Global economic crisis and Brüning‘s government, 1929-32 Lecture 11 17 April 2012

1. HIST2133. The Weimar Republic through Documents, 1918-1933 Global economic crisis and Brüning‘s government, 1929-32 Lecture 11 17 April 2012

2. The Crisis of Democracy, 1929-32:3 factors 1) Mass unemployment (≥ 6 million) + 2) Art. 53 of Weimar Constitution → ‘Presidential government under Brüning ► First step into an authoritarian regime ► Weimar democracy already at stake + 3) NSDAP election results = Successive dissolution of Weimar Republic

3. ‘Black Friday’: 25 Oct 1929 • Collapse of NY Stock Exchange due to long US overproduction • US credits to G redrawn + US protective customs • Depression tendency in G accelerated = G industrial production decreased to 1903-4 levels ► Rapid decline of salaries & living standards ► Massive unemployment: 1,2 Mill. (1929) → 6 Mill. (Jan 1932)

4. Results • Fall of Chancellor Müller’s SPD & DVP government over economic & social issues (Mar 1930) ► ‘Self-acquittal’ of SPD from power • New CP Brüning government as ‘presidential cabinet’ appointed by Reich President (art. 53) ► Hindenburg’s concession to Brüning to make use of art. 48 (state of emergency) if needed = Major turn in WR politics+ power

5. Reichstag election, Sep 1930 Decisive break-through of NSDAP: • High voters’ turn out • Decline of DNVP • Voters from lower middle-class + various other strata of society • Financial subsidies from big industry much less important than Hitler’s own charisma

6. 1928 - 1930: SPD 29,8 - 24,5 % NSDAP 2,6 - 18,3 % KPD 10,6 - 13,1 % DNVP 14,2 - 7,0 % DVP 8,7 - 4,5 % DDP 4,9 - 3,8 % July – November 1932 NSDAP 37,3 - 33,1 % SPD 21,6 – 20,4 % KPD 14,3 – 16,9 % DNVP 5,9 – 8,3 % DVP 1,2 – 1,9 % DDP 1,0 – 1,0 % NSDAP in Reichstag elections

7. NSDAP after re-founding in 1925 • Munich branch effectively party headquarter • Hitler’s claim for absolute leadership + personal orders to sub-leaders ☺ ≠ Strasser’s bureaucratic structure ☻ • Hitler’s concept of SA as party force ☺ ≠ Röhm’s concept as military force ☻ • 30-36 districts lead by Gauleiter (district leaders) + local party branches leaders • Special party organisations + professional associations as wider mass networks

8. NSDAP characteristics • Internal symbols of Hitler’s charismatic rule: A) Super-power position B) Embodiment of heroism + sacred mission + greatness + devotion C) Decision-making as ‘action and example’ without formal limitations • External symbols of Führer cult: • Heil Hitler’, Hitler Youth, propaganda (Goebbels) • Sub-leaders in ‘blood brotherhood’ with feudal loyalty to Hitler • Führer myth → ‘Hitler Party’

9. NSDAP agitation + propaganda • Rites + symbols, parades of NS organisations • Rallies: 1926 Weimar, since 1927 Nuremberg • Election campaigns: Mass rallies, flags, films, Hitler’s flights through Germany = Omnipresence, actions, dynamism, technical modernity, H’s charisma → Movement of the ‘Young-and-fresh’ = Flag consecrations, martyr cult for fallen Nazis, oaths for loyalty + sacrifice, terror + attacks on political enemies → ‘Fighting Movement’ ► Actionist ‘movement’ style + irrational heroism ≠ rational discourse, compromise, pluralism, democracy

10. Hitler’s Way to Power:8 explanations • Political: Versailles Treaty • Economic: Economic crises • Institutional: Weimar constitution • Sociological: Lower middle class • Ideological: Authoritarian tradition • Marxist: Necessary crisis of capitalism • Mass psychology: Propaganda • Personality: Hitler

14. Brüning government Oct 1930-May 1932 • Over 40% of Reichstag deputies from NSDAP + KPD + DNVP after Sep 1930 elections • No coalition possible between pro-Republican parties due to ideological divisions • No new election wished due to anticipated further rise of NSDAP + KPD + DNVP → Toleration of Brüning government by SPD: “Brüning the lesser evil than Hitler”

15. Brüning’s deflation policy • Strong cuts in government’s spending esp. in civil service • Massive increase of + introduction of new taxes → To raise competitiveness of G products abroad → To demonstrate to Allies willingness to pay reparations = Deflation policy with clearly foreign policy intentions

16. Results • After major bank crisis → G’s severe financial crisis (spring 1931) ☺ Final end of all reparations (Jun/Jul 1932) ☻ No end of economic crisis → Deflation policy cuts government expenditures in economy + lowers buying- power of people = Self-destructive mechanism ≠ J.M. Keynes’ idea of temporarily expanded public debts

17. Economic crisis 1931-2 • Huge unemployment • Decrease of unemployment subsidies • More people receive only welfare subsidies = No active government plan to fight but only to manage crisis ► Strong decline of trust in government ► Brüning’s public appeals no longer believed ► Hopes faded for improvement of situation

18. Presidential elections 1932 • Pro Hindenburg: SPD, Centre Party, BVP, DDP, DVP (not DNVP) • No absolute majority in 1st round: 49,6% for Hindenburg, 30,4% for Hitler • Absolute majority in 2nd round: 53% for Hindenburg, 36,9% = Hindenburg regarded lacking support of DNVP as ‘personal humiliation’ → Increasing lack-of-trust in Brüning’s political skills