC Lateral prefrontal cortex lPFC We don’t know how these regions work together e.g. Frith & Frith, 2003 Van Overwalle, 2009 Precuneus PC Medial view

  44. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) 1,2, or 3 discs Self / Other Consistent You / He 2 Disc position varies Self / Other Inconsistent You / He 2

  45. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) 1,2, or 3 discs Self / Other Consistent You / He 2 Disc position varies Self / Other Inconsistent You / He 2

  46. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) Egocentric interference on explicit judgement of other RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

  47. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) Altercentric interference =evidence of automatic calculation of perspective RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

  48. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) Various follow-ups..... Altercentric interference = evidence of automatic calculation of perspective RT (ms) Main effect of consistency Significant interaction

  49. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

  50. Automatic perspective-taking?(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP) * ns Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see

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