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They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices

They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices. Introduction. Implantable Medical Devices ( IMDs ) are vulnerable to exploitation (last paper) Unauthorized data retrieval Malicious commands Millions of IMDs are currently deployed This is a big problem.

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They Can Hear Your Heartbeats: Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices

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  1. They Can Hear Your Heartbeats:Non-Invasive Security for Implantable Medical Devices

  2. Introduction • Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are vulnerable to exploitation (last paper) • Unauthorized data retrieval • Malicious commands • Millions of IMDs are currently deployed • This is a big problem

  3. Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) • Surgically Implanted into a patient’s body • Facilitates Medical Treatment • i.e. pacemakers, defibrillators, insulin pumps. • Communicates Wirelessly • Sends vital sign information • Receives commands • Battery Powered http://wwwp.medtronic.com/newsroom/content/1150828881634.low_resolution.jpg

  4. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/WIMD.png

  5. More IMD Properties • Does not transmit unless… • It is responding to an IMD programmer • It detects a life-threatening condition • Does not share channels with other IMDs

  6. IMD Programmer • Wirelessly configure IMDs • query IMD for data • send commands to IMD • Requires no credentials • Good: settings can be changed in an emergency without hassle • Bad: anyone can use it • Communicates Wirelessly • Sends vital sign information • Receives commands http://henkboxma.com/casestudy/2090.gif

  7. Commands Confidential Patient data

  8. Unauthorized Commands Confidential Patient data

  9. Problems with using crypto • Inalterability • IMDs last for up to 10 years • IMD replacement requires surgery • IMD hardware is inadequate • Safety • Immediate access • False negatives • Maintainability • Bugs/Recalls

  10. Solution: The Shield • Does not alter IMD • Protects against Passive and Active Adversaries • Does not inconvenience patient • Does not reduce safety of IMD

  11. The shield passes legitimate Commands along to the IMD Encrypted Channels

  12. The shield blocks unauthorized commands

  13. Assumptions • IMDs and Programmers are honest • The shield is a wearable device such as a necklace • There is a secure channel between IMD and the programmer

  14. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/IMDShield.pnghttp://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/IMDShield.png

  15. Jamming • Jams Eavesdroppers during IMDs transmissions • Does this only when it knows the IMD will transmit • Jams the IMD during programmer transmissions • If a signal is detected while the shield is transmitting, it automatically starts jamming

  16. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/FULLDUPLEX.pnghttp://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/FULLDUPLEX.png

  17. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/ResultsAC1.pnghttp://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/ResultsAC1.png

  18. http://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/ResultsAC2.pnghttp://groups.csail.mit.edu/netmit/IMDShield/images/ResultsAC2.png

  19. The End.

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