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Credit Risk of Traded Products under Basel II HEC Conference Montreal April 13, 2007. Niall Whelan, Director Research & Model Risk Management Scotiabank. The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of Scotiabank. Introduction and Terms.
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Credit Risk of Traded Products under Basel II HEC ConferenceMontrealApril 13, 2007 Niall Whelan, DirectorResearch & Model Risk Management Scotiabank The views expressed here are those of the author and not necessarily those of Scotiabank.
Introduction and Terms • Three components of regulatory capital from trading activities: • Credit Risk • Market Risk • Operational Risk • Credit Risk: Counterparties may default, leading to losses • Market Risk: Market conditions may be adverse, leading to losses in the trading portfolio • Operational Risk: Fraud, terrorism, pandemics, weather disasters etc. may occur, leading to losses to physical or other assets
Layout of Talk • Focus: • Credit risk with some discussion of market risk • Excluding: operational risk • Agenda/Topics: • The need for a special treatment • History of regulatory capital and traded products • pre-Basel • Basel I • Basel II • Overview of Basel II requirements • 5 chapters of Trading Book document • Implementation • “use test” and connections to other risk measures • Pillar 1, 2 and 3 issues
Credit Risk of Trading Portfolios • Trading activities are significant businesses for most large banks: • OTC derivatives • repo and reverse-repo transactions • security lending and borrowing • They can all generate losses when counterparties default and should therefore be capitalised... • HOWEVER • ... we do not generally know how much our exposure will be if and when the counterparty defaults: • values of traded products are intrinsically uncertain • we do not know what the portfolio of transactions will be when default occurs
Market Risk of Trading Portfolios • Derivatives portfolios are marked-to-market on a daily basis • Typically well hedged but not perfectly so • There is some residual net open position • This net open position can deteriorate in value under adverse market conditions • This effect is captured by Value-at-Risk (VaR) capital provisions. Based on extreme movement over 10 days of exposure • No banking book equivalent • Illiquid positions may require special treatment • Idiosyncratic risk factors may require special treatment
History of Regulatory Treatment for Capital • Pre-Basel • There was no international consensus on setting of capital • Regulators did not adhere to rigid capital ratios • relied on judgment of risk by the banks and themselves • echoed in current "principle-based" approach • Capital ratios fell through time • 1840 ratio was about 50% • deposit insurance, access to central bank funds acted to buffer bank risk • 1940 ratio was about 6-8% • Huge bank failures in the US during the Depression lead to much more active regulatory environment • 1973 collapse of Bretton Woods coincided with emergence of a significant Capital Markets industry to create a more dynamic and volatile FX and interest rate trading environment • 1980's: Latin American debt crisis as well as the S&L crisis in the US led to more concern about the robustness of the banking industry. The US brought in a series of ever tightening capital requirements • 1988: the Basel I accord...
Traded Products under Basel I What is the exposure associated with an OTC contract? OTC credit risk is the mark-to-market plus notional times the following add-on factor: • Consider: • is silver really so different from gold? • what about a cross-currency equity derivative? • is a 1½ year swap really identical to a 4½ year swap? • etc... only reverse repos attract credit risk capital (not repos), due to collateral only securities lending attracts capital (not securities borrowing), due to collateral
Basel I cont... Further multiply by the counterparty riskfactor weight Capital is then 8% of the product • Consider: • shouldn't the perceived risk vary with economic conditions? • are all OECD banks of equal credit risk? • is a CCC corporate really identical to a AA corporate? • etc...
Netting under Basel I • Netting is the legal ability to settle on the net value of a portfolio of derivatives upon default by one counterparty (vs. deal by deal) • Potential to lessen the exposure at default • First recognised as an amendment in 1995 A' = 0.4*A + 0.6*NGR*A A is the add-on ignoring netting NGR =(net current replacement cost) / (gross replacement cost) • Consider: • this is very ad-hoc • what about netting with collateral? • deeply out-of-the money portfolios still attract significant capital • not "coherent"/sub-additive
Market Risk Capital under Basel I • In 1996 Basel outlined capital treatment of market risk (VaR). • Based on the 99'th percentile of market loss over a 10 day horizon, multiplied by 3 • Banks have wide latitude in deciding how this is determined • Regulatory focus on self-consistency, back-testing, internal controls and validation • The result is a key internal risk measure that is regularly reported in financial statements • “Prototype” for internal modelling approach now embedded in Basel II • Separate charge for "specific risk" for derivatives subject to idiosyncratic entity-specific risk (equity derivatives, credit derivatives etc.)
Basel II • The main document: • International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, June 2004 A document specific to trading activities was published in April 2005 Two months of industry consultation led to... • The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects, July 2005 • The treatment of counterparty credit risk and cross-product netting • The treatment of double default • The short-term maturity adjustment in the IRB approach • Improvements to the current trading book regime • A capital treatment for failed trades and non-DvP transactions
Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel II • Consider: • 1-e-50 = 1-10-22 is a built-in underflow
Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel II cont… • Risk-weighted assets = 12.5*Capital • RWA now a derived quantity, not fundamental to the capital calculation • PD and LGD are common to other asset classes • Trading book requirement is the determination of EAD and of M
Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel II continued... • Determination of EAD and M for OTC: Three methods • Current exposure method (essentially Basel I augmented for credit derivatives) • Standardized method (I am not aware of any bank using this) • Internal (EPE) method • Determination of EAD and M for repo-style: Three methods • Standardised haircuts • Adapted VaR • Internal (EPE) method
Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel II continued... • EPE method. Use an internal model to estimate expected exposures over a one year time horizon Determine "running maximum" through time (roll-over risk) Average of the running maximum times 1.4 is EAD M is determined by a similar manipulation of the exposure profile Factor of 1.4 is regulatory; it can be as small as 1.2
Counterparty Credit Risk under Basel II continued... • Other considerations: • Can be done at the level of a netting set • Collateral treated as a negative offsetting position • Under certain conditions can net OTC and repo-style • Margin agreements effectively cap the potential exposure • Based on expected exposure, not 99.9’th percentile • Explains need for the scaling by 1.4 • Can impose one’s own scaling of: • Subject to a floor of 1.2 • Industry studies indicate 1.1 to 1.2 is typical • Internal economic capital is an explicit component of the calibration • We find about 20-30% relief relative to CEM
The treatment of double default • Credit derivatives that are hedging loan exposures do not attract counterparty capital • They are treated the same as a credit guarantee • Under certain conditions guarantees or credit derivatives can attract "double default treatment" • Reflects the probability that both the counterparty and the guarantor must default to experience an exposure. Consider: This can actually increase capital if Equation "should" be
The short-term maturity adjustment in the IRB approach • Technical point. • By default M is floored at unity but in some cases it can be less than one • Repo-style transactions with daily remargining are the most important application
Improvements to the current trading book regime • Not an extensive overhaul, implying an overall regulatory and industry comfort with market risk under Basel I • Changes include: • Greater oversight about what can be held in trading books • Greater concern by regulators about validity of the 10-day unwind period in VaR for illiquid positions • More rigorous validation and stress testing standards • Lessening of specific risk charge multiplier from 4 to 3 • Need to capture “event risk” and “incremental default risk” in specific risk • Still somewhat contentious • These are based on 99.9’th percentile of loss over one year • Difficult to combine with market VaR defined as a multiple of 99’th over 10 days
A capital treatment for failed trades and non-DvP transactions • Meant to plug a small hole in Basel I: how to treat trades which have failed to settle • DvP - treat as a forward contract • non-DvP - treat as a loan • Typically so immaterial that applying a conservative factor is the best approach
Use Test • Related market risk measures • Desk and business-level market VaR • Related credit risk measures • Economic Capital • Credit Line Utilisation • Credit loss provisions (expected losses) • Principle is that the internal model for these measures should be broadly in line (not necessarily identical) to what is done for Basel • Systems/infrastructure • Data
Pillars 1, 2 & 3 • We have focused mostly on Pillar 1 – the determination of capital • Significant Pillar 2 requirements – supervisory oversight. This includes disclosure to regulators, back-testing, stress-testing, use-test and other evidence that the measures are embedded within a robust risk framework • Important consideration for regulators in light of the "principle-based" approach • Connection to Economic Capital particularly important • Pillar 3 requirements – public disclosure. This is a relatively light component for the Trading Book
Bank Experiences • A major improvement. Principle-based/internal modelling approach makes sense • Avoid “regulatory arbitrage” • More granular and dynamic reflection of credit and market risk • Use test requirements • Little time for consultation between first and second drafts of Trading Book document • Regulators and Basel Committee were receptive to industry feedback • Still some aspects of the accord that are somewhat contentious • Tendency for Trading Activities to be an "after thought" • Basel guidelines came later • Gap analysis from OSFI came later and was not paragraph-by-paragraph • Internally • A major piece of work involving multiple departments across the bank • A valuable tool to improve banks’ internal processes • Data flows and system information • Consistency of risk assessment across business lines • Improvement and rationalisation of internal risk measures • VaR • Economic Capital • Loss provisions • Credit line utilisation