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Information Economics. The value of information. The role of information in perfect competition: 1. Why the demand curve is flat in this case. 2. How information available to potential entrants affects “free entry and exit”. 3. Why perfectly competitive firms do not usually advertise.
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The role of information in perfect competition: 1. Why the demand curve is flat in this case. 2. How information available to potential entrants affects “free entry and exit”. 3. Why perfectly competitive firms do not usually advertise.
Information and advertising: 1. In the Phillip Nelson theory of ads, they are entirely informational. 2. Contrast the Santa Barbara theory 3. There is also a new theory of advertising called “The Advertising as a Complement Good” Theory.
Between the first two advertising theories, which is closest to the truth? a. Advertising as information? b. Advertising as a persuasive tool? Try these examples:
Advertising: A provider of information? Disinformation? or is it a product on its own? Let's decide for ourselves by looking at some advertisements.
Do frogs and lizards convey information about Budweiser? Create loyalty? Do they “go with” a Budweiser beer?
Ad for a Malaysian apartment complex, on the web.
Ad for a Canadian library organization asks what does Elvis read: Fantasy.
Elvis skating for Mastercard. Why do testimonials work?
Painting found in Kentucky, apparently it was used as an ad for a stylish hair salon. For people who take their hair very seriously.
An ad in 2001 for a Poetry meeting and contest.
Suppose you wanted to spend a week for two to four people in Paris--in this neighborhood.
Price: $1200. For several 'pages' of details consult website. Do you need to know more?
How would you summarize these and other ads you have seen? a. Information? b. Bends your tastes--creating a barrier to entry. c. Is it a good in itself, complementary to the primary product?
There is much more to information economics than advertising. Perhaps the most influential model of information is Akerlof’s “Lemons Model.” 1. The setup: Used car sales with asymmetric information. 2. Sellers well informed about their cars while buyers in the dark.
Asymmetric information and insurance. 1. Adverse selection 2. Different menus as a means to protect against adverse selection.
Information via signalling and signposts: 1. the surgeon who advertises. 2. Cold War signals 3. the country that devalues 4. stockholders accept a buyout with low premium.
A last question: Consumer Error: Is it possible for us as consumers to be wrong about our preferences or about our ways of combining goods. That is, can we be misinformed about our own preferences?