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Web Wallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions. Min Wu, Robert C. Miller and Greg Little Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2006 ) Lee Hyung Kyu 2008. 10. 28. Contents. Introduction Related Work Web Wallet Design Principles User Interface Evaluation
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WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions Min Wu, Robert C. Miller and Greg Little Symposium On Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2006) LeeHyung Kyu 2008. 10. 28
Contents • Introduction • Related Work • Web Wallet • Design Principles • User Interface • Evaluation • Conclusion • Discussion WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Introduction (1/3) • Phishing • Stealconsumers’ personal identity data and financial account credentials [APWG] • Social engineering & Technical subterfuge • Growing Phishing [APWG, Dec. 2005] • 15244 unique phishing attacks • 7197 unique phishing sites • 121 legitimate brands being hijacked cf. [APWG, Dec. 2007] 25683 unique phishing attacks 25328 unique phishing sites 144 legitimate brands being hijacked White-List Approach with Anti-Phishing Web Crawler
Introduction (2/3) • Problems • Appearance • Users tend to decide site identity • Opaque Data To Web Browser • Sensitive or not? • Security Indicator • Located in a Peripheral area WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Introduction (3/3) • Problems • Security is rarely a user’s primary goal! • Users focus on their current task • Sloppy but Common web practices • IP addresses instead of hostnames • Domain names that are totally different from their brand names • Unprotected login pages • Do not suggest good Alternatives • Simple warnings WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Related Work (1/2) • Dynamic Security Skins [R. Dhamija et al., “The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins”(SOUPS’05)] • Visual Difference • Use a randomly generated visual hash • Limitations • Burden on users • To notice the visual difference WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Related Work (2/2) • SpoofGuard [N. Chou et al., “Client-side defense against web-based identity theft”(NDSS’04)] • Heuristics • Calculate Spoof Index with several features • Warn users when a certain page has a high probability of being a spoof • Limitations • High False Positive Rate • Many Unnecessary Warnings – can be ignored by users WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : Design Principles (1/2) • Get the User’s Intention • The User Interface • Bridge the gap between the user’s mental model and the system model(browser) • Help the users transfer their real intention to the browser • Submitting Data • Data type • Sensitive or Not? • Data recipient • Which site? • Dedicated Interface for sensitive information submission • Check to see if the current site is good enough WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : Design Principles (2/2) • Integrate Security into the Workflow • Disable the sensitive input fields in the web forms • Make itself the only way to input sensitive data • Not depend on users remembering to use it • Incorporate security questions by helping users achieve their goals instead of stopping them • Not use a generic warning • “Are you sure?” • Show a user a list of sites and choose WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : User Interface (1/5) • Form Annotation • Use Naïve Bayesian classifier and Hidden Markov Model • Search the login forms Disable them • Provide Login Card • Security Key • Press F2 Key • Browse the site simply • Become habitual WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : User Interface (2/5) • Browser Sidebar • Card Presentation • Card Folder • Encrypted by master password • Stored Card • If it matches Web page Request, WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : User Interface (3/5) • Browser Sidebar • New Login Card • If it doesn’t match Web Page Request, • Show Domain Name & Site Description • “Save Card” checkbox WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : User Interface (4/5) • Confirmation Interface • Untrusted & Not login before WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Web Wallet : User Interface (5/5) • Negative Visual Feedback • Prevent from Fake Web Wallet Attack • Differentiate the Web interface from the Local interface WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Evaluation (1/4) • Simulated Attacks • Normal attack • Undetected-form attack • Fail to detect Login form • Negative Visual Feedback • Online-keyboard attack • Bypass the Zooming character • Flying Icon • Fake-wallet attack • Displayed by web site • Negative Visual Feedback • Fake-suggestion attack • Choose the Phishing site from the list WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Evaluation (2/4) • User study • 21 Subjects (14 / 7) • Role as John Smith’s Assistant • Spoof rate • The fraction of simulated attacks that successfully obtain his information WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Evaluation (3/4) • First Interface • Problems • Not include the current site • Type directly in the web form despite warnings WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Evaluation (4/4) • Modified Interface • Improvements • Add the current site to the site list • Always display a login card WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Conclusion • Web Wallet • Provide Dedicated Interface for Sensitive Information • Spoof rate of Normal attacks from 63% to 7% • Make itself an integrated part of the user’s workflow • The warning from the Web Wallet is no longer a weak signal • Encourages the user to choose her intended site using the Site List WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Discussion • Pros. • Improve the Existing Anti-phishing Tool • Lower Spoof rate • Eliminate Unnecessary Warning • Lower the burden on Users • Trial and Error • Cons. • Undetected-form attack & Fake-wallet attack • Negative Visual Feedback is Ineffective • Image Recognition • Press F2 key • What kind of attacks are there in 7%? WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions
Q & A WebWallet: Preventing Phishing Attacks by Revealing User Intentions