WEEK #5 VIRTUE , KNOWLEDGE , & HAPPINESS ( Gorgias ) ( 2-14-06)

WEEK #5VIRTUE, KNOWLEDGE, & HAPPINESS(Gorgias)(2-14-06)

AGENDA • Topic: the relationship between virtue and happiness • Background • Eudaemonism (The good is happiness) • Intellectualism (Virtue is knowledge) • Alternative Interpretations • Gorgias • Outline of dialogue • Outline of Polus section (461b-481b) • Argument against Polus (474c-476a)

Eudaemonism • Happiness (eudaemonia) – one’s own – is the good • ‘Happiness’ • Flourishing, doing well, being happy • Objective/subjective components • Webster’s New Collegiate: a state of well-being and pleasurable satisfaction; bliss. • The good • The desired end of rational action • Gorgias 499e7-8: the end of all action is what is good and that we should do all other things for its sake, but not it for their sake. (Zeyl trans.) • Eudaemonist Axiom: “happiness is desired by all human beings as the ultimate end of all their rational acts” • Ubiquitous among Greek moralists • What it means

Symposium 205a2-3 the happy (eudaimones) are happy (eudaemones) by acquisition of good things (ktesei … agathon), and we have no more need to ask for what end a man wishes (bouletai) to be happy (eudaimon), when such is his wish: the answer seems to be ultimate (telos). (Fowler trans.)

Vlastos 1991 “This being the case, the question, “Why should I be moral?” which some modern moralists would find tendentious - perversely predicated on the reduction of morality to self-interest - is for all Greek moralists a perfectly proper and unavoidable one, the most urgent of all the questions they must confront. It is on this issue that they divide. They agree that the right reply is “Because moral conduct offers me the best prospects for happiness.” They disagree on the reason why this is so: ...”

Intellectualism • Virtue is knowledge • Arete = ‘excellence’ ‘virtue’ • Knowledge  virtue (sufficiency claim) • Denial of akrasia • Wrongdoing is involuntary • Wrongdoing is a matter of ignorance • Ignorance or knowledge of what? • Good and bad • Virtue • Virtue  Knowledge (necessity claim) • Knowledge is teachable (K  teach (not train)) • Virtue is teachable (V  teach (not train)) • Evidence

Apology 20a6-b5 • “I said ‘O Callias, if your sons were colts or calves, we could find and engage a supervisor for them who would make them excel in their proper qualities (ten prosekousan areten) ... Now since they are men, whom do you have in mind to supervise them? Who is an expert in this kind of excellence (tis tes toiautes aretes), the human and social kind?’” [Grube trans.]

Protagoras 361b1-7 endeavoring to prove that all things are knowledge--justice, temperance, and courage--which is the best way to make virtue appear teachable: for if virtue were anything else than knowledge, as Protagoras tried to make out, obviously it would not be teachable; but if as a matter of fact it turns out to be entirely knowledge, as you urge, Socrates, I shall be surprised if it is not teachable. [Lamb trans.]

Laches & Charmides Laches 194d1-3: I have often heard you say that every man is good in that wherein he is wise, and bad in that wherein he is unlearned. [Lamb trans.] Charmides 165c4-6: For if temperance is knowing anything, obviously it must be a kind of science, and a science of something, must it not? [Lamb trans.]

Euthyphro, Meno, Aristotle Euthyphro 14c5-6: What do you say the holy, or holiness, is? Do you not say that it is a kind of science of sacrificing and praying? [Fowler trans.] Meno 87c11-89a4 Nicomachean Ethics 1144b28-30: Socrates then thought that the virtues are principles (λογοί), for he said that they are all of them forms of knowledge (e)pisthmai).

Xenophon Memorabilia II ix 5 He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. “For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom.”

Virtue’s Relation to Happiness • Necessary and Sufficient • At the same time I should like you to consider whether we are still satisfied on this point, that the really important thing is not to live, but to live well (eu zen). ... And that to live well means the same thing as to live honorably or rightly (kalos kai dikaios) we examine next whether it is just for me to try to get out of here ... If it is seen to be just, we try to do so; if it is not, we will abandon the idea. ... For us, however, ... the only valid consideration ... is whether we should be acting rightly in giving money and gratitude to those who will lead me out of here ... or whether in truth we shall do wrong in doing all this. If it appears we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong (adikein). (48b4-d6; Grube trans.)

Evidence Continued • You are wrong, sir, if you think that a man who is any good at all should take into account the risk of life or death; he should look to this only in his actions, whether what he does is right or wrong, whether he is acting like a good or bad man. (Apology 28b6-c1; Grube trans.) • a good man cannot be harmed in life or in death (Apology 41c9-d3; Grube trans.)

Alternative Interpretations • Necessary & Sufficient • Identity (Stoics) – the only thing with intrinsic value • Sovereignty (Vlastos) – the primary thing with intrinsic value • Instrumentalism (Irwin) – virtue only has extrinsic value • Not Sufficient (B&S) • Enabling conditions • Diseased body (Crito 47e3-5 & Gorgias 512a2-b2) • Not Necessary (B&S) • Socrates is good (& so happy) but not virtuous • B&S view • Virtuous actions are necessary & sufficient for happiness • Virtue is instrumental for virtuous actions, but neither nec nor suf

Diseased Body • And is a life worth living with a body that is corrupted and in bad condition? C: In no way. [Crito 47e3-5; Grube trans.] • And so he reckons out how wrong it is that, whereas a victim of severe and incurable diseases of the body who has escaped drowning is miserable in not having died, and has got no benefit at his hands, yet, if a man has many incurable diseases in that part of him so much more precious than the body, his soul, that such a person is to live, and that he will be doing him the service of saving him either from the sea or from a law court or from any other peril whatsoever: no, he knows it cannot be better for a man who is vicious to live, since he must needs live ill. [Gorgias 512a2-b2; Lamb trans.]

Socrates’ Alleged Goodness • Be sure that if you kill the sort of man I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves. Neither Meletus nor Anytus can harm me in any way; he could not harm me, for I do not think it is permitted that a better man be harmed by a worse. [Apology 30c6-d1; Grube trans.] • I am convinced that I never willingly wrong anyone. [Apology 37a5-6; Grube trans.] • [a] You too must be of good hope as regards death, gentlemen of the jury, and keep this one truth in mind, that a good man cannot be harmed either in life or in death, and that his affairs are not neglected by the gods. [b] What has happened to me now has not happened of itself, but it is clear to me that it is better for me to die now and to escape from trouble. [c] That is why my divine sign did not oppose me at any point. [Apology 41c8-d6; Grube trans.] • I think I am one of a few Athenians - not to say the only one - who undertake the real political craft, and practise politics - the only one among you now. [Gorgias 521d6-8; Irwin trans.]

Brickhouse & Smith • The previous passages testify to Socrates’ goodness • Eudaemonism entails Socrates’ happiness • Socrates’ ignorance and Socratic Intellectualism entail that Socrates is not virtuous • So, Socrates is happy but not virtuous • So, virtue is not necessary for happiness

B&S continued • Virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for happiness • Virtuous action is necessary and sufficient for happiness • Virtue is not necessary nor sufficient for virtuous action • But virtue is connected to virtuous action

A Concluding Statement • Hence the worst life is led by him who has the vice and is not relieved of it. ... And this is the man who in committing the greatest wrongs and practicing the greatest injustice has contrived to escape reproof and chastisement and penalty alike, as you say Archelaus has succeeded in doing, and the rest of the despots and orators and overlords? [Gorgias 478e4-479a3; Lamb trans.]

Gorgias Outline • Discussion with Gorgias (447a-461b) • The nature of rhetoric • Discussion with Polus (461b-481b) • Injustice/vice is good for the agent, but shameful • Discussion with Callicles (481b-522e) • Injustice is neither bad nor shameful • The myth (523a-527e)

Sketch of Gorgias Section • Gorgias’ definition: rhetoric is the craftsman of persuasion that yields belief but not knowledge about the just and unjust (Gorgias 454e9-455a3) • Refutation • Some of Gorgias’ students use rhetoric unjustly (457a4-c2) • Gorgias will teach the student about justice and injustice (460a3-7) • If an individual learns about justice s/he will be just (460b) • If just then acts justly (460b8) • If the student acts justly s/he will not use rhetoric unjustly • So, Gorgias students do not use rhetoric unjustly

Polus’s Response • Polus objects to [2] that Gorgias will teach his students justice and injustice • Polus claims that Gorgias admitted this out of shame • Why would Gorgias have admitted this out of shame? • Because he didn’t want to appear to maintain that what is shameful – injustice – is not bad for the agent • Ignoring Polus’ diagnosis we might say that Gorgias maintains that injustice is both bad and shameful • So, Polus will maintain that injustice is shameful but not bad for the agent

Sketch of Callicles Section • Callicles Great Speech (482c-486d) • Injustice is neither bad nor shameful • Nature/convention distinction • Hedonism: happiness is pleasure gratification • Refutation • First objection to hedonism (494b7-495c2) • Second objection to hedonism (495e-497d) • Third objection to hedonism (497e-499b) • Consequences (499c-503c) • The true political techne (503d-522e)

Polus Section • Transition (461b-462b) • Socrates’ definition of rhetoric (462b-466a) • techne aims at the good and involves knowledge/ knack aims at pleasure and involves belief • rhetoric is a knack (empeiria) that aims at the pleasure of the soul (as opposed to the good of the soul) as a result of belief (as opposed to knowledge)

Rhetoric BODY SOUL Techne gymnastics medicine legislation justice Knack cosmetics cookery sophistry rhetoric

Polus’ Attempted Refutation • Reductio • A great power is good for one who has it • Doing what one thinks best without knowledge is not good for one • So, one who does what one thinks best without knowledge lacks great power • So, rhetoric is not a great power • Socrates bites the bullet

Defense of Bullet • Doing what one wants is the good, i.e. what one does the other things one does for the sake of • Doing what seems best may or may not be best, and so may or may not be what one wants • If one lacks knowledge, it will not be what one wants • If one has knowledge, it will be what one wants • So, rhetoric qua knack will be doing what seems best when it is not what one wants • The ability to do what one wants is a great power • So, rhetoric is not a great power

Polus’ Attempted Refutation (469a-474b) • Ad hominem: you would choose to be able to do what seems best - liking killing and expelling people (even without knowledge) • Response: choose it only if done justly (i.e. only with knowledge) - because doing it unjustly (without knowledge) is the greatest evil. • Polus: but that’s only because you are afraid of getting caught • Soc: No, acting unjustly is evil even if I don’t get caught, in fact it is worse. • Archelaus counter-example • Soc: Archelaus is either unhappy or virtuous • Polus: doing injustice is better than suffering it

Archelaus Example • Rhetoric is no great power (dunamis) (467c-468e) • The Archelaus example (471a-e) • Vicious but happy king • Socrates: either not vicious or unhappy • Polus: Better to do injustice than suffer it • Soc: Better to suffer than to do injustice (474c-479e) • Injustice is unhappiness & justice is happiness

Socrates’ Refutation474c-476a • Doing injustice is better (not worse) than suffering it • Doing injustice is more shameful (not finer) than suffering it • x is finer than y, either • because x is more pleasant than y • because x is better (more useful, more beneficial) than y • or both • Suffering injustice is not more pleasant than doing it • So, suffering injustice is better than doing it • So, doing injustice is worse than suffering it.

WEEK #5 VIRTUE , KNOWLEDGE , & HAPPINESS ( Gorgias ) ( 2-14-06)