Weapons of Mass Destruction: Strategy and Proliferation

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Strategy and Proliferation PO 325: International Politics

WMD • Three Kinds • Nuclear • Chemical • Biological • Small in Size, Moderate in Cost, Kill Numerous People Indiscriminately • Very Rarely Used in Interstate War, But They Have Been Used Before • Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 1945 (Nuclear) • WWI and Iran/Iraq War (Chemical) • Slim Possibility in Gulf War (Biological) • Their Importance Derives Not From Their Use, But From the THREAT of Their Use

Nuclear Weapons • First Developed by US (Manhattan Project, WWII) – Relatively Small Fission Nukes • USSR, UK, France, and China (and Probably Israel) had all Developed Fission Weapons by Mid-1960s

Nuclear Weapons • By that Time, the US and USSR Had Also Developed Fusion (Chain Reaction) Weapons (e.g., H-Bomb); Much Larger Yield • US and USSR Had Also Developed Delivery Systems to Strike the Other From their Homeland (ICBMs) and from International Bases and Submarines (SRBMs, Cruise Missiles)

Proliferation • Since mid-1960s, Other States Have Acquired Nukes (India, Pakistan), Some Have Developed Technology and Then Stopped Programs (South Africa, Argentina, Brazil), and Others Appear to Be in The Process of Trying (Iran, North Korea) • Each Must Also Develop Capable Delivery Systems

Proliferation • Why Do States Want to Acquire WMD and Systems to Deliver Them? • It Conceivably Makes a Set of Central State Interests (Sovereignty of Government, Territorial Integrity) Immune From Revision By Other States, Because the Punishment That Potential Revisionists Stand To Incur Are Raised Dramatically

Non-Proliferation • States That Favor the Status Quo or Otherwise Feel That Proliferation Will Harm the Collective Good Have Been Party to Agreements Attempting to Stop the Proliferation of WMD and The Purchase/Development of Delivery Systems By Potential Proliferators (NPT, MTCR)

Non-Proliferation • As Expected, Many States Who Derive Utility From Having Nukes Are Often Not Party to These Regimes (e.g., North Korea), But Some Have Yielded to International Opinion And Signed • Which States Have An Interest In Proliferating? Which Have an Interest In Strict Non-Proliferation?

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • Enough Nuclear Weapons Are Built Between Superpowers So That Neither Side Can Prevent The Other From Utterly Destroying It • Necessitates Second-Strike Capability (Withstand Attack and Still Destroy Enemy); Thus, Does Not Apply to Most New Proliferators

Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) • This Means That Engaging in Conflict that Involves the Credible Threat of Nuclear Usage By Both Can Be Suicidal • BUT, There Are Gains to Be Had From Engaging In Brinkmanship (Extract Concessions and Make Others Lose Face By Relying on Their Forbearance) • There Can Therefore Be a “Slippery Slope” to Annihilation (Chicken)

The Basic “Chicken” Game PLAYER 2 PLAYER 1

Nuclear Brinkmanship as a Game of “Chicken” – Rules for our Game • Two teams (“countries”); selected by nature – both possess second-strike capability • Assume existence of some basic, serious conflict of interest • Two iterations of the game • One team assigned a leader from their rank for the duration; the other team allowed to elect their leader and hold another election after the first iteration (all points tied to leaders’ decisions) • First iteration with no communication; next with communication • Game score is cumulative, BUT – If general nuclear war occurs: • The game ends • Previous scores do not matter; all receive -10

Nuclear Brinkmanship as a Game of “Chicken” PLAYER 2 PLAYER 1

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Strategy and Proliferation