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RSA SecurID ® Authentication. Ellen Stuart CS265 Cryptography and Computer Security Fall 2004. Agenda. Introduction Components Tokens Server Algorithm Weaknesses Comparison Conclusion. Introduction. RSA SecurID ® Authentication History of the RSA and SecurID ®
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RSA SecurID® Authentication Ellen Stuart CS265 Cryptography and Computer Security Fall 2004
Agenda • Introduction • Components • Tokens • Server • Algorithm • Weaknesses • Comparison • Conclusion E.Stuart
Introduction • RSA SecurID® Authentication • History of the RSA and SecurID® • Two Factor Authentication • Customer List • NSA • CIA • White House E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • Tokens • Authentication Server • Algorithm E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • Tokens • Issued to users • Each token had a unique 64 bit seed value • “Something the user has” • Software Token • Does not require separate Device • User required to use PIN to access pass code Hardware Token User required to login in with PIN and displayed pass code PINPAD User required to use PIN to access pass code Key Fob User required to login in with PIN and displayed pass code E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • Authentication Server • Maintains database of user assigned tokens • Generates pass code following the same algorithm as the token • Seed – similar to symmetric key E.Stuart
SecurID Login Users issued tokens RSA Authentication Server Internet E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • Algorithm • Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm • AES Hashing Algorithm E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm • Secret key := unique seed value • Time := 32 bit count of minutes since January 1, 1986 E.Stuart
Components of the SecurID® System • ASHF description of Brainard’s Hashing Algorithm Each round -> 64 sub-rounds E.Stuart
Weaknesses of the SecurID® System • Violation of Kerckhoff’s Principle • Publication of the alleged hash algorithm • Key Recovery Attack (Biryukov, 2003; Contini, 2003) • AES Implementation • Human Factors E.Stuart
Comparison to Password Systems • Password systems are built-in, no additional implementation cost? • Administration Costs • Security Costs • SecurID • No need to regularly change passwords • No changes as long as tokens uncompromised (and hash function) E.Stuart
Conclusion • Former implementation of SecurID supports Kerckhoff’s principle • RSA phasing out versions with Brainard’s Hash Function E.Stuart
References • Mudge, Kingpin, Initial Cryptanalysis of the RSA SecurID Algorithm, January 2001 • www.atstake.com/research/reports/acrobat/initialsecuridanalysis.pdf • V. McLellan; Firewall Wizards: RE: securid AES tokens, http://www.insecure.org, Apr 26 2004, retrieved November 2004F. Muhtar, Safer means to use passwords, Computimes, NSTP, Feb 13th 2003, retrieved November 2004 from http://www.transniaga.com/Default.htm • S. Contini, Y.L. Yin, Improved Cryptanalysis of SecurID, Cryptology ePrintArchive, Report 2003/205, http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/205, October 21, 2003. • V. McLellan, Re: SecurID Token Emulator, post to BugTraq, http://cert.uni- • stuttgart.de/archive/bugtraq/2001/01/msg00090.html • I.C. Wiener, Sample SecurID Token Emulator with Token Secret Import, post to • BugTraq, http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/152525 • The Authentication Scorecard, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http://www.rsasecurity.com, retrieved November 2004. • Protecting Against Phishing by Implementing Strong Two-Factor Authentication, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http://www.rsasecurity.com, retrieved November 2004. • Are passwords Really Free? A closer look at the hidden costs of password security, White Paper, RSA Security, Inc, http://www.rsasecurity.com, retrieved November 2004. • RSA Laboritories, FAQ Version 4.1, May 2000 RSA Security, Inc, http://www.rsasecurity.com. • G. Welsh; Breaking the Code, Macquarie University News Feature, March 2004. Retrieved November 2004, from http://www.pr.mq.edu.au/macnews. • Biryukov, J. Lano, and B. Preneel; Cryptanalysis of the Alleged SecurID Hash Function (extended version), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 2003. • RSA security website, http://www.rsasecurity.com/company E.Stuart