PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS ARE SPECIAL.

1. MIND THE PHENO WHY DOES IT HURT SO PHENOMENALLY? PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS ARE SPECIAL. THE PROBLEM THE SOLUTION THE EXEMPLAR THEORY 3 Phenomenal Concepts 3.2 3.1 Block 2 1 The Explanatory Gap Experience Thesis Template Theory Papineau 3.3 1.1 Identity Statements 2.1 2.2 Phenomenal Concepts Are Perceptual Concepts Dualism of Concepts Conceptual Analysis Thesis 1.2 3.4 Perceptual Concepts 3.5 Sensory Templates Q1 Why does it hurt so good? 2.3 Recognitional Perceptually Derived Concepts 1.3 3.6 Phenomenal Concepts Intuition of Distinctness A1 Mary & Fred 3.7 2.4 Q2 Demonstrative Derived Phenomenal Concepts Antipathetic Fallacy A1.1 A2 Block & Stalnaker 3.8 2.5 Disquotational How do we type the phenomenal concept? T1. Explanatory Gap. The explanatory gap argument is meant to show that even if physicalism is correct it will always be unable to explain the relation of physical brain states with phenomenal mental states. As such it has to be offered either as a metaphysical argument as to why physicalism must be false (Kripke, 1980, Chalmers, 1996, Jackson 1982, 1986, 1993, Chalmers & Jackson 2001) or as an epistemological argument to the effect that the gap removes our ability to produce an explanatory reduction of the qualitative character of experience to physical mechanisms or properties (Levine, 1983, 1993). The explanatory gap is a problem for anyone claiming that brain states are identical with phenomenal mental states. If physicalism is true and phenomenal mental states just are brain states then it is suggested that we will still have the problem of explaining how it is that the brain states feel the way they do. Possible formulations of the gap: 1.1 Identity Statements: (Kripke, 1980) Water = H2O The Feeling of Pain (p) = A Specific Brain State (BSp) We can discover a posteriori that A = B and that this identity is necessary; however the apparent contingency of the identity must be explain. In the case of water, the explanation is that the reference of our pre-theoretic natural kind terms can be determined via an associated description of a causal role, meaning that once we know that H2O = Water it follows a priori that the colourless liquid in our lakes and oceans is H2O. However, with the cases of phenomenological mental states the causal role description of that state just is that feeling (pain is just the feeling of pain), thus once the identity is established, how can we explain away this sense of contingency? Q1 - Why does it hurt so good? A request for an explanation of how brain states feel a certain way. A1 - The question derives from our intuition of distinctness and not mind-body physicalism. What drives the intuition is the antipathetic fallacy (Papineau, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1998, 2002). A1.1 – The antipathetic fallacy. The fallacy is that when we contemplate phenomenal concepts we elicit some of the what-it-is-likeness, but not when we contemplate the physical states. 1.2 Conceptual analysis thesis - There can be no conceptual analysis of consciousness, which entails that the explanatory gap can never be closed (Jackson and Chalmers, 2001). Physicalist identity statements thought necessary a posteriori require further conceptual analysis. Regarding such identity statements, a priori conceptual analysis in terms of micro-physics is required to justify the necessity of the identity statement. Q2 – If Pain = A specific state then why is it that we cannot explain this identity in the same manner as H20 = Water? A2 - Block and Stalnaker’s (1999) Reply. 1) J & C - a priori conceptual analysis is required to close the gap. 2) Necessary a posteriori identity statements have two parts. a) H2O = waterish stuff. b) Water = waterish stuff (a priori). 3) Indexical Condition is needed for 2b, but 4) An indexical condition builds physicalism into micro-physics, rather what needs to be done is rule out multiple role fillers for 2b. 1.3 Jackson (1982 & 1986) Mary and Fred. CAN MARY COME OUT AND SEE? Mary does not have access to all the physical functional facts. Certain physical facts can only be acquired and possessed through actual experiences. Of course she does not know what red looks like – phenomenally or otherwise, because she has never seen red. Mary does not acquire knowledge that cannot be capture by physicalism, rather she gains a new concept that was not available to her in the isolation chamber. 2. Phenomenal Concepts. Phenomenal concepts are special concepts used for thinking about phenomenal experiences. Concepts of the phenomenal experience. 2.1 Conceptual Dualism. Rather than admitting a dualism of properties into our ontology we can solve the explanatory gap by positing a dualism of concepts. Mary has gained a phenomenal concept, whose acquisition can be explained in a purely physical manner. 2.3 The Experience Thesis - Possession condition for phenomenal concepts is having the relevant physical experience. “Experience thesis: S posses the (phenomenal) concept C of experience E only if S has actually had experience E”(Stoljar, 2005, p.3). 2.4 Recognitional Concepts – (Loar, 1997; Tye, 2003). The acquisition and possession conditions are determined by a recognitional ability. 2.5 Demonstrative Phenomenal Concepts – (Chalmers 2003, 2006). The acquisition and possession require tokening a demonstrative thought with the phenomenal experience as a proper part. “I am having THAT experience”“I am thinking about THAT experience” 2.5 - The quotation indexical account (Papineau, 2002) Papineau’s original theory (2002) used what he refers to as the “quotational-indexical” account of phenomenal concepts. According to which the phenomenal concept uses a current experience or an imagined recreation of an experience such that the phenomenal concept has the structure “the experience;____,” where the gap is literally filled with an experience. Thus, tokening a phenomenal concept requires tokening an experience that it is of or meant to represent. This aspect of the theory he aptly dubs the use mention aspect of phenomenal concepts. The experience is used in mentioning the phenomenal concept. 3 - The Exemplar theory of Phenomenal Concepts. Any theory of phenomenal concepts that determines the possession condition and content of the concept based on an exemplar experience. 3.1 – Block’s Phenomenal Concept. “A phenomenal concept is individuated with respect to fundamental uses that involve the actual occurrence of phenomenal properties. In these fundamental uses, an actually occurring experience is used to think about that very experience. No one could have a phenomenal concept if they could not in some way relate the concept to such fundamental uses in which the subject actually has an instance of the phenomenal” (Block, 2006). 3.2 The Template theory (Papineau, 2006) The current theory sees phenomenal concepts as a special case of perceptual concepts. Perceptual concepts are templates that allow us to keep track of information about a given entity. These templates are meant as a repository of information regarding their referent. 3.3 - Perceptual Concepts: “Perceptual concepts allow subjects to think about perceptible entities. Such concepts are formed when subjects initially perceive the relevant entities, and are re-activated by latter perceptual encounters. Subjects can also use these concepts to think imaginatively about those entities even when they are not present.” 3.5 - Stored Templates. Perceptual Concepts are sensory templates. a. Accumulates information about relevant referent. b. Guide subjects future interaction with referent. “We can think of the referential value of perceptual concept as that entity which it is its function to accumulate information about. Give or take a bit, this will depend on two factors: the origin of the perceptual concept, and the kind of information that gets attached to it.” 3.6 - Phenomenal Concepts: For phenomenal concepts the template is now being used to think about the experience and no longer about the object of the experience. It is not that there is a phenomenal template, but that the same sensory template is being used in a different way. Thus, it would seem that the content of a phenomenal concept is determined by the template. The extension of a phenomenal concept is a template. 3.8 - Typing phenomenal concepts. “The phenomenology of these states goes with the sensory template involved, independently of what information the subject attaches to these templates or is disposed to attach” Therefore, we cannot determine type and token based on type/token of the perceptual concept. Papineau embraces the fact that we cannot have the same particular phenomenal experience and thereby assumes that the phenomenal concept must always be of the experiential type. He does so by arguing that if the function of a template is to keep track of information regarding its referent then phenomenal concepts cannot be capturing information regarding particulars than can never re-occur, but only those aspects that can.

2. Benjamin D. Young City University of New York, Graduate Center byoung@gc.cuny.edu MENAL CONCEPT TOO SPECIAL.The only thing I fear is the phenomenal concept of fear itself. NONCONCEPTUAL CONCEPTS? WHAT ABOUT FRED? NONCONCEPTUAL PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS. 7 4 Constraining the Phenomenal Concept Four Possibilities for Determining the Type 6 7.1 5 Phenomenology is Determined by Nonconceptual Sensory State Thesis Similarity 6.1 7.2 Demonstrative Theory of Concepts Current Function 5.1 The Generality Constraint Innateness Theory of Object Individuation and Persistence 7.3 5.2 Publicity 6.2 Teleofunction Referent 5.3 6.3 7.5 Meets Intrapersonal Stability Stability 7.4 5.4 Deny Publicity Communicability Explains the existence of The Explanatory Gap 6.4 7.6 The Sensory State 4 - What about Fred? The aforementioned gap spackle might work for the thought experiments like Mary, but can the theory of phenomenal concepts with an experience thesis give us access to Fred’s phenomenal concept of red. If it cannot then the conclusion should be that we cannot share phenomenal concepts or there cannot be phenomenal conceptual content that is typed interpersonally. 5 - I fear the phenomenal concept of fear itself. It is my thesis that if the content of phenomenal concepts cannot be shared then it is hard to see how a further gap does not arise. My worry is not that the experience thesis generates a sufficient difference between the types of concepts such that we can fill the gap, but that accepting the experience thesis makes phenomenal concepts too different. Phenomenal concepts cannot adequately meet the following plausible constrains for theories of concepts. 5.1 Generality constraint - Constraint on concept possession (and hence on the ability to entertain genuine thoughts) to the effect that a subject has the concept C only if the set of thoughts the subject is able to entertain is closed under recombination of C with all other semantically and categorically appropriate concepts that the subject possesses. (Rick Grush & Pete Mandik) 5.2 - Publicity: Any account of concepts must be able to provide a theory of concept acquisition, possession and content individuation such that each person can share the type identical concept given a finite and non-identical experiential base. 5.3 - The stability problem. Interpersonal – the generation of sameness or similarity of conceptual content across individuals. Intrapersonal – requires that intrapersonal conceptual types be generates in a stable manner to range over multiple tokens of a finite experiential base. 5.4 - Communicability – how can we communicate given the privacy of the phenomenal conceptual content? Weak – understand a speaker is expressing a phenomenal concept and that you know which experiential property it refers to. Strong – ability to identify this experiential property via the same phenomenal concept and not via some material concept. (Papineau, 2002, p. 130) 6.1 - Four possible solutions on behalf of the exemplar theory are explored, but none are plausible. 6.1. Communality or similarity of experiences. Content similarity is not sufficient to generate sameness of content, because sameness of content requires identity of content and not mere similarities of features or inferences that only generate similarity of content. We need not worry about intrapersonal similarity of content and how this can generate a sameness or similarity of interpersonal communality so long as there is a shared object of referent that determines the conceptual content (Smith, Medin, and Rips (1984). 6.2 - Innateness:Functional role of the template. The functional role of the conceptual template is teleofunctionally determined via some of evolutionary process. Thus, the claim would be the content of our phenomenal concepts is selectively hardwired, which would generate intrapersonal and interpersonal stability. But, this solution will not work, because his theory requires the templates have a current function rather than a teleofunction. 6.3 - The referent itself. How can we type phenomenal concept tokens, such that we do not form an infinite number of types one for each person’s token phenomenal experience, as well as how can we communicate with a mere communality of phenomenal conceptual content. Given mere similarity of an unbounded number of types it seems impossible to generate some notion of how we can share these types of concepts, but at the very least in normal perceptual cases we might say that there is a shared object of referent and can say experiences that are caused by that ____. However, this might work for perceptual concepts, but in the case of phenomenal concepts where the template is the determiner of the referential value and thereby the content of the phenomenal concept, it is unclear how we could have a shared referent. 6.4 - The sensory template. Hail Mary solution:Type phenomenal concepts based on gross similarity of content, that can be determined by the shared object of reference, as well as the same causal mechanisms. Typing the content through shared causal mechanisms.Papineau (2006) assumes that the phenomenal concepts and the perceptual concepts are both mediated by purely straightforward causal processes and that the typing of phenomenal concepts can be done purely based on the perceptual object. 6.4 Cont.- But, it doesn’t work that way. - Jacob Feldman and Patrice D. Tremoulet (2006) “The individuation of visual objects over time.” How does featural change effect object individuation? Object individuation - the mental construction of individual phenomenal objects having continous existence over time. (In developmental psychology this is commonly referred to as identification.) Bouncing/Streaming paradigm - Luminance, size, shape. (∆F) - Results • Ramifications for Exemplar Theories of Phenomenal Concepts. • - Object individuation is not a purely straightforward causal process, but involves top-down cognitive processing. • The phenomenal concept cannot be typed using the sensory template, because the sensory state is far more detailed in its phenomenal character than the sensory template. • 7 – Nonconceptual Phenomenal Concept. • Content of phenomenal concept is determined by the initial sensory state, theory of object persistence, and demonstrative concept, which contains a non-conceptual token of the sensory state. • 7.1 - Phenomenal experiences are determined by nonconceptual sensory states. • - The difference between conceptual and nonconceptual mental states is a matter of the content’s format and not access. • - Nonconscious phenomenal mental states. • 7.2 – Demonstrative Theory of Nonconceptual Phenomenal Concept. • - Concept is of the nonconceptual sensory state. • - The activation of the sensory state is necessary condition for the acquisition of the phenomenal concept. • 7.3 Theory of object persistence through time. • Object constancy and persistence determined by theory to fully determine the complete context of the sensory state in the demonstrative concept. • - Leave this open as an empirical matter, but (Feldman 2003, 2007; Feldman & Tremoulet, 2006; Tremoulet & Feldman, 2006) is a good starting point. • 7.4-5 Give up publicity, but maintain stability. • If the nonconceptually structured sensory state determines the content of the phenomenal concept, then these cannot be typed conceptually. 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