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SOT: Secure Overlay Tree for Application Layer Multicast

SOT: Secure Overlay Tree for Application Layer Multicast. Ken Yiu HKUST. Outline. Introduction Related Work Issues on ALM security Two basic approaches Secure Overlay Tree (SOT) Simulation & Results Conclusion. Introduction. Lack of widely deployed multicast-capable network

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SOT: Secure Overlay Tree for Application Layer Multicast

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  1. SOT: Secure Overlay Tree for Application Layer Multicast Ken Yiu HKUST

  2. Outline • Introduction • Related Work • Issues on ALM security • Two basic approaches • Secure Overlay Tree (SOT) • Simulation & Results • Conclusion

  3. Introduction • Lack of widely deployed multicast-capable network • Application Layer Multicast (ALM) • No data confidentiality provided in ALM • Applications that require secure multicast cannot apply ALM directly • SOT – a simple and efficient approach to provide data confidentiality

  4. Introduction : Multicast Security • Multicast data is encrypted by a shared symmetric key • Forward Secrecy : user cannot decrypt future multicast data after he leaves • Backward Secrecy : user cannot decrypt past multicast data before he joins • Change keys (re-key) whenever there is a membership change s a e b d c

  5. Related Work • Security on IP multicast: • Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) • Iolus • Assume multicast-capable network (IGMP, DVRMP, CBT, PIM-DM, etc.) • Multicasting one re-key message takes only one communication overhead

  6. Related Work : LKH Group key kg • Each user holds the keys on the path from its user key to the group key • Re-key : change all keys on the path • Re-key message overhead (multicast): • O(2 logk N) for join • O(k logk N) for leave Key-encryption key (KEK) k0 k1 User key k00 k01 k10 k11 k000 k001 k010 k011 k100 k101 k110 k111 u0 u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 Re-key when u2 joins: Ek’010[k’01], Ek01[k’01], Ek0[k’0], Ek’01[k’0], Ek’0[k’g], Ekg[k’g] Re-key when u6 leaves: Ek111[k’11], Ek10[k’1], Ek’11[k’1], Ek0[k’g], Ek’1[k’g]

  7. Related Work : Iolus • Multicast group is divided into subgroups (each governed by a GSA and has its own subgroup key) • Re-encryption required at GSIs • Join/Leave only affects one subgroup (change subgroup key only) • GSAs (special entities) are chosen a priori and statically configured • No size bound on subgroups GSI GSI GSC GSI GSI GSI Decryption and re-encryption required GSC : Group Security Controller GSI : Group Security Intermediary

  8. Issues on ALM security • Multicast is accomplished by unicast connections between peers • O(N) for each multicast re-key message • O(N logk N) for each re-keying in LKH • No GSAs in ALM • Can their functionalities be moved to peers? • How about large subgroups? • Minimizing average nodal processing overhead on peers for data confidentiality

  9. Two basic approaches Re-encryption: EBC[DAB[k]] • Host-to-host encryption • Large re-encryption overhead • Whole group encryption • Large re-keying overhead A D Ek[data]||EAB[k] Ek[data]||ECD[k] B C Ek[data]||EBC[k] k : random key generated by source XY : secret key shared by X and Y A D EAB[g’] ECD[g’] Eg[data] EBC[g’] B Eg[data] C Eg[data] Re-keying: EBC[DAB[g’]] g : group key shared by all users

  10. Secure Overlay Tree (SOT) • Clustering peers into subgroups • “host-to-host” between clusters • “whole group” within clusters • Balance two kinds of overhead and obtain the minimum total overhead by choosing appropriate optimal cluster size A B Source Ingress f Ek[data]||EB[k] b a h Ek[data]||Ede[k] e d Ek[data]||EA[k] c g Egress

  11. SOT (cont’d) • Split/Merge mechanism is used to maintain cluster size within the bound (m/2 < c < 2m) • Join/Leave only affects one cluster instead of the whole group • Leaders are elected from each cluster to coordinate joining, merging and splitting • Apply Internet coordinate system like GNP to obtain coordinates for clustering purpose • SOT is a framework, existing ALM protocols can be used for implementation

  12. SOT – architecture S I L E

  13. Simulation • Setup • GT-ITM TS topology : 1024 routers • Member Join: Poisson process (avg. rate λ) • Holding Time: Exponential (mean T sec.) • Random chosen data source (constant data rate R bps)

  14. Simulation (cont’d) • Typical applications:

  15. Results – optimal cluster size

  16. Results – avg. nodal processing overhead

  17. Results – relative delay penalty

  18. Results – physical link stress

  19. Conclusion • Security schemes for IP multicast are not suitable for ALM • SOT provides data confidentiality • Based on clustering of peers • Optimal cluster size • Lower nodal processing overhead • Comparable network performance

  20. Thank You !!

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