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The Role of Ownership in Public Conservation Decisions. Amy Ando University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Michael Getzner University of Klagenfurt. Structure of the presentation. Conservation policies - determinants of conservation decisions Wetlands in Austria Empirical analysis
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The Role of Ownership in Public Conservation Decisions Amy Ando University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Michael GetznerUniversity of Klagenfurt
Structure of the presentation • Conservation policies - determinants of conservation decisions • Wetlands in Austria • Empirical analysis • Conclusions
Conservation decisions • Increasing efforts to conserve/protect biodiversity • e.g. Natura 2000 in Europe, Wetlands Reserve Program in US, US Endangered Species Act • Conservation is costly (opportunity cost of land use) - strategic reserve site selection can do much to reduce cost (Ando et al. (1998), Wu and Boggess (1999)
Site selection • Rationality of conservation decisions • ecology • economics • political economy (interest groups, ownership) • Are wetland reserves networks biased toward publicly owned lands? • This could be cost-ineffective.
Scientific and political determinants • Conservation policy decisions • are based in part on scientific considerations • but political forces matter as well • Ando (1999), Weitzman and Metrick (1997), Getzner (2002)
Objective function of policy makers • What objective function are policy makers maximizing? • Stigler (1972), Peltzman (1976) • Could be: • acreage maximization • ideological aims (environmental policy) • maximization of votes
Political economy of conservation • Political pressure from interest groups may influence policy choices • Stigler, Peltzman, Becker (1983) • users (companies, agriculture, recreation) and owners of land • other interest groups such as environmental groups • political (partisan) competition
Land owners • With compensation for "takings", political pressure is reduced, but asymmetric information makes it difficult to induce efficient landowner behavior (Innes, Polasky, and Tschirhart (1998)).
Hypotheses: Conservation decisions ... • ... Influenced by: • Science: ecological/physical/geographical factors • Acreage maximization (minimization?) • Ownership (private land is less likely to be protected?) • Political pressure • Use value of the land - conflicts
Austrian wetlands: data Source: Steiner, 2001
Wetlands data base • 2,997 wetlands, total of 26,404 hectares • 15% are internationally significant • 60% are privately owned • 18% have some kind of protection • 43% are in or near natural state • 18% are not threatened • Most common threats are pasture (25%) and drainage (18%)
Acidity Trophic factor
Empirical analysis of conservation decisions • Logit analysis of the likelihood that a wetland is protected by provincial, national or international rules (n=2,997) • Ordered probit analysis of the conservation status of wetlands that are protected, ranked with increasing stringency (5=national park, 4=state park, 3=protected landscape, 2= partially protected landscape, 1=natural monument; n=539)
Conclusions I • Ecological considerations matter: • "Important", ecologically useful, and easily threatened wetlands are more likely to be protected, and are protected more stringently
Conclusions II • Economic/political factors matter • Protection is more likely if wetland is not in conflict with economic activity • Protection is less stringent if agricultural interest groups are likely to be involved - likely to be political
Conclusions III • Ownership matters • Protection is most likely and strict if federally owned • Protection of private land is actually more likely if owned by a single large entity than by many small owners - does concentration of ownership facilitate bargaining over compensation, reduce asymmetric information problem?
Good news and bad news • This is not just "acreage maximization" • There is some desirable incorporation of opportunity costs into site-selection decisions • Some of the bias against protecting private land is likely to be cost-ineffective, driven by politics and asymmetric information.