Operational Aspects of Bunker CDR 2.0 - A Comprehensive Overview

1. Operational aspects Bunker CDR 2.0 Iain Sutton On behalf of the NSS project team

2. Game plan • Intro • Stakeholders & Systems • Operational environment • Operational Strategy • Conventional safety • Logistics • Summary

3. The Bunkeran important ‘node’ Interdependencies Bi-directional Bunker is at once an ‘operational context’ and system within broader context … • NSS • Bunker system • Instrument systems • Target • NBPI • LSS / NBW • Facility • Crane • Utilities

4. Component activationa long term issue … Severely limited access duration Access Prohibited ? Bunker access regime Activation Limited access duration Unlimited access duration Beam power Integrated beam Beam days Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 .

5. The prime objectiveDelivering science Obsolete but representative provisional schedule >200 days Science 2 long shutdowns 30-50days Many short shut downs < 3days ESS Operating Schedule Oliver Kirstein - November 2016 - ESS Operations Cost Review

6. ESS unique source,setting unique boundary conditions. 2 -3 times more mechanical devices on a ‘long pulse instrument’ than at existing types 60-70% of all ‘mechanical’ components on instruments are within bunker volume

7. Installed systemsInside / Outside / Feed through Target • 16 Beam extraction systems • 16 Light shutter • 42 Beam windows • Helium & Water cooling Instruments • Choppers 98 axis • Optics 300 m • Shutters 30 • Monitors 30 Service supplies • Vacuum 350m • Fluids 520m • Cables 5-10 km

8. Interventions

9. Operational Environment Zoning

10. Conditions in the Bunker (beam off)Component Activation Three contributions • Bunker shielding ESS 0416081 • Instrument components ESS 0087853 • Target systems In progress ~40microSv/h (on contact) ~5-10microSv/h (on contact) <10microSv/h (on contact)

11. Accessibility during shutdown- front of bunker Assumptions Gamma shutters present Aluminum guide housings Number of sources (>0.5) ~50 Source ‘density’ >3 per m2 Exposure regime ‘in-contact’ Delay for personnel access @Roof level ~ 48-72hr hotspot removal @Floor level > 7days Highly restricted (Hotspot removal) Tungsten Gamma source distribution 3days after shutdown (@contact)

12. Accessibility during shutdown- rear of bunker Assumptions Gamma shutters present Aluminum guide housings Number of sources 20-40 Source ‘density 0.5 per m2 Exposure regime ‘whole body @ 30cm’ Delay for personnel access @Roof level ~ 48hs hotspot removal or inspection @Floor level > 72hrs most areas with precaution* Tungsten Gamma source distribution 72hrs after shutdown (@contact)

13. Access strategyDivide and … protect R12 Access control fence Yellow >25 < 2500 microSv/h Restricted controlled Blue < 25 microSv/h Unrestricted controlled Entry point through roof - with access control

14. OPERATIONAL STRATEGY Bunker CDR 2.0

15. InterventionsIB Minor Type of activities • Maintenance & Inspection • Duration: hours > days Principal activities Periodicity Instrument • Inspection 2yr • Maintenance 2 / 5yrs Target • Inspection (tbc) Utilities • Inspection 5yr Additional • Hot spot removal as req Operations per year 20-40

16. INTERVENTIONSIB - MINOR Inspection & Maintenance

17. Access Short shutdown Short shutdown 3-5d • Default mode of access • From above • Remote N

18. Access Short shutdown rear II • Exceptional work mode • Access from above • Hot spot mitigation • Floor • Probably not feasible once operating at moderate or high power N

19. Design constraints - all systems Principal constraints Bunker • Modular roof • Removable roof beams • Frame stability • Materials (activation) Utilities • Utilities routed around or removable Instruments • Vertical extraction • Restricted Materials (activation) • RH compatible Target • Materials (activation

20. Utilities routing USE 4 • Iain slide USE 3 USE 2 ENTRY 1 • Scope • Within shielding ‘bunker’ from Point of entry to Point of use • Bunker entry • Technical feed through • Run • Point of use connection

21. ‘Quick’ access- Short shutdown R6-R9 (Access ‘hole’) Number of blocks/lifts 9/18 Shielding mass 72t Handling time 4 – 6 hr R6-R11.5 Number of blocks/lifts 23/46 Shielding mass 190t Handling time 10-12hr

22. INTERVENTIONSI A - MAJOR Installation & Overhaul

23. InterventionsIA Major Type of activities • Installation / Overhaul • Duration: weeks > months Principal activities Periodicity Instrument • Upgrade 10yr • Installation/Replacement 15yrs Target • Beamport activation 10yr • NBEX renewal 15yr Operations per year 1,5-3

24. Access Long shutdown / Part I Cool down period • Cool down 3-5 days • Shielding removal 2 days • Hot spot removal • Local shielding placement Shielding removal Hot spot mitigation N

25. Access Long shutdown Floor level Access N

26. ‘Full access’ Long instrument- long shutdown R6-R28 Number of blocks/lifts 52/104 Shielding mass 750t Handling time 24-30 hrs Frame beam removed ~11

27. Intervention MajorDesign constraints - all systems Principal constraints Bunker • Modular roof • Removable roof beams • Frame Stability Utilities • Utilities routed around or removable Instruments • Vertical extraction • Restricted Materials • RH compatible

28. INTERVENTIONSII - BREAKDOWN Diagnostics & running Repair

29. InterventionsIB Minor Type of activities • Maintenance & Inspection • Duration: hours > days Principal activities Periodicity Beam-port systems ? Neutron chopper 6 month Vacuum leak Optics 2 month Instrument shutter / jaws 2 month Motion control 3 month Hotspot Removal 3 per cycle Operations per year 20???

30. Access Short shutdown Short shutdown 3-5d • Default mode of access • From above • Remote N

31. Design constraints - all systems Principal constraints Bunker • Modular roof • Removable roof beams • Frame stability Utilities • Utilities routed around or removable Instruments • Vertical extraction • Restricted Materials • RH compatible As per 1B Minor interventions Recommendation to apply this also to critical and unreliable systems

32. Conventional safetyFire ! Fire load Bunker Instrument systems • Cables ~16km • 100g plastic per m (1600kg combustible) • Borated plastic shielding ~3000kg • 20% plastic by weight (600kg combustible) Fire detection Yes Fire suppression Decision is still out but current design is expected to compatible with most fire suppression systems The real challenge will be to retain the maintainability of our systems

33. Conventional safetyHazards • Electrical • ODH • Access Physical division of space within bunker • @R11.5 • Long sector between beamlines

34. LogisticsImplicit requirement on cranes (& instruments) Experimental Hall crane coverage area Cranes crossover (load interchange) area Monolith crane coverage area

35. Logistics 2,3m 3,6m free height 6,7m from TCS 1,3m 3,1m 1.8m N Principal requirement Free height below hook > 3m

36. Take away

37. Summing up The current bunker design is compatible with our current understanding of operating and maintaining instrument and target systems and utilities. Additional work on operational strategies to extract the maximum value from what we have.

38. Thank you for your attention ! NSS Projects Division Instrument teams

39. NBEX locations and transport IET transport ACF docking IET handover on bunker roof from bunker crane to D01/D03 crane Exchange route NBPI/NBPP Vertical handling test stand Horizontal handling test stand LSC transport

40. ESS General Safety Objectives (GSO) Draft version; ESS-0000004 rev 6 Draft In black defined by SSM, and in blue established by ESS.

41. Workers - GSO guideline proposal Nota : 1/ Deterministiceffects: relationship betweeneffectsseverity and dosereceived - thresholdexistence: from 100 mSv (ICRP 103) 2/ Stochasticeffects: no relationship betweendose and effectsseveritybut relationship betweendose and likelihoodofoccurenceofeffects – no evidenceofthresholdexistence so useof the precautionaryprinciple (evenif no excesof cancer foundbelow 100 mSv) – ICRP 103 : assuminglinearresponse at lowdoses, the combineddetrimentdue to exces cancer and heritableeffects is around 5% per Sv (cancer : 5.5.10-2 Sv-1 for public and 4.1.10-2 Sv-1 for adult workers/heritableeffects: 0.2.10-2 Sv-1 and 0.1.10-2 Sv-1) 3/ Euratom 2013/56: Emergencyoccupational exposure 100 mSv (500 mSv in exceptional situations)

42. Crane route Bunker crane Exchange zone Storage zone Hall crane

43. Which equipment should be equipped to be remote handled ? • Equipment which represents a significant hazard to personnel during interventions (due to activation). Eg >0.5mSv after 48hrs • PPS choppers • Shutters • Collimators 2. Equipment which requires regular intervention. • Overhaul or inspect period < 10 years. • Removed frequently i.e. is installed between R6 – R11.5 3. Equipment presenting a unacceptable risk of breakdown. Reliability < 98%

44. Zone I Remote handling Ready Solutions required for • Support structures • Fixations • Alignment & repeatability • Guidance in / out • Service connections Developed in collaboration with • More effort required • Vacuum vessel couplings

45. Which operations should be carried out using remote handling ? • Inspection • Visual inspection • Diagnostic testing • Leak testing • Maintenance tasks • Removal • Disconnection from beam-line components, • Unbolting from support • Disconnection from services • Extraction • Fitment of cask (if required) • (Re)Installation • (Re)insertion • Fixation to support • Repositioning or alignment (if required)  • Reconnection of services

46. Game planR6 – R11.5 Rear of bunker R11.5 – R27 (Zone Blue) • Access • Personal access • Restrictions • Removal of Hot spots • Placement of local shielding • Time limited duration • Installation activities • Installation constraints • All equipment access through the roof • Compatible with vertical insertion & extraction • Compatible with usual activities from roof level platform (& floor level) • Hotspot components shall be ‘RH’ compatible Local shielding N

47. Requirements on instruments • No personal access to floor level • All usual activities from roof level platform • Restrictions • Removal or shielding of Hot spots • Placement of local shielding • Exceptional access reserved for • Installation activities • Accidental situation • Installation constraints (all components) • Compatible with vertical insertion & extraction • Components shall be fully ‘RH’ compatible • Compatible with usual activities from roof level • Use of ‘long’ tools / remote alignment Front of bunker R6 – R11.5 (Yellow zone) N 6m ZONE I 11.5m

48. 2 Feed through • Section is adequate for all instruments • Built in ‘halfen’ rails for attachment • Good access for installation • Vacant space to be filled with bagged shielding as required. • Steel shot • Borated poly New neutronics underway but no significant changes expected

49. 3 Run Standard feed through Custom connection Standard section (4/2/1) Custom feeder Vertical Cable Chain Coupling • From feed through to POU it’s a Fixed installation • Route around access requirements • Exception for vacuum pipes (removable sections) Compact Support Rail

50. 4 Point ofUsegoing the last mile • R7 > Chopper • Flexible / Snorkel • R12-R7 Feeder • Removable • Accessable • Q. Couplings R12 > Rigid R12 Quick Coupling