Reliabilism and virtue epistemology

1. Reliabilism and virtue epistemology Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

2. Reliabilism • You know that p if • p is true; • You believe that p; and • Your belief is caused by a reliable cognitive process. • A reliable cognitive process is just one that produces a high percentage of true beliefs • E.g. perception, memory and testimony • (A false belief caused by a reliable process is not knowledge.)

3. An advantage • Young children and animals have knowledge. • Young children and animals don’t have a sophisticated rational psychology that provides justifications for their beliefs. • So knowledge is not justified true belief. • Young children and animals do have reliable cognitive processes, though. • Knowledge is reliable true belief.

4. Objection • A belief can be true and reliable but not be knowledge • Henry in Barn County: Henry believes ‘there’s a barn’ when looking at the only real barn in a countryside full of barn facades, but he also believes ‘there’s a barn’ when looking at the barn facades. • The problem is Henry can’t tell the difference between real barns and barn facades.

5. Improved reliabilism • You know that p if • pis true; • You believe that p; • Your belief that p is caused by a reliable cognitive process; and • You are able to discriminate between ‘relevant possibilities’ in the actual situation.

6. Tracking the truth • A different definition of ‘reliable cognitive process’ is one that ‘tracks’ the truth. • Nozick: you know that p if • p is true; • You believe that p; • In the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were not true, then you would not believe that p; and • In the situation you are in, or a similar situation, if p were true, then you would believe that p.

7. Tracking the truth • In normal cases, Henry knows whether or not he is looking at a barn • If it wasn’t a barn, he wouldn’t believe that it is. • In Barn County, Henry doesn’t know • Because he would believe something is a barn when it isn’t. • Reliability doesn’t mean you wouldn’t be mistaken in any situation, just in ones likely to come up.

8. Brains in vats • I know I have two hands. • But imagine: • I am a brain in a vat, and all my perceptual experiences are being fed to me by a supercomputer (The Matrix) or a demon (Descartes). • Do I know (now) that I am not a brain in a vat? • No, because if I were, I would believe that I am not.

9. The principle of closure • The principle: if I know the premises, I know the conclusion of a valid deduction. • A valid deduction: • I have two hands • If I have two hands, then I am not a brain in a vat • Therefore, I am not a brain in a vat. • Reliabilism says that I know the premises, but I don’t know the conclusion! • But if you accept the principle, and you accept that you don’t know you are a brain in a vat, you must accept scepticism – you don’t know the premises either.

10. Virtue epistemology • Intellectual virtue: an intellectual skill or ability or trait that contributes to getting to the truth. • You know that p if • p is true; • You believe that p; and • Your true belief is a result of you exercising your intellectual virtues. • The fact that you have a true belief is a ‘cognitive achievement’ for which you deserve ‘credit’.

11. The three As • Sosa: suppose an archer shoots an arrow at a target • Accuracy: did the arrow hit the target? • Adroitness: was the arrow shot well? Was the shot competent? • Aptness: did the arrow hit the target because it was shot well? • A shot can be adroit without being accurate; it can even be accurate and adroit without being apt, e.g. luck (the wind blows the arrow off target and then on again).

12. Apt belief • Knowledge is apt belief: • Accuracy: is the belief true? • Adroitness: is the way that the person formed the belief an exercise of their intellectual virtues? • Aptness: is the belief true because the person used their intellectual virtues in forming it? • Henry: normally, Henry knows ‘there’s a barn’ because he sees and recognises it. In Barn County, his belief isn’t apt • Either because Henry can’t recognise barns – he doesn’t have the right intellectual virtues (abilities) • Or when his belief is right, it isn’t because he has exercised his virtues, but because of luck.