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Firm & Production

Firm & Production. EA Session 5: July 11 th , 2007 Prof. Samar K. Datta. Overview. Why does a firm exist? Decision to buy (subcontracting) or to make (internalization/ integration) Internal organization of the firm Handling separation between ownership and control

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Firm & Production

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  1. Firm & Production EA Session 5: July 11th, 2007 Prof. Samar K. Datta

  2. Overview • Why does a firm exist? • Decision to buy (subcontracting)or to make (internalization/ integration) • Internal organization of the firm • Handling separation between ownership and control • Technology & production function • Classification of inputs & isoquants • Production with one variable input (labor): Relation between AP & MP • Production with two variable inputs & diminishing MRTS • Returns to scale • Some applications

  3. Why does a firm exist?(not part of reading though) • Answers provided by various economists • Coase (highlighting inside vs. market transaction) • Choice of the least transaction-cost contractual arrangement to supply the commodity • Negotiating with a representative of a coalition of resource owners (firm) for the complete commodity • Negotiating with a large number of unitary firms for each component and assemblage of the commodity • Alchian & Demsetz (shirking under team production) • Impossible to measure marginal product of each member of the team • Creates incentive to shirk (reduce work effort without proportional reduction in income) • To prevent shirking, members hire central agent to monitor themselves • Monitor has low incentive to shirk as he gets a claim on the firm’s residual income

  4. Why does a firm exist? (not part of reading though) • Barzel (highlighting measurability problem) • Environment characterized by costly information and outcomes affected by chance • Due to decreasing returns from supervision, the one whose contribution to common effort is the most difficult to measure will assume the role of entrepreneur • Asymmetric information about entrepreneurial activity gives strategic advantage to entrepreneur • Measurement problem solved by assigning entrepreneur a claim on the residual value of the joint venture. • Williamson(highlighting role of specialized assets to conduct transactions – need to vest residual control and residual claim right on a single party) • A specialized or custom-made product has asset specificity, which is vulnerable to opportunistic behavior by both buyers and sellers • Ownership of specialized products or detailed long-term contracts are used to prevent problems of opportunistic bargaining • Formalized structure of a firm is the specialized asset in this case • Therefore, the least transaction cost alternative is chosen

  5. Why are capitalists the bosses? • Who has got the maximum stake in the production process/system? • With respect to whose efforts is there the maximum information failure problem? • Which factor of production is a co-specialized asset along with the firm – land, labor, capital or the capitalist-entrepreneur?

  6. Why does a firm exist? • Two broad conditions, as cited by Dholakia & Oza: • Q (x, y) ≥ Q (x) + Q (y), or, C (x, y) ≤ C (x) + C (y) 2. TC (x, y) ≤ TC (x) + TC (y) Economies of scope thus working in terms of saving in • Either transformation costs(i.e., costs of inputs, which enter directly into the production process) • Or transaction costs(i.e., costs of coordination & monitoring of inputs directly entering into the production process)

  7. Internal organization of the firm • Unitary, partnership, or corporation • M (multi-divisional) form or U (unitary) form • How to manage separation between ownership and control • Incentive-disincentive structure • Market for managers • Market for takeover • Financing of the firm – debt/equity • Growth of the firm • Organic (till marginal benefits, i.e. reduction in transaction costs, of internalizing an additional activity equal the marginal costs, i.e. increase of agency costs) • Inorganic • Merger / Acquisition • Vertical merger (value-addition through byproduct use) • Horizontal merger (economies of scope through co-management of related products)

  8. Possible objectives of the firm • Profit maximization • Sales maximization • Growth maximization • Employment generation • Satisficing behavior • In the long-run, no firm can ignore profit considerations. Hence, profit maximization often looked upon as a reasonable description of firm behavior in reality.

  9. The technology of production • Production Process: Combining inputs or factors of production (land, labor, capital, organizational skill) to achieve an output, i.e., the transformation process • Production Function: Indicates the highest output that a firm can produce for every specified combination of inputs, given the state of technology. • Shows what is technically feasible when the firm operates efficiently.

  10. The Isoquant Map:Production with Two Variable Inputs (L,K) Capital per year E 5 Isoquants showing all possible combinations of inputs that yield the same output 4 3 A B C 2 Q3 = 90 D Q2 = 75 1 Q1 = 55 1 2 3 4 5 Labor per year

  11. Importance of time period • Short-run: • Period of time in which quantities of one or more production factors cannot be changed. • These inputs are calledfixed inputs. • Long-run: • All inputs are variable in the long run; so there are nofixed inputs.

  12. AP = slope of line from origin to a point on TP, lines b, & c. • MP = slope of a tangent to any point on the TP line, lines a & c. Production with One Variable Input (Labor): Relation between AP & MP Output per Month Output per Month D 112 30 C E 20 60 B 10 A Labor per Month Labor per Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 10 9 0 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

  13. Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns • When the labor input is small, MP increases due to specialization (better utilization of fixed inputs). • When the labor input is large, MP decreases due to inefficiencies (fixed factors become limited in supply).

  14. Labor productivity can increase if there are improvements in technology, even though any given production process exhibits diminishing returns to labor. C B O3 A O2 O1 Effect ofTechnological Improvement Output per time period 100 50 Labor per time period 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

  15. 2 1 1 1 Q3 =90 2/3 1 1/3 Q2 =75 1 Q1 =55 Marginal Rate ofTechnical Substitution Capital per year 5 Isoquants are downward sloping and convex like indifference curves, indicating declining MRS. 4 3 2 1 1 2 3 4 5 Labor per month

  16. A B C Q1 Q2 Q3 Isoquants When Inputs are Perfectly Substitutable Capital per month Labor per month

  17. Q3 C Q2 B Q1 K1 A L1 Fixed-Proportions Production Function: Inputs are perfect complements Capital per month Labor per month

  18. Increasing Returns: The isoquants move closer together A 4 30 20 2 10 0 5 10 Increasing Returns to Scale Capital (machine hours) • Reasons: • Larger output associated • with lower cost (autos) • One firm is more efficient • than many (utilities) Labor (hours)

  19. A 6 30 4 20 2 10 0 5 10 15 Constant Returns to Scale Capital (machine hours) • Constant Returns: • Isoquants are equally spaced because: • Size does not affect productivity • May have a large number of producers Labor (hours)

  20. A 4 30 2 20 10 0 5 10 Decreasing Returns to Scale Capital (machine hours) • Decreasing Returns: • Isoquants get further • apart due to: • Decreasing efficiency with large size • Reduction of entrepreneurial abilities Labor (hours)

  21. Application: Malthus and the Food Crisis • Why did Malthus’ prediction fail? • Malthus did not take into consideration the potential impact of technology which has allowed the supply of food to grow faster than demand. • Technology has created surpluses and driven the price down. • Question: If food surpluses exist, why is there hunger? • The cost of distributing food from productive regions to unproductive regions and the low income levels of the non-productive regions.

  22. Example: Explanations for Productivity Growth Slowdown 1)Growth in the stock of capital (both human and non-human) is the primary determinant of the growth in productivity. • Rate of capital accumulation in the U.S. was slower than other developed countries because the others were rebuilding after WWII. 3) Depletion of natural resources 4) Environmental regulations

  23. Co-existence of large & small units in the carpet industry • Economies of scale seem to be favoring larger units • Advantages of product diversification as supported by market segmentation favoring smaller units

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